LSAT Prep Test 82 - Reading Comprehension - Answers (No Explanations)

Forests are among the world’s most valuable resources, both in a narrowly economic sense and in a broader, ecological sense. Besides yielding over 5,000 commercial products that contribute some 2 percent to (5) the world’s total economic production, forests provide recreation, reduce flooding, and prevent soil erosion that clogs rivers with silt. However, if well-grounded policy decisions are to be made concerning which forests must be preserved and how much forest (10) must be preserved, policy makers should have a comprehensive understanding of the arguments for and against the use of forests for economic gain. Two claims often made—one about the oxygen-rencwing capacity of forests, the other about the role of forests (15) in preserving biodiversity—merit special scrutiny.

Some consider the tropical rain forests of the Brazilian Amazon region “the lungs of the earth,” claiming that the foliage absorbs so much carbon dioxide and produces so much oxygen that the (20) atmosphere would be depleted of the latter if these forests ceased to exist. But this belief is largely a myth. Trees do produce oxygen by photosynthesis, but when trees die, the decomposition process consumes as much oxygen as the trees produced. In (25) net terms, therefore, forests neither produce nor consume oxygen.

Another claim made is that the preservation of biodiversity, the globe’s profusion of plant and animal species, requires a stricter policy to conserve forest, (30) especially tropical rain forest. For one thing, many scientists believe that some tropical rain-forest plant species yet to be discovered may contain agents with unique disease-fighting properties. These plants can offer crucial clues, as well as basic materials, for (35) research on new medications. But even if one does not think this indicates that biodiversity is a significant resource, one could agree with the view, widely held by some, that there is a moral imperative to preserve species diversity—or, at least, that to do so would be (40) a noninstrumental, that is, an intrinsic, good.

Actually, careful review of official statistics suggests that tropical deforestation is not occurring as fast as has often been claimed. Some existing forests, however, do consist of commercial plantations, of (45) which some people are highly critical. Such plantations tend to contain significantly fewer plant and animal species than natural forest. However, since plantations are designed to produce large quantities of wood and wood pulp, they reduce the economic pressure on true (50) forests, increasing the latter’s capacity to support biodiversity. In addition, the size of such plantations is often overstated by environmental activists. While the World Wildlife Fund claims that plantations make up “large tracts of current forest area,” review of official (55) data shows that plantations make up just 3 percent of the world’s forest area.

Forests are among the world’s most valuable resources, both in a narrowly economic sense and in a broader, ecological sense. Besides yielding over 5,000 commercial products that contribute some 2 percent to (5) the world’s total economic production, forests provide recreation, reduce flooding, and prevent soil erosion that clogs rivers with silt. However, if well-grounded policy decisions are to be made concerning which forests must be preserved and how much forest (10) must be preserved, policy makers should have a comprehensive understanding of the arguments for and against the use of forests for economic gain. Two claims often made—one about the oxygen-rencwing capacity of forests, the other about the role of forests (15) in preserving biodiversity—merit special scrutiny.

Some consider the tropical rain forests of the Brazilian Amazon region “the lungs of the earth,” claiming that the foliage absorbs so much carbon dioxide and produces so much oxygen that the (20) atmosphere would be depleted of the latter if these forests ceased to exist. But this belief is largely a myth. Trees do produce oxygen by photosynthesis, but when trees die, the decomposition process consumes as much oxygen as the trees produced. In (25) net terms, therefore, forests neither produce nor consume oxygen.

Another claim made is that the preservation of biodiversity, the globe’s profusion of plant and animal species, requires a stricter policy to conserve forest, (30) especially tropical rain forest. For one thing, many scientists believe that some tropical rain-forest plant species yet to be discovered may contain agents with unique disease-fighting properties. These plants can offer crucial clues, as well as basic materials, for (35) research on new medications. But even if one does not think this indicates that biodiversity is a significant resource, one could agree with the view, widely held by some, that there is a moral imperative to preserve species diversity—or, at least, that to do so would be (40) a noninstrumental, that is, an intrinsic, good.

Actually, careful review of official statistics suggests that tropical deforestation is not occurring as fast as has often been claimed. Some existing forests, however, do consist of commercial plantations, of (45) which some people are highly critical. Such plantations tend to contain significantly fewer plant and animal species than natural forest. However, since plantations are designed to produce large quantities of wood and wood pulp, they reduce the economic pressure on true (50) forests, increasing the latter’s capacity to support biodiversity. In addition, the size of such plantations is often overstated by environmental activists. While the World Wildlife Fund claims that plantations make up “large tracts of current forest area,” review of official (55) data shows that plantations make up just 3 percent of the world’s forest area.

Forests are among the world’s most valuable resources, both in a narrowly economic sense and in a broader, ecological sense. Besides yielding over 5,000 commercial products that contribute some 2 percent to (5) the world’s total economic production, forests provide recreation, reduce flooding, and prevent soil erosion that clogs rivers with silt. However, if well-grounded policy decisions are to be made concerning which forests must be preserved and how much forest (10) must be preserved, policy makers should have a comprehensive understanding of the arguments for and against the use of forests for economic gain. Two claims often made—one about the oxygen-rencwing capacity of forests, the other about the role of forests (15) in preserving biodiversity—merit special scrutiny.

Some consider the tropical rain forests of the Brazilian Amazon region “the lungs of the earth,” claiming that the foliage absorbs so much carbon dioxide and produces so much oxygen that the (20) atmosphere would be depleted of the latter if these forests ceased to exist. But this belief is largely a myth. Trees do produce oxygen by photosynthesis, but when trees die, the decomposition process consumes as much oxygen as the trees produced. In (25) net terms, therefore, forests neither produce nor consume oxygen.

Another claim made is that the preservation of biodiversity, the globe’s profusion of plant and animal species, requires a stricter policy to conserve forest, (30) especially tropical rain forest. For one thing, many scientists believe that some tropical rain-forest plant species yet to be discovered may contain agents with unique disease-fighting properties. These plants can offer crucial clues, as well as basic materials, for (35) research on new medications. But even if one does not think this indicates that biodiversity is a significant resource, one could agree with the view, widely held by some, that there is a moral imperative to preserve species diversity—or, at least, that to do so would be (40) a noninstrumental, that is, an intrinsic, good.

Actually, careful review of official statistics suggests that tropical deforestation is not occurring as fast as has often been claimed. Some existing forests, however, do consist of commercial plantations, of (45) which some people are highly critical. Such plantations tend to contain significantly fewer plant and animal species than natural forest. However, since plantations are designed to produce large quantities of wood and wood pulp, they reduce the economic pressure on true (50) forests, increasing the latter’s capacity to support biodiversity. In addition, the size of such plantations is often overstated by environmental activists. While the World Wildlife Fund claims that plantations make up “large tracts of current forest area,” review of official (55) data shows that plantations make up just 3 percent of the world’s forest area.

Forests are among the world’s most valuable resources, both in a narrowly economic sense and in a broader, ecological sense. Besides yielding over 5,000 commercial products that contribute some 2 percent to (5) the world’s total economic production, forests provide recreation, reduce flooding, and prevent soil erosion that clogs rivers with silt. However, if well-grounded policy decisions are to be made concerning which forests must be preserved and how much forest (10) must be preserved, policy makers should have a comprehensive understanding of the arguments for and against the use of forests for economic gain. Two claims often made—one about the oxygen-rencwing capacity of forests, the other about the role of forests (15) in preserving biodiversity—merit special scrutiny.

Some consider the tropical rain forests of the Brazilian Amazon region “the lungs of the earth,” claiming that the foliage absorbs so much carbon dioxide and produces so much oxygen that the (20) atmosphere would be depleted of the latter if these forests ceased to exist. But this belief is largely a myth. Trees do produce oxygen by photosynthesis, but when trees die, the decomposition process consumes as much oxygen as the trees produced. In (25) net terms, therefore, forests neither produce nor consume oxygen.

Another claim made is that the preservation of biodiversity, the globe’s profusion of plant and animal species, requires a stricter policy to conserve forest, (30) especially tropical rain forest. For one thing, many scientists believe that some tropical rain-forest plant species yet to be discovered may contain agents with unique disease-fighting properties. These plants can offer crucial clues, as well as basic materials, for (35) research on new medications. But even if one does not think this indicates that biodiversity is a significant resource, one could agree with the view, widely held by some, that there is a moral imperative to preserve species diversity—or, at least, that to do so would be (40) a noninstrumental, that is, an intrinsic, good.

Actually, careful review of official statistics suggests that tropical deforestation is not occurring as fast as has often been claimed. Some existing forests, however, do consist of commercial plantations, of (45) which some people are highly critical. Such plantations tend to contain significantly fewer plant and animal species than natural forest. However, since plantations are designed to produce large quantities of wood and wood pulp, they reduce the economic pressure on true (50) forests, increasing the latter’s capacity to support biodiversity. In addition, the size of such plantations is often overstated by environmental activists. While the World Wildlife Fund claims that plantations make up “large tracts of current forest area,” review of official (55) data shows that plantations make up just 3 percent of the world’s forest area.

Forests are among the world’s most valuable resources, both in a narrowly economic sense and in a broader, ecological sense. Besides yielding over 5,000 commercial products that contribute some 2 percent to (5) the world’s total economic production, forests provide recreation, reduce flooding, and prevent soil erosion that clogs rivers with silt. However, if well-grounded policy decisions are to be made concerning which forests must be preserved and how much forest (10) must be preserved, policy makers should have a comprehensive understanding of the arguments for and against the use of forests for economic gain. Two claims often made—one about the oxygen-rencwing capacity of forests, the other about the role of forests (15) in preserving biodiversity—merit special scrutiny.

Some consider the tropical rain forests of the Brazilian Amazon region “the lungs of the earth,” claiming that the foliage absorbs so much carbon dioxide and produces so much oxygen that the (20) atmosphere would be depleted of the latter if these forests ceased to exist. But this belief is largely a myth. Trees do produce oxygen by photosynthesis, but when trees die, the decomposition process consumes as much oxygen as the trees produced. In (25) net terms, therefore, forests neither produce nor consume oxygen.

Another claim made is that the preservation of biodiversity, the globe’s profusion of plant and animal species, requires a stricter policy to conserve forest, (30) especially tropical rain forest. For one thing, many scientists believe that some tropical rain-forest plant species yet to be discovered may contain agents with unique disease-fighting properties. These plants can offer crucial clues, as well as basic materials, for (35) research on new medications. But even if one does not think this indicates that biodiversity is a significant resource, one could agree with the view, widely held by some, that there is a moral imperative to preserve species diversity—or, at least, that to do so would be (40) a noninstrumental, that is, an intrinsic, good.

Actually, careful review of official statistics suggests that tropical deforestation is not occurring as fast as has often been claimed. Some existing forests, however, do consist of commercial plantations, of (45) which some people are highly critical. Such plantations tend to contain significantly fewer plant and animal species than natural forest. However, since plantations are designed to produce large quantities of wood and wood pulp, they reduce the economic pressure on true (50) forests, increasing the latter’s capacity to support biodiversity. In addition, the size of such plantations is often overstated by environmental activists. While the World Wildlife Fund claims that plantations make up “large tracts of current forest area,” review of official (55) data shows that plantations make up just 3 percent of the world’s forest area.

Forests are among the world’s most valuable resources, both in a narrowly economic sense and in a broader, ecological sense. Besides yielding over 5,000 commercial products that contribute some 2 percent to (5) the world’s total economic production, forests provide recreation, reduce flooding, and prevent soil erosion that clogs rivers with silt. However, if well-grounded policy decisions are to be made concerning which forests must be preserved and how much forest (10) must be preserved, policy makers should have a comprehensive understanding of the arguments for and against the use of forests for economic gain. Two claims often made—one about the oxygen-rencwing capacity of forests, the other about the role of forests (15) in preserving biodiversity—merit special scrutiny.

Some consider the tropical rain forests of the Brazilian Amazon region “the lungs of the earth,” claiming that the foliage absorbs so much carbon dioxide and produces so much oxygen that the (20) atmosphere would be depleted of the latter if these forests ceased to exist. But this belief is largely a myth. Trees do produce oxygen by photosynthesis, but when trees die, the decomposition process consumes as much oxygen as the trees produced. In (25) net terms, therefore, forests neither produce nor consume oxygen.

Another claim made is that the preservation of biodiversity, the globe’s profusion of plant and animal species, requires a stricter policy to conserve forest, (30) especially tropical rain forest. For one thing, many scientists believe that some tropical rain-forest plant species yet to be discovered may contain agents with unique disease-fighting properties. These plants can offer crucial clues, as well as basic materials, for (35) research on new medications. But even if one does not think this indicates that biodiversity is a significant resource, one could agree with the view, widely held by some, that there is a moral imperative to preserve species diversity—or, at least, that to do so would be (40) a noninstrumental, that is, an intrinsic, good.

Actually, careful review of official statistics suggests that tropical deforestation is not occurring as fast as has often been claimed. Some existing forests, however, do consist of commercial plantations, of (45) which some people are highly critical. Such plantations tend to contain significantly fewer plant and animal species than natural forest. However, since plantations are designed to produce large quantities of wood and wood pulp, they reduce the economic pressure on true (50) forests, increasing the latter’s capacity to support biodiversity. In addition, the size of such plantations is often overstated by environmental activists. While the World Wildlife Fund claims that plantations make up “large tracts of current forest area,” review of official (55) data shows that plantations make up just 3 percent of the world’s forest area.

Forests are among the world’s most valuable resources, both in a narrowly economic sense and in a broader, ecological sense. Besides yielding over 5,000 commercial products that contribute some 2 percent to (5) the world’s total economic production, forests provide recreation, reduce flooding, and prevent soil erosion that clogs rivers with silt. However, if well-grounded policy decisions are to be made concerning which forests must be preserved and how much forest (10) must be preserved, policy makers should have a comprehensive understanding of the arguments for and against the use of forests for economic gain. Two claims often made—one about the oxygen-rencwing capacity of forests, the other about the role of forests (15) in preserving biodiversity—merit special scrutiny.

Some consider the tropical rain forests of the Brazilian Amazon region “the lungs of the earth,” claiming that the foliage absorbs so much carbon dioxide and produces so much oxygen that the (20) atmosphere would be depleted of the latter if these forests ceased to exist. But this belief is largely a myth. Trees do produce oxygen by photosynthesis, but when trees die, the decomposition process consumes as much oxygen as the trees produced. In (25) net terms, therefore, forests neither produce nor consume oxygen.

Another claim made is that the preservation of biodiversity, the globe’s profusion of plant and animal species, requires a stricter policy to conserve forest, (30) especially tropical rain forest. For one thing, many scientists believe that some tropical rain-forest plant species yet to be discovered may contain agents with unique disease-fighting properties. These plants can offer crucial clues, as well as basic materials, for (35) research on new medications. But even if one does not think this indicates that biodiversity is a significant resource, one could agree with the view, widely held by some, that there is a moral imperative to preserve species diversity—or, at least, that to do so would be (40) a noninstrumental, that is, an intrinsic, good.

Actually, careful review of official statistics suggests that tropical deforestation is not occurring as fast as has often been claimed. Some existing forests, however, do consist of commercial plantations, of (45) which some people are highly critical. Such plantations tend to contain significantly fewer plant and animal species than natural forest. However, since plantations are designed to produce large quantities of wood and wood pulp, they reduce the economic pressure on true (50) forests, increasing the latter’s capacity to support biodiversity. In addition, the size of such plantations is often overstated by environmental activists. While the World Wildlife Fund claims that plantations make up “large tracts of current forest area,” review of official (55) data shows that plantations make up just 3 percent of the world’s forest area.

Of the 300 indigenous languages spoken when European explorers reached what is now the United States, fewer than 150 survive today. Of these, one third are near extinction, with fewer than (5) 100 surviving speakers. The decline of many of these languages is due in large part to misguided U.S. government policies: between the 1930s and the 1960s, the U.S. mandated the teaching of English to all Native Americans, an effort that in practice (10) discouraged the transmission of native languages.

Yet despite the residual effects of this effort, there has recently been a resurgence in native language study and preservation efforts. More universities are offering language curricula developed by Native American (15) scholars, and fluent speakers of native languages are being recorded on film and tape. At the same time, many indigenous communities are establishing radio stations that broadcast in native languages. Because of the strong oral traditions of indigenous (20) cultures, radio is a particularly effective tool for preserving native languages. It provides a natural and widely accessible means for the diffusion of native languages. In fact, some communities have consciously founded native language radio stations as a means of (25) simultaneously promoting their languages and keeping community members apprised of important issues. These radio stations have also helped solidify communities, as older people have taken an interest in rekindling the use of their languages and in helping (30) younger generations understand idiomatic usage.

However, the growth of Internet use in many native communities could counter the influence of radio. In order to use this international computer network, many community members often find that (35) they must devote considerable energy to mastering a standard language—generally English. Communities with radio stations have at their disposal a means to combat this trend, but the mere presentation of native language programming is not enough. For radio (40) programming to be effective in countering the potentially deleterious linguistic effects of the Internet, it should resonate with the living oral traditions of indigenous communities.

One analyst noted recently that in native (45) communities where English is a second language— i.e., spoken less frequently than a native language— there is an abundance of such programming, but where English is the primary language, what native language programming there is often takes the form of lessons, (50) which can be unengaging and distant from the cultural contexts that give necessary and subtle meaning to the words. By contrast, effective programming should include things like recordings of elders speaking the native language, word games that mix English and (55) native languages, and speeches by fluent speakers. There is evidence that this along with lessons printed in the local newspaper has had success at revitalizing native languages in some communities. Similarly, integrating traditional songs into the presentation (60) of a native language makes it easier for novice speakers to grasp the language by familiarizing them with its rhythms.

Of the 300 indigenous languages spoken when European explorers reached what is now the United States, fewer than 150 survive today. Of these, one third are near extinction, with fewer than (5) 100 surviving speakers. The decline of many of these languages is due in large part to misguided U.S. government policies: between the 1930s and the 1960s, the U.S. mandated the teaching of English to all Native Americans, an effort that in practice (10) discouraged the transmission of native languages.

Yet despite the residual effects of this effort, there has recently been a resurgence in native language study and preservation efforts. More universities are offering language curricula developed by Native American (15) scholars, and fluent speakers of native languages are being recorded on film and tape. At the same time, many indigenous communities are establishing radio stations that broadcast in native languages. Because of the strong oral traditions of indigenous (20) cultures, radio is a particularly effective tool for preserving native languages. It provides a natural and widely accessible means for the diffusion of native languages. In fact, some communities have consciously founded native language radio stations as a means of (25) simultaneously promoting their languages and keeping community members apprised of important issues. These radio stations have also helped solidify communities, as older people have taken an interest in rekindling the use of their languages and in helping (30) younger generations understand idiomatic usage.

However, the growth of Internet use in many native communities could counter the influence of radio. In order to use this international computer network, many community members often find that (35) they must devote considerable energy to mastering a standard language—generally English. Communities with radio stations have at their disposal a means to combat this trend, but the mere presentation of native language programming is not enough. For radio (40) programming to be effective in countering the potentially deleterious linguistic effects of the Internet, it should resonate with the living oral traditions of indigenous communities.

One analyst noted recently that in native (45) communities where English is a second language— i.e., spoken less frequently than a native language— there is an abundance of such programming, but where English is the primary language, what native language programming there is often takes the form of lessons, (50) which can be unengaging and distant from the cultural contexts that give necessary and subtle meaning to the words. By contrast, effective programming should include things like recordings of elders speaking the native language, word games that mix English and (55) native languages, and speeches by fluent speakers. There is evidence that this along with lessons printed in the local newspaper has had success at revitalizing native languages in some communities. Similarly, integrating traditional songs into the presentation (60) of a native language makes it easier for novice speakers to grasp the language by familiarizing them with its rhythms.

Of the 300 indigenous languages spoken when European explorers reached what is now the United States, fewer than 150 survive today. Of these, one third are near extinction, with fewer than (5) 100 surviving speakers. The decline of many of these languages is due in large part to misguided U.S. government policies: between the 1930s and the 1960s, the U.S. mandated the teaching of English to all Native Americans, an effort that in practice (10) discouraged the transmission of native languages.

Yet despite the residual effects of this effort, there has recently been a resurgence in native language study and preservation efforts. More universities are offering language curricula developed by Native American (15) scholars, and fluent speakers of native languages are being recorded on film and tape. At the same time, many indigenous communities are establishing radio stations that broadcast in native languages. Because of the strong oral traditions of indigenous (20) cultures, radio is a particularly effective tool for preserving native languages. It provides a natural and widely accessible means for the diffusion of native languages. In fact, some communities have consciously founded native language radio stations as a means of (25) simultaneously promoting their languages and keeping community members apprised of important issues. These radio stations have also helped solidify communities, as older people have taken an interest in rekindling the use of their languages and in helping (30) younger generations understand idiomatic usage.

However, the growth of Internet use in many native communities could counter the influence of radio. In order to use this international computer network, many community members often find that (35) they must devote considerable energy to mastering a standard language—generally English. Communities with radio stations have at their disposal a means to combat this trend, but the mere presentation of native language programming is not enough. For radio (40) programming to be effective in countering the potentially deleterious linguistic effects of the Internet, it should resonate with the living oral traditions of indigenous communities.

One analyst noted recently that in native (45) communities where English is a second language— i.e., spoken less frequently than a native language— there is an abundance of such programming, but where English is the primary language, what native language programming there is often takes the form of lessons, (50) which can be unengaging and distant from the cultural contexts that give necessary and subtle meaning to the words. By contrast, effective programming should include things like recordings of elders speaking the native language, word games that mix English and (55) native languages, and speeches by fluent speakers. There is evidence that this along with lessons printed in the local newspaper has had success at revitalizing native languages in some communities. Similarly, integrating traditional songs into the presentation (60) of a native language makes it easier for novice speakers to grasp the language by familiarizing them with its rhythms.

Of the 300 indigenous languages spoken when European explorers reached what is now the United States, fewer than 150 survive today. Of these, one third are near extinction, with fewer than (5) 100 surviving speakers. The decline of many of these languages is due in large part to misguided U.S. government policies: between the 1930s and the 1960s, the U.S. mandated the teaching of English to all Native Americans, an effort that in practice (10) discouraged the transmission of native languages.

Yet despite the residual effects of this effort, there has recently been a resurgence in native language study and preservation efforts. More universities are offering language curricula developed by Native American (15) scholars, and fluent speakers of native languages are being recorded on film and tape. At the same time, many indigenous communities are establishing radio stations that broadcast in native languages. Because of the strong oral traditions of indigenous (20) cultures, radio is a particularly effective tool for preserving native languages. It provides a natural and widely accessible means for the diffusion of native languages. In fact, some communities have consciously founded native language radio stations as a means of (25) simultaneously promoting their languages and keeping community members apprised of important issues. These radio stations have also helped solidify communities, as older people have taken an interest in rekindling the use of their languages and in helping (30) younger generations understand idiomatic usage.

However, the growth of Internet use in many native communities could counter the influence of radio. In order to use this international computer network, many community members often find that (35) they must devote considerable energy to mastering a standard language—generally English. Communities with radio stations have at their disposal a means to combat this trend, but the mere presentation of native language programming is not enough. For radio (40) programming to be effective in countering the potentially deleterious linguistic effects of the Internet, it should resonate with the living oral traditions of indigenous communities.

One analyst noted recently that in native (45) communities where English is a second language— i.e., spoken less frequently than a native language— there is an abundance of such programming, but where English is the primary language, what native language programming there is often takes the form of lessons, (50) which can be unengaging and distant from the cultural contexts that give necessary and subtle meaning to the words. By contrast, effective programming should include things like recordings of elders speaking the native language, word games that mix English and (55) native languages, and speeches by fluent speakers. There is evidence that this along with lessons printed in the local newspaper has had success at revitalizing native languages in some communities. Similarly, integrating traditional songs into the presentation (60) of a native language makes it easier for novice speakers to grasp the language by familiarizing them with its rhythms.

Of the 300 indigenous languages spoken when European explorers reached what is now the United States, fewer than 150 survive today. Of these, one third are near extinction, with fewer than (5) 100 surviving speakers. The decline of many of these languages is due in large part to misguided U.S. government policies: between the 1930s and the 1960s, the U.S. mandated the teaching of English to all Native Americans, an effort that in practice (10) discouraged the transmission of native languages.

Yet despite the residual effects of this effort, there has recently been a resurgence in native language study and preservation efforts. More universities are offering language curricula developed by Native American (15) scholars, and fluent speakers of native languages are being recorded on film and tape. At the same time, many indigenous communities are establishing radio stations that broadcast in native languages. Because of the strong oral traditions of indigenous (20) cultures, radio is a particularly effective tool for preserving native languages. It provides a natural and widely accessible means for the diffusion of native languages. In fact, some communities have consciously founded native language radio stations as a means of (25) simultaneously promoting their languages and keeping community members apprised of important issues. These radio stations have also helped solidify communities, as older people have taken an interest in rekindling the use of their languages and in helping (30) younger generations understand idiomatic usage.

However, the growth of Internet use in many native communities could counter the influence of radio. In order to use this international computer network, many community members often find that (35) they must devote considerable energy to mastering a standard language—generally English. Communities with radio stations have at their disposal a means to combat this trend, but the mere presentation of native language programming is not enough. For radio (40) programming to be effective in countering the potentially deleterious linguistic effects of the Internet, it should resonate with the living oral traditions of indigenous communities.

One analyst noted recently that in native (45) communities where English is a second language— i.e., spoken less frequently than a native language— there is an abundance of such programming, but where English is the primary language, what native language programming there is often takes the form of lessons, (50) which can be unengaging and distant from the cultural contexts that give necessary and subtle meaning to the words. By contrast, effective programming should include things like recordings of elders speaking the native language, word games that mix English and (55) native languages, and speeches by fluent speakers. There is evidence that this along with lessons printed in the local newspaper has had success at revitalizing native languages in some communities. Similarly, integrating traditional songs into the presentation (60) of a native language makes it easier for novice speakers to grasp the language by familiarizing them with its rhythms.

Of the 300 indigenous languages spoken when European explorers reached what is now the United States, fewer than 150 survive today. Of these, one third are near extinction, with fewer than (5) 100 surviving speakers. The decline of many of these languages is due in large part to misguided U.S. government policies: between the 1930s and the 1960s, the U.S. mandated the teaching of English to all Native Americans, an effort that in practice (10) discouraged the transmission of native languages.

Yet despite the residual effects of this effort, there has recently been a resurgence in native language study and preservation efforts. More universities are offering language curricula developed by Native American (15) scholars, and fluent speakers of native languages are being recorded on film and tape. At the same time, many indigenous communities are establishing radio stations that broadcast in native languages. Because of the strong oral traditions of indigenous (20) cultures, radio is a particularly effective tool for preserving native languages. It provides a natural and widely accessible means for the diffusion of native languages. In fact, some communities have consciously founded native language radio stations as a means of (25) simultaneously promoting their languages and keeping community members apprised of important issues. These radio stations have also helped solidify communities, as older people have taken an interest in rekindling the use of their languages and in helping (30) younger generations understand idiomatic usage.

However, the growth of Internet use in many native communities could counter the influence of radio. In order to use this international computer network, many community members often find that (35) they must devote considerable energy to mastering a standard language—generally English. Communities with radio stations have at their disposal a means to combat this trend, but the mere presentation of native language programming is not enough. For radio (40) programming to be effective in countering the potentially deleterious linguistic effects of the Internet, it should resonate with the living oral traditions of indigenous communities.

One analyst noted recently that in native (45) communities where English is a second language— i.e., spoken less frequently than a native language— there is an abundance of such programming, but where English is the primary language, what native language programming there is often takes the form of lessons, (50) which can be unengaging and distant from the cultural contexts that give necessary and subtle meaning to the words. By contrast, effective programming should include things like recordings of elders speaking the native language, word games that mix English and (55) native languages, and speeches by fluent speakers. There is evidence that this along with lessons printed in the local newspaper has had success at revitalizing native languages in some communities. Similarly, integrating traditional songs into the presentation (60) of a native language makes it easier for novice speakers to grasp the language by familiarizing them with its rhythms.

Passage A

Some legal theorists reject the notion that judges must believe what they say in their Opinions. They argue that an emphasis on the need for honesty (5) injudicial decision making ignores the myriad institutional considerations that judges must continuously balance in performing the prudential functions assigned to them. To argue for rigid adherence to a norm of sincerity is, they say, naive, (10) foolhardy, and even dangerously utopian.

There are two ways of defending the principle of judicial sincerity. The first is to marshal prudential reasons that support the principle. If it can be shown that following a general rule favoring sincerity (15) produces the most prudential outcomes—whatever those happen to be—then the rule is justified. Accordingly, proponents of greater candor in the courts have argued, for example, that transparent decision making provides better guidance to lower (20) courts and litigants, or that it strengthens the institutional legitimacy of the courts.

The problem with a prudential defense of judicial candor is that it fails to acknowledge the normative force behind the idea that judges should not lie or (25) deliberately mislead in their opinions. In our ordinary moral thinking, duties of truth telling are not justified merely when they produce good outcomes. Rather, the duty to speak truthfully and openly is an independent constraint on our actions. This suggests a second way (30) to defend the principle of judicial sincerity, namely, by appealing to moral principles rather than prudential considerations.

Passage B

The requirement that judges give reasons for their (35) decisions—reasons that can be debated, attacked, and defended—serves a vital function in constraining the judiciary’s exercise of power. But must judges actually believe the reasons they give? There are reasons to think so.

(40) In the absence of any obligation to be candid, the constraints on judges’ powers would be greatly diluted, since judges who are free to distort or misstate the reasons for their actions can avoid the sanctions of criticism and condemnation that honest (45) disclosure of their motivation may entail. In a sense, candor is an essential prerequisite of all other restraints on abuse of judicial power, for the limitations imposed by constitutions, statutes, and precedents count for little if judges feel free to believe one thing and say (50) another. Moreover, lack of candor is likely to be detectable, and its detection would only serve to increase public cynicism about the judicial system.

Do these points demonstrate that candor is an unshakable obligation of judicial behavior? Do they (55) rebut the argument that judicial deception is warranted in cases where it yields some net benefit? Probably not. But they do suggest that any cost-benefit calculus must take account of the large institutional losses that would result from a lack of trust in the honesty of judges (60) and from an inability to debate and criticize the true reasons for their decisions. These points suffice to show that there is a strong presumption in favor of judicial candor.

Passage A

Some legal theorists reject the notion that judges must believe what they say in their Opinions. They argue that an emphasis on the need for honesty (5) injudicial decision making ignores the myriad institutional considerations that judges must continuously balance in performing the prudential functions assigned to them. To argue for rigid adherence to a norm of sincerity is, they say, naive, (10) foolhardy, and even dangerously utopian.

There are two ways of defending the principle of judicial sincerity. The first is to marshal prudential reasons that support the principle. If it can be shown that following a general rule favoring sincerity (15) produces the most prudential outcomes—whatever those happen to be—then the rule is justified. Accordingly, proponents of greater candor in the courts have argued, for example, that transparent decision making provides better guidance to lower (20) courts and litigants, or that it strengthens the institutional legitimacy of the courts.

The problem with a prudential defense of judicial candor is that it fails to acknowledge the normative force behind the idea that judges should not lie or (25) deliberately mislead in their opinions. In our ordinary moral thinking, duties of truth telling are not justified merely when they produce good outcomes. Rather, the duty to speak truthfully and openly is an independent constraint on our actions. This suggests a second way (30) to defend the principle of judicial sincerity, namely, by appealing to moral principles rather than prudential considerations.

Passage B

The requirement that judges give reasons for their (35) decisions—reasons that can be debated, attacked, and defended—serves a vital function in constraining the judiciary’s exercise of power. But must judges actually believe the reasons they give? There are reasons to think so.

(40) In the absence of any obligation to be candid, the constraints on judges’ powers would be greatly diluted, since judges who are free to distort or misstate the reasons for their actions can avoid the sanctions of criticism and condemnation that honest (45) disclosure of their motivation may entail. In a sense, candor is an essential prerequisite of all other restraints on abuse of judicial power, for the limitations imposed by constitutions, statutes, and precedents count for little if judges feel free to believe one thing and say (50) another. Moreover, lack of candor is likely to be detectable, and its detection would only serve to increase public cynicism about the judicial system.

Do these points demonstrate that candor is an unshakable obligation of judicial behavior? Do they (55) rebut the argument that judicial deception is warranted in cases where it yields some net benefit? Probably not. But they do suggest that any cost-benefit calculus must take account of the large institutional losses that would result from a lack of trust in the honesty of judges (60) and from an inability to debate and criticize the true reasons for their decisions. These points suffice to show that there is a strong presumption in favor of judicial candor.

Passage A

Some legal theorists reject the notion that judges must believe what they say in their Opinions. They argue that an emphasis on the need for honesty (5) injudicial decision making ignores the myriad institutional considerations that judges must continuously balance in performing the prudential functions assigned to them. To argue for rigid adherence to a norm of sincerity is, they say, naive, (10) foolhardy, and even dangerously utopian.

There are two ways of defending the principle of judicial sincerity. The first is to marshal prudential reasons that support the principle. If it can be shown that following a general rule favoring sincerity (15) produces the most prudential outcomes—whatever those happen to be—then the rule is justified. Accordingly, proponents of greater candor in the courts have argued, for example, that transparent decision making provides better guidance to lower (20) courts and litigants, or that it strengthens the institutional legitimacy of the courts.

The problem with a prudential defense of judicial candor is that it fails to acknowledge the normative force behind the idea that judges should not lie or (25) deliberately mislead in their opinions. In our ordinary moral thinking, duties of truth telling are not justified merely when they produce good outcomes. Rather, the duty to speak truthfully and openly is an independent constraint on our actions. This suggests a second way (30) to defend the principle of judicial sincerity, namely, by appealing to moral principles rather than prudential considerations.

Passage B

The requirement that judges give reasons for their (35) decisions—reasons that can be debated, attacked, and defended—serves a vital function in constraining the judiciary’s exercise of power. But must judges actually believe the reasons they give? There are reasons to think so.

(40) In the absence of any obligation to be candid, the constraints on judges’ powers would be greatly diluted, since judges who are free to distort or misstate the reasons for their actions can avoid the sanctions of criticism and condemnation that honest (45) disclosure of their motivation may entail. In a sense, candor is an essential prerequisite of all other restraints on abuse of judicial power, for the limitations imposed by constitutions, statutes, and precedents count for little if judges feel free to believe one thing and say (50) another. Moreover, lack of candor is likely to be detectable, and its detection would only serve to increase public cynicism about the judicial system.

Do these points demonstrate that candor is an unshakable obligation of judicial behavior? Do they (55) rebut the argument that judicial deception is warranted in cases where it yields some net benefit? Probably not. But they do suggest that any cost-benefit calculus must take account of the large institutional losses that would result from a lack of trust in the honesty of judges (60) and from an inability to debate and criticize the true reasons for their decisions. These points suffice to show that there is a strong presumption in favor of judicial candor.

Passage A

Some legal theorists reject the notion that judges must believe what they say in their Opinions. They argue that an emphasis on the need for honesty (5) injudicial decision making ignores the myriad institutional considerations that judges must continuously balance in performing the prudential functions assigned to them. To argue for rigid adherence to a norm of sincerity is, they say, naive, (10) foolhardy, and even dangerously utopian.

There are two ways of defending the principle of judicial sincerity. The first is to marshal prudential reasons that support the principle. If it can be shown that following a general rule favoring sincerity (15) produces the most prudential outcomes—whatever those happen to be—then the rule is justified. Accordingly, proponents of greater candor in the courts have argued, for example, that transparent decision making provides better guidance to lower (20) courts and litigants, or that it strengthens the institutional legitimacy of the courts.

The problem with a prudential defense of judicial candor is that it fails to acknowledge the normative force behind the idea that judges should not lie or (25) deliberately mislead in their opinions. In our ordinary moral thinking, duties of truth telling are not justified merely when they produce good outcomes. Rather, the duty to speak truthfully and openly is an independent constraint on our actions. This suggests a second way (30) to defend the principle of judicial sincerity, namely, by appealing to moral principles rather than prudential considerations.

Passage B

The requirement that judges give reasons for their (35) decisions—reasons that can be debated, attacked, and defended—serves a vital function in constraining the judiciary’s exercise of power. But must judges actually believe the reasons they give? There are reasons to think so.

(40) In the absence of any obligation to be candid, the constraints on judges’ powers would be greatly diluted, since judges who are free to distort or misstate the reasons for their actions can avoid the sanctions of criticism and condemnation that honest (45) disclosure of their motivation may entail. In a sense, candor is an essential prerequisite of all other restraints on abuse of judicial power, for the limitations imposed by constitutions, statutes, and precedents count for little if judges feel free to believe one thing and say (50) another. Moreover, lack of candor is likely to be detectable, and its detection would only serve to increase public cynicism about the judicial system.

Do these points demonstrate that candor is an unshakable obligation of judicial behavior? Do they (55) rebut the argument that judicial deception is warranted in cases where it yields some net benefit? Probably not. But they do suggest that any cost-benefit calculus must take account of the large institutional losses that would result from a lack of trust in the honesty of judges (60) and from an inability to debate and criticize the true reasons for their decisions. These points suffice to show that there is a strong presumption in favor of judicial candor.

Passage A

Some legal theorists reject the notion that judges must believe what they say in their Opinions. They argue that an emphasis on the need for honesty (5) injudicial decision making ignores the myriad institutional considerations that judges must continuously balance in performing the prudential functions assigned to them. To argue for rigid adherence to a norm of sincerity is, they say, naive, (10) foolhardy, and even dangerously utopian.

There are two ways of defending the principle of judicial sincerity. The first is to marshal prudential reasons that support the principle. If it can be shown that following a general rule favoring sincerity (15) produces the most prudential outcomes—whatever those happen to be—then the rule is justified. Accordingly, proponents of greater candor in the courts have argued, for example, that transparent decision making provides better guidance to lower (20) courts and litigants, or that it strengthens the institutional legitimacy of the courts.

The problem with a prudential defense of judicial candor is that it fails to acknowledge the normative force behind the idea that judges should not lie or (25) deliberately mislead in their opinions. In our ordinary moral thinking, duties of truth telling are not justified merely when they produce good outcomes. Rather, the duty to speak truthfully and openly is an independent constraint on our actions. This suggests a second way (30) to defend the principle of judicial sincerity, namely, by appealing to moral principles rather than prudential considerations.

Passage B

The requirement that judges give reasons for their (35) decisions—reasons that can be debated, attacked, and defended—serves a vital function in constraining the judiciary’s exercise of power. But must judges actually believe the reasons they give? There are reasons to think so.

(40) In the absence of any obligation to be candid, the constraints on judges’ powers would be greatly diluted, since judges who are free to distort or misstate the reasons for their actions can avoid the sanctions of criticism and condemnation that honest (45) disclosure of their motivation may entail. In a sense, candor is an essential prerequisite of all other restraints on abuse of judicial power, for the limitations imposed by constitutions, statutes, and precedents count for little if judges feel free to believe one thing and say (50) another. Moreover, lack of candor is likely to be detectable, and its detection would only serve to increase public cynicism about the judicial system.

Do these points demonstrate that candor is an unshakable obligation of judicial behavior? Do they (55) rebut the argument that judicial deception is warranted in cases where it yields some net benefit? Probably not. But they do suggest that any cost-benefit calculus must take account of the large institutional losses that would result from a lack of trust in the honesty of judges (60) and from an inability to debate and criticize the true reasons for their decisions. These points suffice to show that there is a strong presumption in favor of judicial candor.

Passage A

Some legal theorists reject the notion that judges must believe what they say in their Opinions. They argue that an emphasis on the need for honesty (5) injudicial decision making ignores the myriad institutional considerations that judges must continuously balance in performing the prudential functions assigned to them. To argue for rigid adherence to a norm of sincerity is, they say, naive, (10) foolhardy, and even dangerously utopian.

There are two ways of defending the principle of judicial sincerity. The first is to marshal prudential reasons that support the principle. If it can be shown that following a general rule favoring sincerity (15) produces the most prudential outcomes—whatever those happen to be—then the rule is justified. Accordingly, proponents of greater candor in the courts have argued, for example, that transparent decision making provides better guidance to lower (20) courts and litigants, or that it strengthens the institutional legitimacy of the courts.

The problem with a prudential defense of judicial candor is that it fails to acknowledge the normative force behind the idea that judges should not lie or (25) deliberately mislead in their opinions. In our ordinary moral thinking, duties of truth telling are not justified merely when they produce good outcomes. Rather, the duty to speak truthfully and openly is an independent constraint on our actions. This suggests a second way (30) to defend the principle of judicial sincerity, namely, by appealing to moral principles rather than prudential considerations.

Passage B

The requirement that judges give reasons for their (35) decisions—reasons that can be debated, attacked, and defended—serves a vital function in constraining the judiciary’s exercise of power. But must judges actually believe the reasons they give? There are reasons to think so.

(40) In the absence of any obligation to be candid, the constraints on judges’ powers would be greatly diluted, since judges who are free to distort or misstate the reasons for their actions can avoid the sanctions of criticism and condemnation that honest (45) disclosure of their motivation may entail. In a sense, candor is an essential prerequisite of all other restraints on abuse of judicial power, for the limitations imposed by constitutions, statutes, and precedents count for little if judges feel free to believe one thing and say (50) another. Moreover, lack of candor is likely to be detectable, and its detection would only serve to increase public cynicism about the judicial system.

Do these points demonstrate that candor is an unshakable obligation of judicial behavior? Do they (55) rebut the argument that judicial deception is warranted in cases where it yields some net benefit? Probably not. But they do suggest that any cost-benefit calculus must take account of the large institutional losses that would result from a lack of trust in the honesty of judges (60) and from an inability to debate and criticize the true reasons for their decisions. These points suffice to show that there is a strong presumption in favor of judicial candor.

Passage A

Some legal theorists reject the notion that judges must believe what they say in their Opinions. They argue that an emphasis on the need for honesty (5) injudicial decision making ignores the myriad institutional considerations that judges must continuously balance in performing the prudential functions assigned to them. To argue for rigid adherence to a norm of sincerity is, they say, naive, (10) foolhardy, and even dangerously utopian.

There are two ways of defending the principle of judicial sincerity. The first is to marshal prudential reasons that support the principle. If it can be shown that following a general rule favoring sincerity (15) produces the most prudential outcomes—whatever those happen to be—then the rule is justified. Accordingly, proponents of greater candor in the courts have argued, for example, that transparent decision making provides better guidance to lower (20) courts and litigants, or that it strengthens the institutional legitimacy of the courts.

The problem with a prudential defense of judicial candor is that it fails to acknowledge the normative force behind the idea that judges should not lie or (25) deliberately mislead in their opinions. In our ordinary moral thinking, duties of truth telling are not justified merely when they produce good outcomes. Rather, the duty to speak truthfully and openly is an independent constraint on our actions. This suggests a second way (30) to defend the principle of judicial sincerity, namely, by appealing to moral principles rather than prudential considerations.

Passage B

The requirement that judges give reasons for their (35) decisions—reasons that can be debated, attacked, and defended—serves a vital function in constraining the judiciary’s exercise of power. But must judges actually believe the reasons they give? There are reasons to think so.

(40) In the absence of any obligation to be candid, the constraints on judges’ powers would be greatly diluted, since judges who are free to distort or misstate the reasons for their actions can avoid the sanctions of criticism and condemnation that honest (45) disclosure of their motivation may entail. In a sense, candor is an essential prerequisite of all other restraints on abuse of judicial power, for the limitations imposed by constitutions, statutes, and precedents count for little if judges feel free to believe one thing and say (50) another. Moreover, lack of candor is likely to be detectable, and its detection would only serve to increase public cynicism about the judicial system.

Do these points demonstrate that candor is an unshakable obligation of judicial behavior? Do they (55) rebut the argument that judicial deception is warranted in cases where it yields some net benefit? Probably not. But they do suggest that any cost-benefit calculus must take account of the large institutional losses that would result from a lack of trust in the honesty of judges (60) and from an inability to debate and criticize the true reasons for their decisions. These points suffice to show that there is a strong presumption in favor of judicial candor.

Passage A

Some legal theorists reject the notion that judges must believe what they say in their Opinions. They argue that an emphasis on the need for honesty (5) injudicial decision making ignores the myriad institutional considerations that judges must continuously balance in performing the prudential functions assigned to them. To argue for rigid adherence to a norm of sincerity is, they say, naive, (10) foolhardy, and even dangerously utopian.

There are two ways of defending the principle of judicial sincerity. The first is to marshal prudential reasons that support the principle. If it can be shown that following a general rule favoring sincerity (15) produces the most prudential outcomes—whatever those happen to be—then the rule is justified. Accordingly, proponents of greater candor in the courts have argued, for example, that transparent decision making provides better guidance to lower (20) courts and litigants, or that it strengthens the institutional legitimacy of the courts.

The problem with a prudential defense of judicial candor is that it fails to acknowledge the normative force behind the idea that judges should not lie or (25) deliberately mislead in their opinions. In our ordinary moral thinking, duties of truth telling are not justified merely when they produce good outcomes. Rather, the duty to speak truthfully and openly is an independent constraint on our actions. This suggests a second way (30) to defend the principle of judicial sincerity, namely, by appealing to moral principles rather than prudential considerations.

Passage B

The requirement that judges give reasons for their (35) decisions—reasons that can be debated, attacked, and defended—serves a vital function in constraining the judiciary’s exercise of power. But must judges actually believe the reasons they give? There are reasons to think so.

(40) In the absence of any obligation to be candid, the constraints on judges’ powers would be greatly diluted, since judges who are free to distort or misstate the reasons for their actions can avoid the sanctions of criticism and condemnation that honest (45) disclosure of their motivation may entail. In a sense, candor is an essential prerequisite of all other restraints on abuse of judicial power, for the limitations imposed by constitutions, statutes, and precedents count for little if judges feel free to believe one thing and say (50) another. Moreover, lack of candor is likely to be detectable, and its detection would only serve to increase public cynicism about the judicial system.

Do these points demonstrate that candor is an unshakable obligation of judicial behavior? Do they (55) rebut the argument that judicial deception is warranted in cases where it yields some net benefit? Probably not. But they do suggest that any cost-benefit calculus must take account of the large institutional losses that would result from a lack of trust in the honesty of judges (60) and from an inability to debate and criticize the true reasons for their decisions. These points suffice to show that there is a strong presumption in favor of judicial candor.

Social historians have noted that European social and political thought of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was marked by the popularity of “grand theories,” influential intellectual movements (5) such as Freudianism or Marxism that attempted to account for a broad range of historical phenomena with a single, ambitious explanation. Freudianism, for example, views culture, politics, and other forms of social interaction as the products of specific human (10) psychological traits that Sigmund Freud and his followers believed were universal. Similarly, Marxism sees these interactions as arising from universal economic factors. Such theories naturally tend toward historical determinism, the view that history develops (15) according to universal and necessary laws.

Grand theories were sometimes so influential that, in certain intellectual circles, challenging them was tantamount to denying scientific fact. In recent years, however, the authority wielded by these theories has (20) been tarnished by the occurrence of events that do not fit them. In some cases, they have also been discredited by being linked to political systems that have been seen to fail or that have inflicted injustices on their citizens. It is not that works such as those of (25) Freud and Marx, written in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, were implausible explanations of phenomena that preceded them, but that, as history has progressed, they have been revealed as products of their era, possessing inherent explanatory limitations, (30) rather than the universal truths they purported to be.

Despite the decline of grand theories, people have what one scholar calls “a nostalgia for determinism.” The attraction of grand theories was the sense they conveyed that history is logical and proceeds (35) according to certain universal laws; in discarding these theories, we seem to have lost faith in historical determinism. But while we no longer believe in the deterministic explanations of history offered by grand theories, we still long for the cognitive satisfaction (40) provided by a belief in historical inevitability. This leaves us in a curious state of intellectual discomfort. But perhaps this discomfort is no bad thing, for it might finally persuade us to relinquish the vain hope for inevitability and hence restore us to the (45) contemplation of historical contingency, particularity, and novelty, all of which can serve as stimuli to serious thought. Perhaps what is needed is a historical perspective that seeks to include, as grand theories did not and could not, the particular and unrepeatable (50) details of historical events. Rather than forcing these details into an inflexible progression, such a perspective might instead explain history by means of laws that constrain rather than necessitate. In this way it might permit us the kind of narrative satisfaction (55) provided by the arrangement of events in a cogent story. In short, it would allow for the possibility of historical explanation without viewing history as fully determined.

Social historians have noted that European social and political thought of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was marked by the popularity of “grand theories,” influential intellectual movements (5) such as Freudianism or Marxism that attempted to account for a broad range of historical phenomena with a single, ambitious explanation. Freudianism, for example, views culture, politics, and other forms of social interaction as the products of specific human (10) psychological traits that Sigmund Freud and his followers believed were universal. Similarly, Marxism sees these interactions as arising from universal economic factors. Such theories naturally tend toward historical determinism, the view that history develops (15) according to universal and necessary laws.

Grand theories were sometimes so influential that, in certain intellectual circles, challenging them was tantamount to denying scientific fact. In recent years, however, the authority wielded by these theories has (20) been tarnished by the occurrence of events that do not fit them. In some cases, they have also been discredited by being linked to political systems that have been seen to fail or that have inflicted injustices on their citizens. It is not that works such as those of (25) Freud and Marx, written in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, were implausible explanations of phenomena that preceded them, but that, as history has progressed, they have been revealed as products of their era, possessing inherent explanatory limitations, (30) rather than the universal truths they purported to be.

Despite the decline of grand theories, people have what one scholar calls “a nostalgia for determinism.” The attraction of grand theories was the sense they conveyed that history is logical and proceeds (35) according to certain universal laws; in discarding these theories, we seem to have lost faith in historical determinism. But while we no longer believe in the deterministic explanations of history offered by grand theories, we still long for the cognitive satisfaction (40) provided by a belief in historical inevitability. This leaves us in a curious state of intellectual discomfort. But perhaps this discomfort is no bad thing, for it might finally persuade us to relinquish the vain hope for inevitability and hence restore us to the (45) contemplation of historical contingency, particularity, and novelty, all of which can serve as stimuli to serious thought. Perhaps what is needed is a historical perspective that seeks to include, as grand theories did not and could not, the particular and unrepeatable (50) details of historical events. Rather than forcing these details into an inflexible progression, such a perspective might instead explain history by means of laws that constrain rather than necessitate. In this way it might permit us the kind of narrative satisfaction (55) provided by the arrangement of events in a cogent story. In short, it would allow for the possibility of historical explanation without viewing history as fully determined.

Social historians have noted that European social and political thought of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was marked by the popularity of “grand theories,” influential intellectual movements (5) such as Freudianism or Marxism that attempted to account for a broad range of historical phenomena with a single, ambitious explanation. Freudianism, for example, views culture, politics, and other forms of social interaction as the products of specific human (10) psychological traits that Sigmund Freud and his followers believed were universal. Similarly, Marxism sees these interactions as arising from universal economic factors. Such theories naturally tend toward historical determinism, the view that history develops (15) according to universal and necessary laws.

Grand theories were sometimes so influential that, in certain intellectual circles, challenging them was tantamount to denying scientific fact. In recent years, however, the authority wielded by these theories has (20) been tarnished by the occurrence of events that do not fit them. In some cases, they have also been discredited by being linked to political systems that have been seen to fail or that have inflicted injustices on their citizens. It is not that works such as those of (25) Freud and Marx, written in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, were implausible explanations of phenomena that preceded them, but that, as history has progressed, they have been revealed as products of their era, possessing inherent explanatory limitations, (30) rather than the universal truths they purported to be.

Despite the decline of grand theories, people have what one scholar calls “a nostalgia for determinism.” The attraction of grand theories was the sense they conveyed that history is logical and proceeds (35) according to certain universal laws; in discarding these theories, we seem to have lost faith in historical determinism. But while we no longer believe in the deterministic explanations of history offered by grand theories, we still long for the cognitive satisfaction (40) provided by a belief in historical inevitability. This leaves us in a curious state of intellectual discomfort. But perhaps this discomfort is no bad thing, for it might finally persuade us to relinquish the vain hope for inevitability and hence restore us to the (45) contemplation of historical contingency, particularity, and novelty, all of which can serve as stimuli to serious thought. Perhaps what is needed is a historical perspective that seeks to include, as grand theories did not and could not, the particular and unrepeatable (50) details of historical events. Rather than forcing these details into an inflexible progression, such a perspective might instead explain history by means of laws that constrain rather than necessitate. In this way it might permit us the kind of narrative satisfaction (55) provided by the arrangement of events in a cogent story. In short, it would allow for the possibility of historical explanation without viewing history as fully determined.

Social historians have noted that European social and political thought of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was marked by the popularity of “grand theories,” influential intellectual movements (5) such as Freudianism or Marxism that attempted to account for a broad range of historical phenomena with a single, ambitious explanation. Freudianism, for example, views culture, politics, and other forms of social interaction as the products of specific human (10) psychological traits that Sigmund Freud and his followers believed were universal. Similarly, Marxism sees these interactions as arising from universal economic factors. Such theories naturally tend toward historical determinism, the view that history develops (15) according to universal and necessary laws.

Grand theories were sometimes so influential that, in certain intellectual circles, challenging them was tantamount to denying scientific fact. In recent years, however, the authority wielded by these theories has (20) been tarnished by the occurrence of events that do not fit them. In some cases, they have also been discredited by being linked to political systems that have been seen to fail or that have inflicted injustices on their citizens. It is not that works such as those of (25) Freud and Marx, written in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, were implausible explanations of phenomena that preceded them, but that, as history has progressed, they have been revealed as products of their era, possessing inherent explanatory limitations, (30) rather than the universal truths they purported to be.

Despite the decline of grand theories, people have what one scholar calls “a nostalgia for determinism.” The attraction of grand theories was the sense they conveyed that history is logical and proceeds (35) according to certain universal laws; in discarding these theories, we seem to have lost faith in historical determinism. But while we no longer believe in the deterministic explanations of history offered by grand theories, we still long for the cognitive satisfaction (40) provided by a belief in historical inevitability. This leaves us in a curious state of intellectual discomfort. But perhaps this discomfort is no bad thing, for it might finally persuade us to relinquish the vain hope for inevitability and hence restore us to the (45) contemplation of historical contingency, particularity, and novelty, all of which can serve as stimuli to serious thought. Perhaps what is needed is a historical perspective that seeks to include, as grand theories did not and could not, the particular and unrepeatable (50) details of historical events. Rather than forcing these details into an inflexible progression, such a perspective might instead explain history by means of laws that constrain rather than necessitate. In this way it might permit us the kind of narrative satisfaction (55) provided by the arrangement of events in a cogent story. In short, it would allow for the possibility of historical explanation without viewing history as fully determined.

Social historians have noted that European social and political thought of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was marked by the popularity of “grand theories,” influential intellectual movements (5) such as Freudianism or Marxism that attempted to account for a broad range of historical phenomena with a single, ambitious explanation. Freudianism, for example, views culture, politics, and other forms of social interaction as the products of specific human (10) psychological traits that Sigmund Freud and his followers believed were universal. Similarly, Marxism sees these interactions as arising from universal economic factors. Such theories naturally tend toward historical determinism, the view that history develops (15) according to universal and necessary laws.

Grand theories were sometimes so influential that, in certain intellectual circles, challenging them was tantamount to denying scientific fact. In recent years, however, the authority wielded by these theories has (20) been tarnished by the occurrence of events that do not fit them. In some cases, they have also been discredited by being linked to political systems that have been seen to fail or that have inflicted injustices on their citizens. It is not that works such as those of (25) Freud and Marx, written in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, were implausible explanations of phenomena that preceded them, but that, as history has progressed, they have been revealed as products of their era, possessing inherent explanatory limitations, (30) rather than the universal truths they purported to be.

Despite the decline of grand theories, people have what one scholar calls “a nostalgia for determinism.” The attraction of grand theories was the sense they conveyed that history is logical and proceeds (35) according to certain universal laws; in discarding these theories, we seem to have lost faith in historical determinism. But while we no longer believe in the deterministic explanations of history offered by grand theories, we still long for the cognitive satisfaction (40) provided by a belief in historical inevitability. This leaves us in a curious state of intellectual discomfort. But perhaps this discomfort is no bad thing, for it might finally persuade us to relinquish the vain hope for inevitability and hence restore us to the (45) contemplation of historical contingency, particularity, and novelty, all of which can serve as stimuli to serious thought. Perhaps what is needed is a historical perspective that seeks to include, as grand theories did not and could not, the particular and unrepeatable (50) details of historical events. Rather than forcing these details into an inflexible progression, such a perspective might instead explain history by means of laws that constrain rather than necessitate. In this way it might permit us the kind of narrative satisfaction (55) provided by the arrangement of events in a cogent story. In short, it would allow for the possibility of historical explanation without viewing history as fully determined.

Social historians have noted that European social and political thought of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was marked by the popularity of “grand theories,” influential intellectual movements (5) such as Freudianism or Marxism that attempted to account for a broad range of historical phenomena with a single, ambitious explanation. Freudianism, for example, views culture, politics, and other forms of social interaction as the products of specific human (10) psychological traits that Sigmund Freud and his followers believed were universal. Similarly, Marxism sees these interactions as arising from universal economic factors. Such theories naturally tend toward historical determinism, the view that history develops (15) according to universal and necessary laws.

Grand theories were sometimes so influential that, in certain intellectual circles, challenging them was tantamount to denying scientific fact. In recent years, however, the authority wielded by these theories has (20) been tarnished by the occurrence of events that do not fit them. In some cases, they have also been discredited by being linked to political systems that have been seen to fail or that have inflicted injustices on their citizens. It is not that works such as those of (25) Freud and Marx, written in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, were implausible explanations of phenomena that preceded them, but that, as history has progressed, they have been revealed as products of their era, possessing inherent explanatory limitations, (30) rather than the universal truths they purported to be.

Despite the decline of grand theories, people have what one scholar calls “a nostalgia for determinism.” The attraction of grand theories was the sense they conveyed that history is logical and proceeds (35) according to certain universal laws; in discarding these theories, we seem to have lost faith in historical determinism. But while we no longer believe in the deterministic explanations of history offered by grand theories, we still long for the cognitive satisfaction (40) provided by a belief in historical inevitability. This leaves us in a curious state of intellectual discomfort. But perhaps this discomfort is no bad thing, for it might finally persuade us to relinquish the vain hope for inevitability and hence restore us to the (45) contemplation of historical contingency, particularity, and novelty, all of which can serve as stimuli to serious thought. Perhaps what is needed is a historical perspective that seeks to include, as grand theories did not and could not, the particular and unrepeatable (50) details of historical events. Rather than forcing these details into an inflexible progression, such a perspective might instead explain history by means of laws that constrain rather than necessitate. In this way it might permit us the kind of narrative satisfaction (55) provided by the arrangement of events in a cogent story. In short, it would allow for the possibility of historical explanation without viewing history as fully determined.