TUTORONE MCAT Diagnostic Test - Critical Analysis and Reasoning Skills

2. Which of the following statements best expresses the passage author’s personal belief system? A true philosopher should:

4. Which of the following scenarios would the author say is LEAST similar to engaging in “immanent practice” as discussed in paragraph 1? An individual who:

13. What is the best summary of the way that the author characterizes the various theories of associations?

18. If a drug company could take all of the positive effects of exercise and put them into a pill, they’d be the most successful company in history. It is, in fact, nearly impossible to overstate the positive effects that regular exercise has on nearly every facet of the body’s physiological and the mind’s psychological state. Exercise has been demonstrated to not just slow the progression of, but to reverse, many of the symptoms of type 2 diabetes, heart disease, high cholesterol, and hypertension. It can delay the onset of dementia, reduce symptoms of anxiety and depression disorders, and aid in smoking cessation programs.

And yet when patients meet with their physicians, the overwhelming majority of primary care doctors fail to discuss the importance of exercise with patients. To the extent that the topic is discussed at all, the doctor will make, at best, passing remarks about the importance of an exercise program. Even more perversely, there is a strong correlation between lower economic class and decreased likelihood of physician-recommended exercise programs, despite the even stronger correlation between lower economic class and many of the diseases that exercise would most directly benefit (most notably obesity and type 2 diabetes). That is to say, those patients who most need regular exercise are the ones least likely to have a doctor that strongly recommends such a program.

Why this connection exists is still somewhat unclear, although research is slowly shedding light on the topic. Fundamentally, public health scientists examine two different facets of the correlation: patient-sided factors and healthcare provider-sided factors. Thus, working and lower-class patients may not have access to the kind of doctors that will recommend exercise, or doctors may change how they treat patients based on perceived economic class.

To date, research seems to suggest both of these factors work in concert. In a groundbreaking study at the University of Arizona College of Medicine, experimenters created audio recordings of over 5,000 patient-physician interactions for patients that were classified as obese. The patient population was categorized into three broad categories of economic class based on income. Researchers found that physicians were 22% more likely to discuss exercise regimens with the high-class patient group than the lowest, and that when exercise was discussed, doctors spent a staggering 420% more time in conversation about exercise with the high-economic class group than either the middle or low-class group. Despite these stark findings, the researchers’ failure to control for factors of ethnicity and gender have created large enough concerns about methodological validity to lead some critics to dismiss the study entirely.

More promising are results obtained from examining the patient-sided factors, including frequency of patient-initiated discussions about exercise programs and patient access to high quality primary care. Here, surveys of both patients and healthcare workers have demonstrated a strong correlation between a patient’s economic class and their likelihood of initiating a conversation about exercise with their healthcare provider. This correlation seems to exist regardless of the health status of the patient, and any similarities between the patient and provider in terms of demographic categories. The findings suggest, perhaps, that patients from higher-economic classes are simply more comfortable initiating conversations with their healthcare professionals.

A final irony was revealed in the most recent major study published on the topic, which found no correlation between a patient’s ability to start and stick with an exercise regimen and how frequently such programs were discussed with healthcare professionals.

20. For which of the following statements does the passage provide the LEAST explanation or support?

If a drug company could take all of the positive effects of exercise and put them into a pill, they’d be the most successful company in history. It is, in fact, nearly impossible to overstate the positive effects that regular exercise has on nearly every facet of the body’s physiological and the mind’s psychological state. Exercise has been demonstrated to not just slow the progression of, but to reverse, many of the symptoms of type 2 diabetes, heart disease, high cholesterol, and hypertension. It can delay the onset of dementia, reduce symptoms of anxiety and depression disorders, and aid in smoking cessation programs.

And yet when patients meet with their physicians, the overwhelming majority of primary care doctors fail to discuss the importance of exercise with patients. To the extent that the topic is discussed at all, the doctor will make, at best, passing remarks about the importance of an exercise program. Even more perversely, there is a strong correlation between lower economic class and decreased likelihood of physician-recommended exercise programs, despite the even stronger correlation between lower economic class and many of the diseases that exercise would most directly benefit (most notably obesity and type 2 diabetes). That is to say, those patients who most need regular exercise are the ones least likely to have a doctor that strongly recommends such a program.

Why this connection exists is still somewhat unclear, although research is slowly shedding light on the topic. Fundamentally, public health scientists examine two different facets of the correlation: patient-sided factors and healthcare provider-sided factors. Thus, working and lower-class patients may not have access to the kind of doctors that will recommend exercise, or doctors may change how they treat patients based on perceived economic class.

To date, research seems to suggest both of these factors work in concert. In a groundbreaking study at the University of Arizona College of Medicine, experimenters created audio recordings of over 5,000 patient-physician interactions for patients that were classified as obese. The patient population was categorized into three broad categories of economic class based on income. Researchers found that physicians were 22% more likely to discuss exercise regimens with the high-class patient group than the lowest, and that when exercise was discussed, doctors spent a staggering 420% more time in conversation about exercise with the high-economic class group than either the middle or low-class group. Despite these stark findings, the researchers’ failure to control for factors of ethnicity and gender have created large enough concerns about methodological validity to lead some critics to dismiss the study entirely.

More promising are results obtained from examining the patient-sided factors, including frequency of patient-initiated discussions about exercise programs and patient access to high quality primary care. Here, surveys of both patients and healthcare workers have demonstrated a strong correlation between a patient’s economic class and their likelihood of initiating a conversation about exercise with their healthcare provider. This correlation seems to exist regardless of the health status of the patient, and any similarities between the patient and provider in terms of demographic categories. The findings suggest, perhaps, that patients from higher-economic classes are simply more comfortable initiating conversations with their healthcare professionals.

A final irony was revealed in the most recent major study published on the topic, which found no correlation between a patient’s ability to start and stick with an exercise regimen and how frequently such programs were discussed with healthcare professionals.

21. Which of the following could serve as an appropriate title for the passage?

I. Physician-Recommended Exercise Plans: Disparities in Action

II. The Benefits of Exercise in Addiction Recovery

III. Doctors and Patients Both Fail to Adequately Address Exercise

If a drug company could take all of the positive effects of exercise and put them into a pill, they’d be the most successful company in history. It is, in fact, nearly impossible to overstate the positive effects that regular exercise has on nearly every facet of the body’s physiological and the mind’s psychological state. Exercise has been demonstrated to not just slow the progression of, but to reverse, many of the symptoms of type 2 diabetes, heart disease, high cholesterol, and hypertension. It can delay the onset of dementia, reduce symptoms of anxiety and depression disorders, and aid in smoking cessation programs.

And yet when patients meet with their physicians, the overwhelming majority of primary care doctors fail to discuss the importance of exercise with patients. To the extent that the topic is discussed at all, the doctor will make, at best, passing remarks about the importance of an exercise program. Even more perversely, there is a strong correlation between lower economic class and decreased likelihood of physician-recommended exercise programs, despite the even stronger correlation between lower economic class and many of the diseases that exercise would most directly benefit (most notably obesity and type 2 diabetes). That is to say, those patients who most need regular exercise are the ones least likely to have a doctor that strongly recommends such a program.

Why this connection exists is still somewhat unclear, although research is slowly shedding light on the topic. Fundamentally, public health scientists examine two different facets of the correlation: patient-sided factors and healthcare provider-sided factors. Thus, working and lower-class patients may not have access to the kind of doctors that will recommend exercise, or doctors may change how they treat patients based on perceived economic class.

To date, research seems to suggest both of these factors work in concert. In a groundbreaking study at the University of Arizona College of Medicine, experimenters created audio recordings of over 5,000 patient-physician interactions for patients that were classified as obese. The patient population was categorized into three broad categories of economic class based on income. Researchers found that physicians were 22% more likely to discuss exercise regimens with the high-class patient group than the lowest, and that when exercise was discussed, doctors spent a staggering 420% more time in conversation about exercise with the high-economic class group than either the middle or low-class group. Despite these stark findings, the researchers’ failure to control for factors of ethnicity and gender have created large enough concerns about methodological validity to lead some critics to dismiss the study entirely.

More promising are results obtained from examining the patient-sided factors, including frequency of patient-initiated discussions about exercise programs and patient access to high quality primary care. Here, surveys of both patients and healthcare workers have demonstrated a strong correlation between a patient’s economic class and their likelihood of initiating a conversation about exercise with their healthcare provider. This correlation seems to exist regardless of the health status of the patient, and any similarities between the patient and provider in terms of demographic categories. The findings suggest, perhaps, that patients from higher-economic classes are simply more comfortable initiating conversations with their healthcare professionals.

A final irony was revealed in the most recent major study published on the topic, which found no correlation between a patient’s ability to start and stick with an exercise regimen and how frequently such programs were discussed with healthcare professionals.

22. Mexicans have long attributed the origins of their political system to the Revolution of 1910-20. They cite the constitution of 1917 as the foundation of their modern political institutions and practices. Mexico's governing institutions and political culture also bear the imprint of three centuries of Spanish colonial rule. Mexicans' adherence to a highly codified civil law tradition, their acceptance of heavy state involvement in business and civic affairs, and the deference accorded the executive over other branches of government can be traced to the administrative and legal practices of the colonial period.

During the 1920s, President Elías Calles reorganized Mexican politics along corporatist lines to contain latent social conflicts. Calles expanded government bureaucracy to enable it to mediate among rival constituencies and to dispense state funds to organizations supportive of the "official" party. Calles also created umbrella organizations that lumped together disparate groups according to broad functional categories. Newly created interest groups depended heavily on the state for their financing and were required to maintain strong ties to the ruling party, the newly created Institutional Revolutionary Party (IRP).

Calles's successor, Lázaro Cárdenas, revived populism as a force within the IRP by redistributing land to landless peasants via state-sponsored communal farming known as the ejido system. Cárdenas emphasized nationalism as a political force by expropriating the holdings of foreign oil corporations. By 1942, the political processes and institutions that would define Mexican politics for the next forty years were established: a strong federal government dominated by a civilian president and his loyalists within the ruling party, a symbiotic relationship between the state and the official party, a regular rotation of power among rival factions within a de facto single-party system, and a highly structured corporatist relationship between the state and government-sponsored businesses.

During the 1980s, the pattern of Mexican politics instituted by Calles and Cárdenas began to break down. Public funding for a variety of programs dried up, which led to the state's role in the economy being scaled back, and the relationships developed over four decades between government agencies and legally recognized constituent groups were weakened. An internal rift emerged between the populists and the more technocratic wing of the ruling party over the market reforms and the authoritarian nature of the IRP-dominated political system. This internal rift developed into the first major mass defection from the IRP when a key minority group broke ranks and contested the 1988 presidential election as a coalition of populist parties.

Self-preservation can help explain this breach in partisanship. IRP members’ longstanding loyalty to the party means that in the absence of disrupting forces, they can be expected to vote for that party. However, when drastic changes occur in the political and financial landscape, members are responsive to a range of pressures that can weaken their loyalty. Obvious variations occur in such factors as the charisma of the candidates, the impact of economic and domestic policy issues, foreign policy, and especially local economic changes. These factors may well have caused members to dissociate from the IRP.

Since 1987, the IRP has managed to defeat most of the serious electoral challenges to its central role in Mexican politics. However, by 2002, most believed, correctly, that the IRP-dominated political system was in an advanced state of decay and that a move to greater pluralism in organized political activity was at hand. How this transition period would unfold, and whether it would result in a more participatory and competitive political process for Mexico, was yet to be determined. Traumatic experiences during the nineteenth century, including foreign military occupations, the loss of half of the national territory to the United States, as well as the disillusion sown by a series of unconstitutional regimes, continue to have a profound impact on contemporary political culture.

According to the passage, one problem that likely precipitated the 1980s crisis was:

23. Which of the following is NOT characterized as a contributing factor to present-day Mexican politics?

Mexicans have long attributed the origins of their political system to the Revolution of 1910-20. They cite the constitution of 1917 as the foundation of their modern political institutions and practices. Mexico's governing institutions and political culture also bear the imprint of three centuries of Spanish colonial rule. Mexicans' adherence to a highly codified civil law tradition, their acceptance of heavy state involvement in business and civic affairs, and the deference accorded the executive over other branches of government can be traced to the administrative and legal practices of the colonial period.

During the 1920s, President Elías Calles reorganized Mexican politics along corporatist lines to contain latent social conflicts. Calles expanded government bureaucracy to enable it to mediate among rival constituencies and to dispense state funds to organizations supportive of the "official" party. Calles also created umbrella organizations that lumped together disparate groups according to broad functional categories. Newly created interest groups depended heavily on the state for their financing and were required to maintain strong ties to the ruling party, the newly created Institutional Revolutionary Party (IRP).

Calles's successor, Lázaro Cárdenas, revived populism as a force within the IRP by redistributing land to landless peasants via state-sponsored communal farming known as the ejido system. Cárdenas emphasized nationalism as a political force by expropriating the holdings of foreign oil corporations. By 1942, the political processes and institutions that would define Mexican politics for the next forty years were established: a strong federal government dominated by a civilian president and his loyalists within the ruling party, a symbiotic relationship between the state and the official party, a regular rotation of power among rival factions within a de facto single-party system, and a highly structured corporatist relationship between the state and government-sponsored businesses.

During the 1980s, the pattern of Mexican politics instituted by Calles and Cárdenas began to break down. Public funding for a variety of programs dried up, which led to the state's role in the economy being scaled back, and the relationships developed over four decades between government agencies and legally recognized constituent groups were weakened. An internal rift emerged between the populists and the more technocratic wing of the ruling party over the market reforms and the authoritarian nature of the IRP-dominated political system. This internal rift developed into the first major mass defection from the IRP when a key minority group broke ranks and contested the 1988 presidential election as a coalition of populist parties.

Self-preservation can help explain this breach in partisanship. IRP members’ longstanding loyalty to the party means that in the absence of disrupting forces, they can be expected to vote for that party. However, when drastic changes occur in the political and financial landscape, members are responsive to a range of pressures that can weaken their loyalty. Obvious variations occur in such factors as the charisma of the candidates, the impact of economic and domestic policy issues, foreign policy, and especially local economic changes. These factors may well have caused members to dissociate from the IRP.

Since 1987, the IRP has managed to defeat most of the serious electoral challenges to its central role in Mexican politics. However, by 2002, most believed, correctly, that the IRP-dominated political system was in an advanced state of decay and that a move to greater pluralism in organized political activity was at hand. How this transition period would unfold, and whether it would result in a more participatory and competitive political process for Mexico, was yet to be determined. Traumatic experiences during the nineteenth century, including foreign military occupations, the loss of half of the national territory to the United States, as well as the disillusion sown by a series of unconstitutional regimes, continue to have a profound impact on contemporary political culture.

24. Which of the following incidents may have led to the rift between groups within the IRP?

Mexicans have long attributed the origins of their political system to the Revolution of 1910-20. They cite the constitution of 1917 as the foundation of their modern political institutions and practices. Mexico's governing institutions and political culture also bear the imprint of three centuries of Spanish colonial rule. Mexicans' adherence to a highly codified civil law tradition, their acceptance of heavy state involvement in business and civic affairs, and the deference accorded the executive over other branches of government can be traced to the administrative and legal practices of the colonial period.

During the 1920s, President Elías Calles reorganized Mexican politics along corporatist lines to contain latent social conflicts. Calles expanded government bureaucracy to enable it to mediate among rival constituencies and to dispense state funds to organizations supportive of the "official" party. Calles also created umbrella organizations that lumped together disparate groups according to broad functional categories. Newly created interest groups depended heavily on the state for their financing and were required to maintain strong ties to the ruling party, the newly created Institutional Revolutionary Party (IRP).

Calles's successor, Lázaro Cárdenas, revived populism as a force within the IRP by redistributing land to landless peasants via state-sponsored communal farming known as the ejido system. Cárdenas emphasized nationalism as a political force by expropriating the holdings of foreign oil corporations. By 1942, the political processes and institutions that would define Mexican politics for the next forty years were established: a strong federal government dominated by a civilian president and his loyalists within the ruling party, a symbiotic relationship between the state and the official party, a regular rotation of power among rival factions within a de facto single-party system, and a highly structured corporatist relationship between the state and government-sponsored businesses.

During the 1980s, the pattern of Mexican politics instituted by Calles and Cárdenas began to break down. Public funding for a variety of programs dried up, which led to the state's role in the economy being scaled back, and the relationships developed over four decades between government agencies and legally recognized constituent groups were weakened. An internal rift emerged between the populists and the more technocratic wing of the ruling party over the market reforms and the authoritarian nature of the IRP-dominated political system. This internal rift developed into the first major mass defection from the IRP when a key minority group broke ranks and contested the 1988 presidential election as a coalition of populist parties.

Self-preservation can help explain this breach in partisanship. IRP members’ longstanding loyalty to the party means that in the absence of disrupting forces, they can be expected to vote for that party. However, when drastic changes occur in the political and financial landscape, members are responsive to a range of pressures that can weaken their loyalty. Obvious variations occur in such factors as the charisma of the candidates, the impact of economic and domestic policy issues, foreign policy, and especially local economic changes. These factors may well have caused members to dissociate from the IRP.

Since 1987, the IRP has managed to defeat most of the serious electoral challenges to its central role in Mexican politics. However, by 2002, most believed, correctly, that the IRP-dominated political system was in an advanced state of decay and that a move to greater pluralism in organized political activity was at hand. How this transition period would unfold, and whether it would result in a more participatory and competitive political process for Mexico, was yet to be determined. Traumatic experiences during the nineteenth century, including foreign military occupations, the loss of half of the national territory to the United States, as well as the disillusion sown by a series of unconstitutional regimes, continue to have a profound impact on contemporary political culture.

25. In 2006, despite a substantial technocrat majority among the Mexican senate, leftist parties modestly increased their share of senate seats at the expense of the IRP. Given the information in the passage, this result was probably due to:

Mexicans have long attributed the origins of their political system to the Revolution of 1910-20. They cite the constitution of 1917 as the foundation of their modern political institutions and practices. Mexico's governing institutions and political culture also bear the imprint of three centuries of Spanish colonial rule. Mexicans' adherence to a highly codified civil law tradition, their acceptance of heavy state involvement in business and civic affairs, and the deference accorded the executive over other branches of government can be traced to the administrative and legal practices of the colonial period.

During the 1920s, President Elías Calles reorganized Mexican politics along corporatist lines to contain latent social conflicts. Calles expanded government bureaucracy to enable it to mediate among rival constituencies and to dispense state funds to organizations supportive of the "official" party. Calles also created umbrella organizations that lumped together disparate groups according to broad functional categories. Newly created interest groups depended heavily on the state for their financing and were required to maintain strong ties to the ruling party, the newly created Institutional Revolutionary Party (IRP).

Calles's successor, Lázaro Cárdenas, revived populism as a force within the IRP by redistributing land to landless peasants via state-sponsored communal farming known as the ejido system. Cárdenas emphasized nationalism as a political force by expropriating the holdings of foreign oil corporations. By 1942, the political processes and institutions that would define Mexican politics for the next forty years were established: a strong federal government dominated by a civilian president and his loyalists within the ruling party, a symbiotic relationship between the state and the official party, a regular rotation of power among rival factions within a de facto single-party system, and a highly structured corporatist relationship between the state and government-sponsored businesses.

During the 1980s, the pattern of Mexican politics instituted by Calles and Cárdenas began to break down. Public funding for a variety of programs dried up, which led to the state's role in the economy being scaled back, and the relationships developed over four decades between government agencies and legally recognized constituent groups were weakened. An internal rift emerged between the populists and the more technocratic wing of the ruling party over the market reforms and the authoritarian nature of the IRP-dominated political system. This internal rift developed into the first major mass defection from the IRP when a key minority group broke ranks and contested the 1988 presidential election as a coalition of populist parties.

Self-preservation can help explain this breach in partisanship. IRP members’ longstanding loyalty to the party means that in the absence of disrupting forces, they can be expected to vote for that party. However, when drastic changes occur in the political and financial landscape, members are responsive to a range of pressures that can weaken their loyalty. Obvious variations occur in such factors as the charisma of the candidates, the impact of economic and domestic policy issues, foreign policy, and especially local economic changes. These factors may well have caused members to dissociate from the IRP.

Since 1987, the IRP has managed to defeat most of the serious electoral challenges to its central role in Mexican politics. However, by 2002, most believed, correctly, that the IRP-dominated political system was in an advanced state of decay and that a move to greater pluralism in organized political activity was at hand. How this transition period would unfold, and whether it would result in a more participatory and competitive political process for Mexico, was yet to be determined. Traumatic experiences during the nineteenth century, including foreign military occupations, the loss of half of the national territory to the United States, as well as the disillusion sown by a series of unconstitutional regimes, continue to have a profound impact on contemporary political culture.

26. Which of the following words would the author MOST likely use to describe the establishment of the IRP as the “official” party?

Mexicans have long attributed the origins of their political system to the Revolution of 1910-20. They cite the constitution of 1917 as the foundation of their modern political institutions and practices. Mexico's governing institutions and political culture also bear the imprint of three centuries of Spanish colonial rule. Mexicans' adherence to a highly codified civil law tradition, their acceptance of heavy state involvement in business and civic affairs, and the deference accorded the executive over other branches of government can be traced to the administrative and legal practices of the colonial period.

During the 1920s, President Elías Calles reorganized Mexican politics along corporatist lines to contain latent social conflicts. Calles expanded government bureaucracy to enable it to mediate among rival constituencies and to dispense state funds to organizations supportive of the "official" party. Calles also created umbrella organizations that lumped together disparate groups according to broad functional categories. Newly created interest groups depended heavily on the state for their financing and were required to maintain strong ties to the ruling party, the newly created Institutional Revolutionary Party (IRP).

Calles's successor, Lázaro Cárdenas, revived populism as a force within the IRP by redistributing land to landless peasants via state-sponsored communal farming known as the ejido system. Cárdenas emphasized nationalism as a political force by expropriating the holdings of foreign oil corporations. By 1942, the political processes and institutions that would define Mexican politics for the next forty years were established: a strong federal government dominated by a civilian president and his loyalists within the ruling party, a symbiotic relationship between the state and the official party, a regular rotation of power among rival factions within a de facto single-party system, and a highly structured corporatist relationship between the state and government-sponsored businesses.

During the 1980s, the pattern of Mexican politics instituted by Calles and Cárdenas began to break down. Public funding for a variety of programs dried up, which led to the state's role in the economy being scaled back, and the relationships developed over four decades between government agencies and legally recognized constituent groups were weakened. An internal rift emerged between the populists and the more technocratic wing of the ruling party over the market reforms and the authoritarian nature of the IRP-dominated political system. This internal rift developed into the first major mass defection from the IRP when a key minority group broke ranks and contested the 1988 presidential election as a coalition of populist parties.

Self-preservation can help explain this breach in partisanship. IRP members’ longstanding loyalty to the party means that in the absence of disrupting forces, they can be expected to vote for that party. However, when drastic changes occur in the political and financial landscape, members are responsive to a range of pressures that can weaken their loyalty. Obvious variations occur in such factors as the charisma of the candidates, the impact of economic and domestic policy issues, foreign policy, and especially local economic changes. These factors may well have caused members to dissociate from the IRP.

Since 1987, the IRP has managed to defeat most of the serious electoral challenges to its central role in Mexican politics. However, by 2002, most believed, correctly, that the IRP-dominated political system was in an advanced state of decay and that a move to greater pluralism in organized political activity was at hand. How this transition period would unfold, and whether it would result in a more participatory and competitive political process for Mexico, was yet to be determined. Traumatic experiences during the nineteenth century, including foreign military occupations, the loss of half of the national territory to the United States, as well as the disillusion sown by a series of unconstitutional regimes, continue to have a profound impact on contemporary political culture.