LSAT Prep Test 81 - Reading Comprehension - Answers (No Explanations)

For two decades, Wynton Marsalis complemented his extraordinary gifts as a jazz trumpeter with persuasive advocacy of the importance of jazz history and jazz masters. At his peak, Marsalis ruled the jazz (5) universe, enjoying virtually unqualified admiration as a musician and unsurpassed influence as the music’s leading promoter and defmer. But after drawing increasing fire from critics and fellow musicians alike for his neotraditionalism, the biggest name in jazz (10) faces an uncertain future, as does jazz itself. In 1999, to mark the end of the century, Marsalis issued a total of fifteen new CDs. In the following two years he did not release a single collection of new music. In fact, after two decades with Columbia (15) Records—the prestigious label historically associated with Duke Ellington, Thelonious Monk, and Miles Davis—Marsalis has no record contract with any company. Over the past few years Columbia has drastically reduced its roster of active jazz musicians, (20) shifting its emphasis to reissues of old recordings. Atlantic Records folded its jazz catalog into the operations of its parent company, Warner Music, and essentially gave up on developing new artists. For this grim state of affairs in jazz, Marsalis, (25) the public face of the music and the evident master of its destiny, has been accused of being at least partly culpable. Critics charge that, by leading jazz into the realm of unbending classicism and by sanctifying a canon of their own choosing, Marsalis and his (30) adherents have codified the music into a stifling orthodoxy and inhibited the innovative impulses that have always advanced jazz. As a former executive with Columbia noted, “For many people, Marsalis has come to embody some retro ideology that is not really (35) of the moment—it’s more museumlike in nature, a look back.”

Indeed, in seeking to elevate the public perception of jazz and to encourage young practitioners to pay attention to the music’s traditions, Marsalis put great (40) emphasis on its past masters. Still, he never advocated mere revivalism, and he has demonstrated in his compositions how traditional elements can be alluded to, recombined, and reinvented in the name of individualistic expression, taking the nature of that (45) tradition and trying to push it forward. However, record executives came away with a different message: if the artists of the past are so great and enduring, why continue investing so much in young talent? So they shifted their attention to repackaging their catalogs of (50) vintage recordings.

Where the young talent saw role models and their critics saw idolatry, the record companies saw brand names—the ultimate prize of marketing. For long- established record companies with vast archives of (55) historic recordings, the economics were irresistible: it is far more profitable to wrap new covers around albums paid for generations ago than it is to find, record, and promote new artists.

For two decades, Wynton Marsalis complemented his extraordinary gifts as a jazz trumpeter with persuasive advocacy of the importance of jazz history and jazz masters. At his peak, Marsalis ruled the jazz (5) universe, enjoying virtually unqualified admiration as a musician and unsurpassed influence as the music’s leading promoter and defmer. But after drawing increasing fire from critics and fellow musicians alike for his neotraditionalism, the biggest name in jazz (10) faces an uncertain future, as does jazz itself. In 1999, to mark the end of the century, Marsalis issued a total of fifteen new CDs. In the following two years he did not release a single collection of new music. In fact, after two decades with Columbia (15) Records—the prestigious label historically associated with Duke Ellington, Thelonious Monk, and Miles Davis—Marsalis has no record contract with any company. Over the past few years Columbia has drastically reduced its roster of active jazz musicians, (20) shifting its emphasis to reissues of old recordings. Atlantic Records folded its jazz catalog into the operations of its parent company, Warner Music, and essentially gave up on developing new artists. For this grim state of affairs in jazz, Marsalis, (25) the public face of the music and the evident master of its destiny, has been accused of being at least partly culpable. Critics charge that, by leading jazz into the realm of unbending classicism and by sanctifying a canon of their own choosing, Marsalis and his (30) adherents have codified the music into a stifling orthodoxy and inhibited the innovative impulses that have always advanced jazz. As a former executive with Columbia noted, “For many people, Marsalis has come to embody some retro ideology that is not really (35) of the moment—it’s more museumlike in nature, a look back.”

Indeed, in seeking to elevate the public perception of jazz and to encourage young practitioners to pay attention to the music’s traditions, Marsalis put great (40) emphasis on its past masters. Still, he never advocated mere revivalism, and he has demonstrated in his compositions how traditional elements can be alluded to, recombined, and reinvented in the name of individualistic expression, taking the nature of that (45) tradition and trying to push it forward. However, record executives came away with a different message: if the artists of the past are so great and enduring, why continue investing so much in young talent? So they shifted their attention to repackaging their catalogs of (50) vintage recordings.

Where the young talent saw role models and their critics saw idolatry, the record companies saw brand names—the ultimate prize of marketing. For long- established record companies with vast archives of (55) historic recordings, the economics were irresistible: it is far more profitable to wrap new covers around albums paid for generations ago than it is to find, record, and promote new artists.

For two decades, Wynton Marsalis complemented his extraordinary gifts as a jazz trumpeter with persuasive advocacy of the importance of jazz history and jazz masters. At his peak, Marsalis ruled the jazz (5) universe, enjoying virtually unqualified admiration as a musician and unsurpassed influence as the music’s leading promoter and defmer. But after drawing increasing fire from critics and fellow musicians alike for his neotraditionalism, the biggest name in jazz (10) faces an uncertain future, as does jazz itself. In 1999, to mark the end of the century, Marsalis issued a total of fifteen new CDs. In the following two years he did not release a single collection of new music. In fact, after two decades with Columbia (15) Records—the prestigious label historically associated with Duke Ellington, Thelonious Monk, and Miles Davis—Marsalis has no record contract with any company. Over the past few years Columbia has drastically reduced its roster of active jazz musicians, (20) shifting its emphasis to reissues of old recordings. Atlantic Records folded its jazz catalog into the operations of its parent company, Warner Music, and essentially gave up on developing new artists. For this grim state of affairs in jazz, Marsalis, (25) the public face of the music and the evident master of its destiny, has been accused of being at least partly culpable. Critics charge that, by leading jazz into the realm of unbending classicism and by sanctifying a canon of their own choosing, Marsalis and his (30) adherents have codified the music into a stifling orthodoxy and inhibited the innovative impulses that have always advanced jazz. As a former executive with Columbia noted, “For many people, Marsalis has come to embody some retro ideology that is not really (35) of the moment—it’s more museumlike in nature, a look back.”

Indeed, in seeking to elevate the public perception of jazz and to encourage young practitioners to pay attention to the music’s traditions, Marsalis put great (40) emphasis on its past masters. Still, he never advocated mere revivalism, and he has demonstrated in his compositions how traditional elements can be alluded to, recombined, and reinvented in the name of individualistic expression, taking the nature of that (45) tradition and trying to push it forward. However, record executives came away with a different message: if the artists of the past are so great and enduring, why continue investing so much in young talent? So they shifted their attention to repackaging their catalogs of (50) vintage recordings.

Where the young talent saw role models and their critics saw idolatry, the record companies saw brand names—the ultimate prize of marketing. For long- established record companies with vast archives of (55) historic recordings, the economics were irresistible: it is far more profitable to wrap new covers around albums paid for generations ago than it is to find, record, and promote new artists.

For two decades, Wynton Marsalis complemented his extraordinary gifts as a jazz trumpeter with persuasive advocacy of the importance of jazz history and jazz masters. At his peak, Marsalis ruled the jazz (5) universe, enjoying virtually unqualified admiration as a musician and unsurpassed influence as the music’s leading promoter and defmer. But after drawing increasing fire from critics and fellow musicians alike for his neotraditionalism, the biggest name in jazz (10) faces an uncertain future, as does jazz itself. In 1999, to mark the end of the century, Marsalis issued a total of fifteen new CDs. In the following two years he did not release a single collection of new music. In fact, after two decades with Columbia (15) Records—the prestigious label historically associated with Duke Ellington, Thelonious Monk, and Miles Davis—Marsalis has no record contract with any company. Over the past few years Columbia has drastically reduced its roster of active jazz musicians, (20) shifting its emphasis to reissues of old recordings. Atlantic Records folded its jazz catalog into the operations of its parent company, Warner Music, and essentially gave up on developing new artists. For this grim state of affairs in jazz, Marsalis, (25) the public face of the music and the evident master of its destiny, has been accused of being at least partly culpable. Critics charge that, by leading jazz into the realm of unbending classicism and by sanctifying a canon of their own choosing, Marsalis and his (30) adherents have codified the music into a stifling orthodoxy and inhibited the innovative impulses that have always advanced jazz. As a former executive with Columbia noted, “For many people, Marsalis has come to embody some retro ideology that is not really (35) of the moment—it’s more museumlike in nature, a look back.”

Indeed, in seeking to elevate the public perception of jazz and to encourage young practitioners to pay attention to the music’s traditions, Marsalis put great (40) emphasis on its past masters. Still, he never advocated mere revivalism, and he has demonstrated in his compositions how traditional elements can be alluded to, recombined, and reinvented in the name of individualistic expression, taking the nature of that (45) tradition and trying to push it forward. However, record executives came away with a different message: if the artists of the past are so great and enduring, why continue investing so much in young talent? So they shifted their attention to repackaging their catalogs of (50) vintage recordings.

Where the young talent saw role models and their critics saw idolatry, the record companies saw brand names—the ultimate prize of marketing. For long- established record companies with vast archives of (55) historic recordings, the economics were irresistible: it is far more profitable to wrap new covers around albums paid for generations ago than it is to find, record, and promote new artists.

For two decades, Wynton Marsalis complemented his extraordinary gifts as a jazz trumpeter with persuasive advocacy of the importance of jazz history and jazz masters. At his peak, Marsalis ruled the jazz (5) universe, enjoying virtually unqualified admiration as a musician and unsurpassed influence as the music’s leading promoter and defmer. But after drawing increasing fire from critics and fellow musicians alike for his neotraditionalism, the biggest name in jazz (10) faces an uncertain future, as does jazz itself. In 1999, to mark the end of the century, Marsalis issued a total of fifteen new CDs. In the following two years he did not release a single collection of new music. In fact, after two decades with Columbia (15) Records—the prestigious label historically associated with Duke Ellington, Thelonious Monk, and Miles Davis—Marsalis has no record contract with any company. Over the past few years Columbia has drastically reduced its roster of active jazz musicians, (20) shifting its emphasis to reissues of old recordings. Atlantic Records folded its jazz catalog into the operations of its parent company, Warner Music, and essentially gave up on developing new artists. For this grim state of affairs in jazz, Marsalis, (25) the public face of the music and the evident master of its destiny, has been accused of being at least partly culpable. Critics charge that, by leading jazz into the realm of unbending classicism and by sanctifying a canon of their own choosing, Marsalis and his (30) adherents have codified the music into a stifling orthodoxy and inhibited the innovative impulses that have always advanced jazz. As a former executive with Columbia noted, “For many people, Marsalis has come to embody some retro ideology that is not really (35) of the moment—it’s more museumlike in nature, a look back.”

Indeed, in seeking to elevate the public perception of jazz and to encourage young practitioners to pay attention to the music’s traditions, Marsalis put great (40) emphasis on its past masters. Still, he never advocated mere revivalism, and he has demonstrated in his compositions how traditional elements can be alluded to, recombined, and reinvented in the name of individualistic expression, taking the nature of that (45) tradition and trying to push it forward. However, record executives came away with a different message: if the artists of the past are so great and enduring, why continue investing so much in young talent? So they shifted their attention to repackaging their catalogs of (50) vintage recordings.

Where the young talent saw role models and their critics saw idolatry, the record companies saw brand names—the ultimate prize of marketing. For long- established record companies with vast archives of (55) historic recordings, the economics were irresistible: it is far more profitable to wrap new covers around albums paid for generations ago than it is to find, record, and promote new artists.

For two decades, Wynton Marsalis complemented his extraordinary gifts as a jazz trumpeter with persuasive advocacy of the importance of jazz history and jazz masters. At his peak, Marsalis ruled the jazz (5) universe, enjoying virtually unqualified admiration as a musician and unsurpassed influence as the music’s leading promoter and defmer. But after drawing increasing fire from critics and fellow musicians alike for his neotraditionalism, the biggest name in jazz (10) faces an uncertain future, as does jazz itself. In 1999, to mark the end of the century, Marsalis issued a total of fifteen new CDs. In the following two years he did not release a single collection of new music. In fact, after two decades with Columbia (15) Records—the prestigious label historically associated with Duke Ellington, Thelonious Monk, and Miles Davis—Marsalis has no record contract with any company. Over the past few years Columbia has drastically reduced its roster of active jazz musicians, (20) shifting its emphasis to reissues of old recordings. Atlantic Records folded its jazz catalog into the operations of its parent company, Warner Music, and essentially gave up on developing new artists. For this grim state of affairs in jazz, Marsalis, (25) the public face of the music and the evident master of its destiny, has been accused of being at least partly culpable. Critics charge that, by leading jazz into the realm of unbending classicism and by sanctifying a canon of their own choosing, Marsalis and his (30) adherents have codified the music into a stifling orthodoxy and inhibited the innovative impulses that have always advanced jazz. As a former executive with Columbia noted, “For many people, Marsalis has come to embody some retro ideology that is not really (35) of the moment—it’s more museumlike in nature, a look back.”

Indeed, in seeking to elevate the public perception of jazz and to encourage young practitioners to pay attention to the music’s traditions, Marsalis put great (40) emphasis on its past masters. Still, he never advocated mere revivalism, and he has demonstrated in his compositions how traditional elements can be alluded to, recombined, and reinvented in the name of individualistic expression, taking the nature of that (45) tradition and trying to push it forward. However, record executives came away with a different message: if the artists of the past are so great and enduring, why continue investing so much in young talent? So they shifted their attention to repackaging their catalogs of (50) vintage recordings.

Where the young talent saw role models and their critics saw idolatry, the record companies saw brand names—the ultimate prize of marketing. For long- established record companies with vast archives of (55) historic recordings, the economics were irresistible: it is far more profitable to wrap new covers around albums paid for generations ago than it is to find, record, and promote new artists.

For two decades, Wynton Marsalis complemented his extraordinary gifts as a jazz trumpeter with persuasive advocacy of the importance of jazz history and jazz masters. At his peak, Marsalis ruled the jazz (5) universe, enjoying virtually unqualified admiration as a musician and unsurpassed influence as the music’s leading promoter and defmer. But after drawing increasing fire from critics and fellow musicians alike for his neotraditionalism, the biggest name in jazz (10) faces an uncertain future, as does jazz itself. In 1999, to mark the end of the century, Marsalis issued a total of fifteen new CDs. In the following two years he did not release a single collection of new music. In fact, after two decades with Columbia (15) Records—the prestigious label historically associated with Duke Ellington, Thelonious Monk, and Miles Davis—Marsalis has no record contract with any company. Over the past few years Columbia has drastically reduced its roster of active jazz musicians, (20) shifting its emphasis to reissues of old recordings. Atlantic Records folded its jazz catalog into the operations of its parent company, Warner Music, and essentially gave up on developing new artists. For this grim state of affairs in jazz, Marsalis, (25) the public face of the music and the evident master of its destiny, has been accused of being at least partly culpable. Critics charge that, by leading jazz into the realm of unbending classicism and by sanctifying a canon of their own choosing, Marsalis and his (30) adherents have codified the music into a stifling orthodoxy and inhibited the innovative impulses that have always advanced jazz. As a former executive with Columbia noted, “For many people, Marsalis has come to embody some retro ideology that is not really (35) of the moment—it’s more museumlike in nature, a look back.”

Indeed, in seeking to elevate the public perception of jazz and to encourage young practitioners to pay attention to the music’s traditions, Marsalis put great (40) emphasis on its past masters. Still, he never advocated mere revivalism, and he has demonstrated in his compositions how traditional elements can be alluded to, recombined, and reinvented in the name of individualistic expression, taking the nature of that (45) tradition and trying to push it forward. However, record executives came away with a different message: if the artists of the past are so great and enduring, why continue investing so much in young talent? So they shifted their attention to repackaging their catalogs of (50) vintage recordings.

Where the young talent saw role models and their critics saw idolatry, the record companies saw brand names—the ultimate prize of marketing. For long- established record companies with vast archives of (55) historic recordings, the economics were irresistible: it is far more profitable to wrap new covers around albums paid for generations ago than it is to find, record, and promote new artists.

Common sense suggests that we know our own thoughts directly, but that we infer the thoughts of other people. The former process is noninferential and infallible, while the latter is based on others’ behavior (5) and can always be wrorig. But this assumption is challenged by experiments in psychology demonstrating that in certain circumstances young children tend to misdescribe their own thoughts regarding simple phenomena while nonetheless (10) correctly describing those phenomena. It seems that these children have the same thoughts that adults have regarding the phenomena but are much less capable of identifying these thoughts. Some psychologists argue that this indicates that one’s awareness of one’s own (15) thoughts is every bit as inferential as one’s awareness of another person’s thoughts. According to their interpretation of the experiments, thoughts are unobservable entities that, among other things, help to explain why we act as we do. It follows from this that (20) we are wrong to think of ourselves as having noninferential and infallible access to our own thoughts.

Recognizing an obligation to explain why we cling so tenaciously to an illusory belief in noninferential and infallible knowledge of our own thoughts, these (25) psychologists suggest that this illusion is analogous to what happens to us when we become experts in a particular area. Greater expertise appears to change not only our knowledge of the area as a whole, but our very perception of entities in that area. It appears to us (30) that we become able to see and to grasp these entities and their relations directly, whereas before we could only make inferences about them. For instance, chess experts claim the ability to see without calculation whether a position is weak or strong. (35) From a psychological perspective, we become so expert in making incredibly fast introspective inferences about our thinking that we fail to notice that we are making them. This failure leads naturally to the supposition that there is no way for us to be wrong in (40) our identification of what we ourselves think because we believe we are perceiving it directly.

In claiming that we have only inferential access to our thoughts, the psychologists come perilously close to claiming that we base our inferences about what we (45) ourselves are thinking solely on observations of our own external behavior. But, in fact, their arguments do not commit them to this claim; the psychologists suggest that we are somehow able to base our inferences about what we are thinking on internal (50) cognitive activity that is not itself thought— e.g., fleeting and instantaneous sensations and emotions. The frequent occurrence of such internal activities explains why we develop the capacity to make quick and reliable inferences. Their intemality (55) makes it impossible for anyone else to make an inference based on them that contradicts our own. Thus, they are crucial in creating the illusion of noninferentiality and infallibility.

Common sense suggests that we know our own thoughts directly, but that we infer the thoughts of other people. The former process is noninferential and infallible, while the latter is based on others’ behavior (5) and can always be wrorig. But this assumption is challenged by experiments in psychology demonstrating that in certain circumstances young children tend to misdescribe their own thoughts regarding simple phenomena while nonetheless (10) correctly describing those phenomena. It seems that these children have the same thoughts that adults have regarding the phenomena but are much less capable of identifying these thoughts. Some psychologists argue that this indicates that one’s awareness of one’s own (15) thoughts is every bit as inferential as one’s awareness of another person’s thoughts. According to their interpretation of the experiments, thoughts are unobservable entities that, among other things, help to explain why we act as we do. It follows from this that (20) we are wrong to think of ourselves as having noninferential and infallible access to our own thoughts.

Recognizing an obligation to explain why we cling so tenaciously to an illusory belief in noninferential and infallible knowledge of our own thoughts, these (25) psychologists suggest that this illusion is analogous to what happens to us when we become experts in a particular area. Greater expertise appears to change not only our knowledge of the area as a whole, but our very perception of entities in that area. It appears to us (30) that we become able to see and to grasp these entities and their relations directly, whereas before we could only make inferences about them. For instance, chess experts claim the ability to see without calculation whether a position is weak or strong. (35) From a psychological perspective, we become so expert in making incredibly fast introspective inferences about our thinking that we fail to notice that we are making them. This failure leads naturally to the supposition that there is no way for us to be wrong in (40) our identification of what we ourselves think because we believe we are perceiving it directly.

In claiming that we have only inferential access to our thoughts, the psychologists come perilously close to claiming that we base our inferences about what we (45) ourselves are thinking solely on observations of our own external behavior. But, in fact, their arguments do not commit them to this claim; the psychologists suggest that we are somehow able to base our inferences about what we are thinking on internal (50) cognitive activity that is not itself thought— e.g., fleeting and instantaneous sensations and emotions. The frequent occurrence of such internal activities explains why we develop the capacity to make quick and reliable inferences. Their intemality (55) makes it impossible for anyone else to make an inference based on them that contradicts our own. Thus, they are crucial in creating the illusion of noninferentiality and infallibility.

Common sense suggests that we know our own thoughts directly, but that we infer the thoughts of other people. The former process is noninferential and infallible, while the latter is based on others’ behavior (5) and can always be wrorig. But this assumption is challenged by experiments in psychology demonstrating that in certain circumstances young children tend to misdescribe their own thoughts regarding simple phenomena while nonetheless (10) correctly describing those phenomena. It seems that these children have the same thoughts that adults have regarding the phenomena but are much less capable of identifying these thoughts. Some psychologists argue that this indicates that one’s awareness of one’s own (15) thoughts is every bit as inferential as one’s awareness of another person’s thoughts. According to their interpretation of the experiments, thoughts are unobservable entities that, among other things, help to explain why we act as we do. It follows from this that (20) we are wrong to think of ourselves as having noninferential and infallible access to our own thoughts.

Recognizing an obligation to explain why we cling so tenaciously to an illusory belief in noninferential and infallible knowledge of our own thoughts, these (25) psychologists suggest that this illusion is analogous to what happens to us when we become experts in a particular area. Greater expertise appears to change not only our knowledge of the area as a whole, but our very perception of entities in that area. It appears to us (30) that we become able to see and to grasp these entities and their relations directly, whereas before we could only make inferences about them. For instance, chess experts claim the ability to see without calculation whether a position is weak or strong. (35) From a psychological perspective, we become so expert in making incredibly fast introspective inferences about our thinking that we fail to notice that we are making them. This failure leads naturally to the supposition that there is no way for us to be wrong in (40) our identification of what we ourselves think because we believe we are perceiving it directly.

In claiming that we have only inferential access to our thoughts, the psychologists come perilously close to claiming that we base our inferences about what we (45) ourselves are thinking solely on observations of our own external behavior. But, in fact, their arguments do not commit them to this claim; the psychologists suggest that we are somehow able to base our inferences about what we are thinking on internal (50) cognitive activity that is not itself thought— e.g., fleeting and instantaneous sensations and emotions. The frequent occurrence of such internal activities explains why we develop the capacity to make quick and reliable inferences. Their intemality (55) makes it impossible for anyone else to make an inference based on them that contradicts our own. Thus, they are crucial in creating the illusion of noninferentiality and infallibility.

Common sense suggests that we know our own thoughts directly, but that we infer the thoughts of other people. The former process is noninferential and infallible, while the latter is based on others’ behavior (5) and can always be wrorig. But this assumption is challenged by experiments in psychology demonstrating that in certain circumstances young children tend to misdescribe their own thoughts regarding simple phenomena while nonetheless (10) correctly describing those phenomena. It seems that these children have the same thoughts that adults have regarding the phenomena but are much less capable of identifying these thoughts. Some psychologists argue that this indicates that one’s awareness of one’s own (15) thoughts is every bit as inferential as one’s awareness of another person’s thoughts. According to their interpretation of the experiments, thoughts are unobservable entities that, among other things, help to explain why we act as we do. It follows from this that (20) we are wrong to think of ourselves as having noninferential and infallible access to our own thoughts.

Recognizing an obligation to explain why we cling so tenaciously to an illusory belief in noninferential and infallible knowledge of our own thoughts, these (25) psychologists suggest that this illusion is analogous to what happens to us when we become experts in a particular area. Greater expertise appears to change not only our knowledge of the area as a whole, but our very perception of entities in that area. It appears to us (30) that we become able to see and to grasp these entities and their relations directly, whereas before we could only make inferences about them. For instance, chess experts claim the ability to see without calculation whether a position is weak or strong. (35) From a psychological perspective, we become so expert in making incredibly fast introspective inferences about our thinking that we fail to notice that we are making them. This failure leads naturally to the supposition that there is no way for us to be wrong in (40) our identification of what we ourselves think because we believe we are perceiving it directly.

In claiming that we have only inferential access to our thoughts, the psychologists come perilously close to claiming that we base our inferences about what we (45) ourselves are thinking solely on observations of our own external behavior. But, in fact, their arguments do not commit them to this claim; the psychologists suggest that we are somehow able to base our inferences about what we are thinking on internal (50) cognitive activity that is not itself thought— e.g., fleeting and instantaneous sensations and emotions. The frequent occurrence of such internal activities explains why we develop the capacity to make quick and reliable inferences. Their intemality (55) makes it impossible for anyone else to make an inference based on them that contradicts our own. Thus, they are crucial in creating the illusion of noninferentiality and infallibility.

Common sense suggests that we know our own thoughts directly, but that we infer the thoughts of other people. The former process is noninferential and infallible, while the latter is based on others’ behavior (5) and can always be wrorig. But this assumption is challenged by experiments in psychology demonstrating that in certain circumstances young children tend to misdescribe their own thoughts regarding simple phenomena while nonetheless (10) correctly describing those phenomena. It seems that these children have the same thoughts that adults have regarding the phenomena but are much less capable of identifying these thoughts. Some psychologists argue that this indicates that one’s awareness of one’s own (15) thoughts is every bit as inferential as one’s awareness of another person’s thoughts. According to their interpretation of the experiments, thoughts are unobservable entities that, among other things, help to explain why we act as we do. It follows from this that (20) we are wrong to think of ourselves as having noninferential and infallible access to our own thoughts.

Recognizing an obligation to explain why we cling so tenaciously to an illusory belief in noninferential and infallible knowledge of our own thoughts, these (25) psychologists suggest that this illusion is analogous to what happens to us when we become experts in a particular area. Greater expertise appears to change not only our knowledge of the area as a whole, but our very perception of entities in that area. It appears to us (30) that we become able to see and to grasp these entities and their relations directly, whereas before we could only make inferences about them. For instance, chess experts claim the ability to see without calculation whether a position is weak or strong. (35) From a psychological perspective, we become so expert in making incredibly fast introspective inferences about our thinking that we fail to notice that we are making them. This failure leads naturally to the supposition that there is no way for us to be wrong in (40) our identification of what we ourselves think because we believe we are perceiving it directly.

In claiming that we have only inferential access to our thoughts, the psychologists come perilously close to claiming that we base our inferences about what we (45) ourselves are thinking solely on observations of our own external behavior. But, in fact, their arguments do not commit them to this claim; the psychologists suggest that we are somehow able to base our inferences about what we are thinking on internal (50) cognitive activity that is not itself thought— e.g., fleeting and instantaneous sensations and emotions. The frequent occurrence of such internal activities explains why we develop the capacity to make quick and reliable inferences. Their intemality (55) makes it impossible for anyone else to make an inference based on them that contradicts our own. Thus, they are crucial in creating the illusion of noninferentiality and infallibility.

Common sense suggests that we know our own thoughts directly, but that we infer the thoughts of other people. The former process is noninferential and infallible, while the latter is based on others’ behavior (5) and can always be wrorig. But this assumption is challenged by experiments in psychology demonstrating that in certain circumstances young children tend to misdescribe their own thoughts regarding simple phenomena while nonetheless (10) correctly describing those phenomena. It seems that these children have the same thoughts that adults have regarding the phenomena but are much less capable of identifying these thoughts. Some psychologists argue that this indicates that one’s awareness of one’s own (15) thoughts is every bit as inferential as one’s awareness of another person’s thoughts. According to their interpretation of the experiments, thoughts are unobservable entities that, among other things, help to explain why we act as we do. It follows from this that (20) we are wrong to think of ourselves as having noninferential and infallible access to our own thoughts.

Recognizing an obligation to explain why we cling so tenaciously to an illusory belief in noninferential and infallible knowledge of our own thoughts, these (25) psychologists suggest that this illusion is analogous to what happens to us when we become experts in a particular area. Greater expertise appears to change not only our knowledge of the area as a whole, but our very perception of entities in that area. It appears to us (30) that we become able to see and to grasp these entities and their relations directly, whereas before we could only make inferences about them. For instance, chess experts claim the ability to see without calculation whether a position is weak or strong. (35) From a psychological perspective, we become so expert in making incredibly fast introspective inferences about our thinking that we fail to notice that we are making them. This failure leads naturally to the supposition that there is no way for us to be wrong in (40) our identification of what we ourselves think because we believe we are perceiving it directly.

In claiming that we have only inferential access to our thoughts, the psychologists come perilously close to claiming that we base our inferences about what we (45) ourselves are thinking solely on observations of our own external behavior. But, in fact, their arguments do not commit them to this claim; the psychologists suggest that we are somehow able to base our inferences about what we are thinking on internal (50) cognitive activity that is not itself thought— e.g., fleeting and instantaneous sensations and emotions. The frequent occurrence of such internal activities explains why we develop the capacity to make quick and reliable inferences. Their intemality (55) makes it impossible for anyone else to make an inference based on them that contradicts our own. Thus, they are crucial in creating the illusion of noninferentiality and infallibility.

Common sense suggests that we know our own thoughts directly, but that we infer the thoughts of other people. The former process is noninferential and infallible, while the latter is based on others’ behavior (5) and can always be wrorig. But this assumption is challenged by experiments in psychology demonstrating that in certain circumstances young children tend to misdescribe their own thoughts regarding simple phenomena while nonetheless (10) correctly describing those phenomena. It seems that these children have the same thoughts that adults have regarding the phenomena but are much less capable of identifying these thoughts. Some psychologists argue that this indicates that one’s awareness of one’s own (15) thoughts is every bit as inferential as one’s awareness of another person’s thoughts. According to their interpretation of the experiments, thoughts are unobservable entities that, among other things, help to explain why we act as we do. It follows from this that (20) we are wrong to think of ourselves as having noninferential and infallible access to our own thoughts.

Recognizing an obligation to explain why we cling so tenaciously to an illusory belief in noninferential and infallible knowledge of our own thoughts, these (25) psychologists suggest that this illusion is analogous to what happens to us when we become experts in a particular area. Greater expertise appears to change not only our knowledge of the area as a whole, but our very perception of entities in that area. It appears to us (30) that we become able to see and to grasp these entities and their relations directly, whereas before we could only make inferences about them. For instance, chess experts claim the ability to see without calculation whether a position is weak or strong. (35) From a psychological perspective, we become so expert in making incredibly fast introspective inferences about our thinking that we fail to notice that we are making them. This failure leads naturally to the supposition that there is no way for us to be wrong in (40) our identification of what we ourselves think because we believe we are perceiving it directly.

In claiming that we have only inferential access to our thoughts, the psychologists come perilously close to claiming that we base our inferences about what we (45) ourselves are thinking solely on observations of our own external behavior. But, in fact, their arguments do not commit them to this claim; the psychologists suggest that we are somehow able to base our inferences about what we are thinking on internal (50) cognitive activity that is not itself thought— e.g., fleeting and instantaneous sensations and emotions. The frequent occurrence of such internal activities explains why we develop the capacity to make quick and reliable inferences. Their intemality (55) makes it impossible for anyone else to make an inference based on them that contradicts our own. Thus, they are crucial in creating the illusion of noninferentiality and infallibility.

Dowsing is the practice of detecting resources or objects beneath the ground by passing handheld, inert tools such as forked sticks, pendulums, or metal rods over a terrain. For example, dowsers typically (5) determine prospective water-well drilling locations by walking with a horizontally held forked tree branch until it becomes vertical, claiming the branch is pulled to this position. The distance to the water from the surface and the potential well’s flow rate are then (10) determined by holding the branch horizontally again and either walking in place or backwards while the branch is pulled vertical again. The number of paces indicates the distance to the water, and the strength of the pull felt by the dowser correlates with the potential (15) well’s flow rate.

Those skeptical of dowsing’s efficacy point to the crudeness of its methods as a self-evident reason to question it. They assert that dowsers’ use of inert tools indicates that the dowsers themselves actually make (20) subconscious determinations concerning the likely location of groundwater using clues derived from surface conditions; the tools’ movements merely reflect the dowsers’ subconscious thoughts. Further, skeptics say, numerous studies show that while a few (25) dowsers have demonstrated considerable and consistent success, the success rate for dowsers generally is notably inconsistent. Finally, skeptics note, dowsing to locate groundwater is largely confined to areas where groundwater is expected to (30) be ubiquitous, making it statistically unlikely that a dowsed well will be completely dry.

Proponents of dowsing point out that it involves a number of distinct techniques and contend that each of these techniques should be evaluated separately. They (35) also note that numerous dowsing studies have been influenced by a lack of care in selecting the study population; dowsers are largely self-proclaimed and self-certified, and verifiably successful dowsers are not well represented in the typical study. Proponents (40) claim that successful dowsers may be sensitive to minute changes in Earth’s electromagnetic field associated with variations in subsurface conditions. They also claim that these dowsers have higher success rates than geologists and hydrologists who (45) use scientific tools such as electromagnetic sensors or seismic readings to locate groundwater.

The last two claims were corroborated during a recent and extensive study that utilized teams of the most successful dowsers, geologists, and hydrologists (50) to locate reliable water supplies in various arid countries. Efforts were concentrated on finding groundwater in narrow, tilted fracture zones in bedrock underlying surface sediments. The teams were unfamiliar with the areas targeted, and they agreed (55) that no surface clues existed that could assist in pinpointing the locations of fracture zones. The dowsers consistently made significantly more accurate predictions regarding drill sites, and on request even located a dry fracture zone, suggesting that dowsers (60) can detect variations in subsurface conditions.

Dowsing is the practice of detecting resources or objects beneath the ground by passing handheld, inert tools such as forked sticks, pendulums, or metal rods over a terrain. For example, dowsers typically (5) determine prospective water-well drilling locations by walking with a horizontally held forked tree branch until it becomes vertical, claiming the branch is pulled to this position. The distance to the water from the surface and the potential well’s flow rate are then (10) determined by holding the branch horizontally again and either walking in place or backwards while the branch is pulled vertical again. The number of paces indicates the distance to the water, and the strength of the pull felt by the dowser correlates with the potential (15) well’s flow rate.

Those skeptical of dowsing’s efficacy point to the crudeness of its methods as a self-evident reason to question it. They assert that dowsers’ use of inert tools indicates that the dowsers themselves actually make (20) subconscious determinations concerning the likely location of groundwater using clues derived from surface conditions; the tools’ movements merely reflect the dowsers’ subconscious thoughts. Further, skeptics say, numerous studies show that while a few (25) dowsers have demonstrated considerable and consistent success, the success rate for dowsers generally is notably inconsistent. Finally, skeptics note, dowsing to locate groundwater is largely confined to areas where groundwater is expected to (30) be ubiquitous, making it statistically unlikely that a dowsed well will be completely dry.

Proponents of dowsing point out that it involves a number of distinct techniques and contend that each of these techniques should be evaluated separately. They (35) also note that numerous dowsing studies have been influenced by a lack of care in selecting the study population; dowsers are largely self-proclaimed and self-certified, and verifiably successful dowsers are not well represented in the typical study. Proponents (40) claim that successful dowsers may be sensitive to minute changes in Earth’s electromagnetic field associated with variations in subsurface conditions. They also claim that these dowsers have higher success rates than geologists and hydrologists who (45) use scientific tools such as electromagnetic sensors or seismic readings to locate groundwater.

The last two claims were corroborated during a recent and extensive study that utilized teams of the most successful dowsers, geologists, and hydrologists (50) to locate reliable water supplies in various arid countries. Efforts were concentrated on finding groundwater in narrow, tilted fracture zones in bedrock underlying surface sediments. The teams were unfamiliar with the areas targeted, and they agreed (55) that no surface clues existed that could assist in pinpointing the locations of fracture zones. The dowsers consistently made significantly more accurate predictions regarding drill sites, and on request even located a dry fracture zone, suggesting that dowsers (60) can detect variations in subsurface conditions.

Dowsing is the practice of detecting resources or objects beneath the ground by passing handheld, inert tools such as forked sticks, pendulums, or metal rods over a terrain. For example, dowsers typically (5) determine prospective water-well drilling locations by walking with a horizontally held forked tree branch until it becomes vertical, claiming the branch is pulled to this position. The distance to the water from the surface and the potential well’s flow rate are then (10) determined by holding the branch horizontally again and either walking in place or backwards while the branch is pulled vertical again. The number of paces indicates the distance to the water, and the strength of the pull felt by the dowser correlates with the potential (15) well’s flow rate.

Those skeptical of dowsing’s efficacy point to the crudeness of its methods as a self-evident reason to question it. They assert that dowsers’ use of inert tools indicates that the dowsers themselves actually make (20) subconscious determinations concerning the likely location of groundwater using clues derived from surface conditions; the tools’ movements merely reflect the dowsers’ subconscious thoughts. Further, skeptics say, numerous studies show that while a few (25) dowsers have demonstrated considerable and consistent success, the success rate for dowsers generally is notably inconsistent. Finally, skeptics note, dowsing to locate groundwater is largely confined to areas where groundwater is expected to (30) be ubiquitous, making it statistically unlikely that a dowsed well will be completely dry.

Proponents of dowsing point out that it involves a number of distinct techniques and contend that each of these techniques should be evaluated separately. They (35) also note that numerous dowsing studies have been influenced by a lack of care in selecting the study population; dowsers are largely self-proclaimed and self-certified, and verifiably successful dowsers are not well represented in the typical study. Proponents (40) claim that successful dowsers may be sensitive to minute changes in Earth’s electromagnetic field associated with variations in subsurface conditions. They also claim that these dowsers have higher success rates than geologists and hydrologists who (45) use scientific tools such as electromagnetic sensors or seismic readings to locate groundwater.

The last two claims were corroborated during a recent and extensive study that utilized teams of the most successful dowsers, geologists, and hydrologists (50) to locate reliable water supplies in various arid countries. Efforts were concentrated on finding groundwater in narrow, tilted fracture zones in bedrock underlying surface sediments. The teams were unfamiliar with the areas targeted, and they agreed (55) that no surface clues existed that could assist in pinpointing the locations of fracture zones. The dowsers consistently made significantly more accurate predictions regarding drill sites, and on request even located a dry fracture zone, suggesting that dowsers (60) can detect variations in subsurface conditions.

Dowsing is the practice of detecting resources or objects beneath the ground by passing handheld, inert tools such as forked sticks, pendulums, or metal rods over a terrain. For example, dowsers typically (5) determine prospective water-well drilling locations by walking with a horizontally held forked tree branch until it becomes vertical, claiming the branch is pulled to this position. The distance to the water from the surface and the potential well’s flow rate are then (10) determined by holding the branch horizontally again and either walking in place or backwards while the branch is pulled vertical again. The number of paces indicates the distance to the water, and the strength of the pull felt by the dowser correlates with the potential (15) well’s flow rate.

Those skeptical of dowsing’s efficacy point to the crudeness of its methods as a self-evident reason to question it. They assert that dowsers’ use of inert tools indicates that the dowsers themselves actually make (20) subconscious determinations concerning the likely location of groundwater using clues derived from surface conditions; the tools’ movements merely reflect the dowsers’ subconscious thoughts. Further, skeptics say, numerous studies show that while a few (25) dowsers have demonstrated considerable and consistent success, the success rate for dowsers generally is notably inconsistent. Finally, skeptics note, dowsing to locate groundwater is largely confined to areas where groundwater is expected to (30) be ubiquitous, making it statistically unlikely that a dowsed well will be completely dry.

Proponents of dowsing point out that it involves a number of distinct techniques and contend that each of these techniques should be evaluated separately. They (35) also note that numerous dowsing studies have been influenced by a lack of care in selecting the study population; dowsers are largely self-proclaimed and self-certified, and verifiably successful dowsers are not well represented in the typical study. Proponents (40) claim that successful dowsers may be sensitive to minute changes in Earth’s electromagnetic field associated with variations in subsurface conditions. They also claim that these dowsers have higher success rates than geologists and hydrologists who (45) use scientific tools such as electromagnetic sensors or seismic readings to locate groundwater.

The last two claims were corroborated during a recent and extensive study that utilized teams of the most successful dowsers, geologists, and hydrologists (50) to locate reliable water supplies in various arid countries. Efforts were concentrated on finding groundwater in narrow, tilted fracture zones in bedrock underlying surface sediments. The teams were unfamiliar with the areas targeted, and they agreed (55) that no surface clues existed that could assist in pinpointing the locations of fracture zones. The dowsers consistently made significantly more accurate predictions regarding drill sites, and on request even located a dry fracture zone, suggesting that dowsers (60) can detect variations in subsurface conditions.

Dowsing is the practice of detecting resources or objects beneath the ground by passing handheld, inert tools such as forked sticks, pendulums, or metal rods over a terrain. For example, dowsers typically (5) determine prospective water-well drilling locations by walking with a horizontally held forked tree branch until it becomes vertical, claiming the branch is pulled to this position. The distance to the water from the surface and the potential well’s flow rate are then (10) determined by holding the branch horizontally again and either walking in place or backwards while the branch is pulled vertical again. The number of paces indicates the distance to the water, and the strength of the pull felt by the dowser correlates with the potential (15) well’s flow rate.

Those skeptical of dowsing’s efficacy point to the crudeness of its methods as a self-evident reason to question it. They assert that dowsers’ use of inert tools indicates that the dowsers themselves actually make (20) subconscious determinations concerning the likely location of groundwater using clues derived from surface conditions; the tools’ movements merely reflect the dowsers’ subconscious thoughts. Further, skeptics say, numerous studies show that while a few (25) dowsers have demonstrated considerable and consistent success, the success rate for dowsers generally is notably inconsistent. Finally, skeptics note, dowsing to locate groundwater is largely confined to areas where groundwater is expected to (30) be ubiquitous, making it statistically unlikely that a dowsed well will be completely dry.

Proponents of dowsing point out that it involves a number of distinct techniques and contend that each of these techniques should be evaluated separately. They (35) also note that numerous dowsing studies have been influenced by a lack of care in selecting the study population; dowsers are largely self-proclaimed and self-certified, and verifiably successful dowsers are not well represented in the typical study. Proponents (40) claim that successful dowsers may be sensitive to minute changes in Earth’s electromagnetic field associated with variations in subsurface conditions. They also claim that these dowsers have higher success rates than geologists and hydrologists who (45) use scientific tools such as electromagnetic sensors or seismic readings to locate groundwater.

The last two claims were corroborated during a recent and extensive study that utilized teams of the most successful dowsers, geologists, and hydrologists (50) to locate reliable water supplies in various arid countries. Efforts were concentrated on finding groundwater in narrow, tilted fracture zones in bedrock underlying surface sediments. The teams were unfamiliar with the areas targeted, and they agreed (55) that no surface clues existed that could assist in pinpointing the locations of fracture zones. The dowsers consistently made significantly more accurate predictions regarding drill sites, and on request even located a dry fracture zone, suggesting that dowsers (60) can detect variations in subsurface conditions.

Dowsing is the practice of detecting resources or objects beneath the ground by passing handheld, inert tools such as forked sticks, pendulums, or metal rods over a terrain. For example, dowsers typically (5) determine prospective water-well drilling locations by walking with a horizontally held forked tree branch until it becomes vertical, claiming the branch is pulled to this position. The distance to the water from the surface and the potential well’s flow rate are then (10) determined by holding the branch horizontally again and either walking in place or backwards while the branch is pulled vertical again. The number of paces indicates the distance to the water, and the strength of the pull felt by the dowser correlates with the potential (15) well’s flow rate.

Those skeptical of dowsing’s efficacy point to the crudeness of its methods as a self-evident reason to question it. They assert that dowsers’ use of inert tools indicates that the dowsers themselves actually make (20) subconscious determinations concerning the likely location of groundwater using clues derived from surface conditions; the tools’ movements merely reflect the dowsers’ subconscious thoughts. Further, skeptics say, numerous studies show that while a few (25) dowsers have demonstrated considerable and consistent success, the success rate for dowsers generally is notably inconsistent. Finally, skeptics note, dowsing to locate groundwater is largely confined to areas where groundwater is expected to (30) be ubiquitous, making it statistically unlikely that a dowsed well will be completely dry.

Proponents of dowsing point out that it involves a number of distinct techniques and contend that each of these techniques should be evaluated separately. They (35) also note that numerous dowsing studies have been influenced by a lack of care in selecting the study population; dowsers are largely self-proclaimed and self-certified, and verifiably successful dowsers are not well represented in the typical study. Proponents (40) claim that successful dowsers may be sensitive to minute changes in Earth’s electromagnetic field associated with variations in subsurface conditions. They also claim that these dowsers have higher success rates than geologists and hydrologists who (45) use scientific tools such as electromagnetic sensors or seismic readings to locate groundwater.

The last two claims were corroborated during a recent and extensive study that utilized teams of the most successful dowsers, geologists, and hydrologists (50) to locate reliable water supplies in various arid countries. Efforts were concentrated on finding groundwater in narrow, tilted fracture zones in bedrock underlying surface sediments. The teams were unfamiliar with the areas targeted, and they agreed (55) that no surface clues existed that could assist in pinpointing the locations of fracture zones. The dowsers consistently made significantly more accurate predictions regarding drill sites, and on request even located a dry fracture zone, suggesting that dowsers (60) can detect variations in subsurface conditions.

Passage A

Why do some trial court judges oppose conducting independent research to help them make decisions? One of their objections is that it distorts the adversarial (5) system by requiring an active judicial role and undermining the importance of evidence presented by the opposing parties. Another fear is that judges lack the wherewithal to conduct first-rate research and may wind up using outlier or discredited (10) scientific materials.

While these concerns have some merit, they do not justify an absolute prohibition of the practice. First, there are reasons to sacrifice adversarial values in the scientific evidence context. The adversarial (15) system is particularly ill-suited to handling specialized knowledge. The two parties prescreen and compensate expert witnesses, which virtually ensures conflicting and partisan testimony. At the same time, scientific facts are general truths not confined to the immediate (20) cases. Because scientific admissibility decisions can exert considerable influence over future cases, erroneous decisions detract from the legitimacy of the system. Independent research could help judges avoid such errors.

(25) Second, a trial provides a structure that guides any potential independent research, reducing the possibility of a judge’s reaching outlandish results. Independent research supplements, rather than replaces, the parties’ presentation of the evidence, so (30) the parties always frame the debate.

Passage B

Regardless of what trial courts may do, appellate courts should resist the temptation to conduct their own independent research of scientific literature.

(35) As a general rule, appellate courts do not hear live testimony. Thus these courts lack some of the critical tools available at the trial level for arriving at a determination of the facts: live testimony and cross-examination. Experts practicing in the field may (40) have knowledge and experience beyond what is reflected in the available scientific literature. And adverse parties can test the credibility and reliability of proffered literature by subjecting the expert witness to the greatest legal engine ever invented for the (45) discovery of truth—cross-examination. The trial judge may even participate in the process by questioning live witnesses. However, these events can only occur at the trial level.

Literature considered for the first time at the (50) appellate level is not subject to live comment by practicing experts and cannot be tested in the crucible of the adversarial system. Thus one of the core criticisms against the use of such sources by appellate courts is that doing so usurps the trial court’s fact- (55) finding function. Internet sources, in particular, have come under criticism for their potential unreliability.

When an appellate court goes outside the record to determine case facts, it ignores its function as a court of review, and it substitutes its own questionable (60) research results for evidence that should have been tested in the trial court. This criticism applies with full force to the use of outside-the-record texts and treatises, regardless of the medium in which they are found.

Passage A

Why do some trial court judges oppose conducting independent research to help them make decisions? One of their objections is that it distorts the adversarial (5) system by requiring an active judicial role and undermining the importance of evidence presented by the opposing parties. Another fear is that judges lack the wherewithal to conduct first-rate research and may wind up using outlier or discredited (10) scientific materials.

While these concerns have some merit, they do not justify an absolute prohibition of the practice. First, there are reasons to sacrifice adversarial values in the scientific evidence context. The adversarial (15) system is particularly ill-suited to handling specialized knowledge. The two parties prescreen and compensate expert witnesses, which virtually ensures conflicting and partisan testimony. At the same time, scientific facts are general truths not confined to the immediate (20) cases. Because scientific admissibility decisions can exert considerable influence over future cases, erroneous decisions detract from the legitimacy of the system. Independent research could help judges avoid such errors.

(25) Second, a trial provides a structure that guides any potential independent research, reducing the possibility of a judge’s reaching outlandish results. Independent research supplements, rather than replaces, the parties’ presentation of the evidence, so (30) the parties always frame the debate.

Passage B

Regardless of what trial courts may do, appellate courts should resist the temptation to conduct their own independent research of scientific literature.

(35) As a general rule, appellate courts do not hear live testimony. Thus these courts lack some of the critical tools available at the trial level for arriving at a determination of the facts: live testimony and cross-examination. Experts practicing in the field may (40) have knowledge and experience beyond what is reflected in the available scientific literature. And adverse parties can test the credibility and reliability of proffered literature by subjecting the expert witness to the greatest legal engine ever invented for the (45) discovery of truth—cross-examination. The trial judge may even participate in the process by questioning live witnesses. However, these events can only occur at the trial level.

Literature considered for the first time at the (50) appellate level is not subject to live comment by practicing experts and cannot be tested in the crucible of the adversarial system. Thus one of the core criticisms against the use of such sources by appellate courts is that doing so usurps the trial court’s fact- (55) finding function. Internet sources, in particular, have come under criticism for their potential unreliability.

When an appellate court goes outside the record to determine case facts, it ignores its function as a court of review, and it substitutes its own questionable (60) research results for evidence that should have been tested in the trial court. This criticism applies with full force to the use of outside-the-record texts and treatises, regardless of the medium in which they are found.

Passage A

Why do some trial court judges oppose conducting independent research to help them make decisions? One of their objections is that it distorts the adversarial (5) system by requiring an active judicial role and undermining the importance of evidence presented by the opposing parties. Another fear is that judges lack the wherewithal to conduct first-rate research and may wind up using outlier or discredited (10) scientific materials.

While these concerns have some merit, they do not justify an absolute prohibition of the practice. First, there are reasons to sacrifice adversarial values in the scientific evidence context. The adversarial (15) system is particularly ill-suited to handling specialized knowledge. The two parties prescreen and compensate expert witnesses, which virtually ensures conflicting and partisan testimony. At the same time, scientific facts are general truths not confined to the immediate (20) cases. Because scientific admissibility decisions can exert considerable influence over future cases, erroneous decisions detract from the legitimacy of the system. Independent research could help judges avoid such errors.

(25) Second, a trial provides a structure that guides any potential independent research, reducing the possibility of a judge’s reaching outlandish results. Independent research supplements, rather than replaces, the parties’ presentation of the evidence, so (30) the parties always frame the debate.

Passage B

Regardless of what trial courts may do, appellate courts should resist the temptation to conduct their own independent research of scientific literature.

(35) As a general rule, appellate courts do not hear live testimony. Thus these courts lack some of the critical tools available at the trial level for arriving at a determination of the facts: live testimony and cross-examination. Experts practicing in the field may (40) have knowledge and experience beyond what is reflected in the available scientific literature. And adverse parties can test the credibility and reliability of proffered literature by subjecting the expert witness to the greatest legal engine ever invented for the (45) discovery of truth—cross-examination. The trial judge may even participate in the process by questioning live witnesses. However, these events can only occur at the trial level.

Literature considered for the first time at the (50) appellate level is not subject to live comment by practicing experts and cannot be tested in the crucible of the adversarial system. Thus one of the core criticisms against the use of such sources by appellate courts is that doing so usurps the trial court’s fact- (55) finding function. Internet sources, in particular, have come under criticism for their potential unreliability.

When an appellate court goes outside the record to determine case facts, it ignores its function as a court of review, and it substitutes its own questionable (60) research results for evidence that should have been tested in the trial court. This criticism applies with full force to the use of outside-the-record texts and treatises, regardless of the medium in which they are found.

Passage A

Why do some trial court judges oppose conducting independent research to help them make decisions? One of their objections is that it distorts the adversarial (5) system by requiring an active judicial role and undermining the importance of evidence presented by the opposing parties. Another fear is that judges lack the wherewithal to conduct first-rate research and may wind up using outlier or discredited (10) scientific materials.

While these concerns have some merit, they do not justify an absolute prohibition of the practice. First, there are reasons to sacrifice adversarial values in the scientific evidence context. The adversarial (15) system is particularly ill-suited to handling specialized knowledge. The two parties prescreen and compensate expert witnesses, which virtually ensures conflicting and partisan testimony. At the same time, scientific facts are general truths not confined to the immediate (20) cases. Because scientific admissibility decisions can exert considerable influence over future cases, erroneous decisions detract from the legitimacy of the system. Independent research could help judges avoid such errors.

(25) Second, a trial provides a structure that guides any potential independent research, reducing the possibility of a judge’s reaching outlandish results. Independent research supplements, rather than replaces, the parties’ presentation of the evidence, so (30) the parties always frame the debate.

Passage B

Regardless of what trial courts may do, appellate courts should resist the temptation to conduct their own independent research of scientific literature.

(35) As a general rule, appellate courts do not hear live testimony. Thus these courts lack some of the critical tools available at the trial level for arriving at a determination of the facts: live testimony and cross-examination. Experts practicing in the field may (40) have knowledge and experience beyond what is reflected in the available scientific literature. And adverse parties can test the credibility and reliability of proffered literature by subjecting the expert witness to the greatest legal engine ever invented for the (45) discovery of truth—cross-examination. The trial judge may even participate in the process by questioning live witnesses. However, these events can only occur at the trial level.

Literature considered for the first time at the (50) appellate level is not subject to live comment by practicing experts and cannot be tested in the crucible of the adversarial system. Thus one of the core criticisms against the use of such sources by appellate courts is that doing so usurps the trial court’s fact- (55) finding function. Internet sources, in particular, have come under criticism for their potential unreliability.

When an appellate court goes outside the record to determine case facts, it ignores its function as a court of review, and it substitutes its own questionable (60) research results for evidence that should have been tested in the trial court. This criticism applies with full force to the use of outside-the-record texts and treatises, regardless of the medium in which they are found.

Passage A

Why do some trial court judges oppose conducting independent research to help them make decisions? One of their objections is that it distorts the adversarial (5) system by requiring an active judicial role and undermining the importance of evidence presented by the opposing parties. Another fear is that judges lack the wherewithal to conduct first-rate research and may wind up using outlier or discredited (10) scientific materials.

While these concerns have some merit, they do not justify an absolute prohibition of the practice. First, there are reasons to sacrifice adversarial values in the scientific evidence context. The adversarial (15) system is particularly ill-suited to handling specialized knowledge. The two parties prescreen and compensate expert witnesses, which virtually ensures conflicting and partisan testimony. At the same time, scientific facts are general truths not confined to the immediate (20) cases. Because scientific admissibility decisions can exert considerable influence over future cases, erroneous decisions detract from the legitimacy of the system. Independent research could help judges avoid such errors.

(25) Second, a trial provides a structure that guides any potential independent research, reducing the possibility of a judge’s reaching outlandish results. Independent research supplements, rather than replaces, the parties’ presentation of the evidence, so (30) the parties always frame the debate.

Passage B

Regardless of what trial courts may do, appellate courts should resist the temptation to conduct their own independent research of scientific literature.

(35) As a general rule, appellate courts do not hear live testimony. Thus these courts lack some of the critical tools available at the trial level for arriving at a determination of the facts: live testimony and cross-examination. Experts practicing in the field may (40) have knowledge and experience beyond what is reflected in the available scientific literature. And adverse parties can test the credibility and reliability of proffered literature by subjecting the expert witness to the greatest legal engine ever invented for the (45) discovery of truth—cross-examination. The trial judge may even participate in the process by questioning live witnesses. However, these events can only occur at the trial level.

Literature considered for the first time at the (50) appellate level is not subject to live comment by practicing experts and cannot be tested in the crucible of the adversarial system. Thus one of the core criticisms against the use of such sources by appellate courts is that doing so usurps the trial court’s fact- (55) finding function. Internet sources, in particular, have come under criticism for their potential unreliability.

When an appellate court goes outside the record to determine case facts, it ignores its function as a court of review, and it substitutes its own questionable (60) research results for evidence that should have been tested in the trial court. This criticism applies with full force to the use of outside-the-record texts and treatises, regardless of the medium in which they are found.

Passage A

Why do some trial court judges oppose conducting independent research to help them make decisions? One of their objections is that it distorts the adversarial (5) system by requiring an active judicial role and undermining the importance of evidence presented by the opposing parties. Another fear is that judges lack the wherewithal to conduct first-rate research and may wind up using outlier or discredited (10) scientific materials.

While these concerns have some merit, they do not justify an absolute prohibition of the practice. First, there are reasons to sacrifice adversarial values in the scientific evidence context. The adversarial (15) system is particularly ill-suited to handling specialized knowledge. The two parties prescreen and compensate expert witnesses, which virtually ensures conflicting and partisan testimony. At the same time, scientific facts are general truths not confined to the immediate (20) cases. Because scientific admissibility decisions can exert considerable influence over future cases, erroneous decisions detract from the legitimacy of the system. Independent research could help judges avoid such errors.

(25) Second, a trial provides a structure that guides any potential independent research, reducing the possibility of a judge’s reaching outlandish results. Independent research supplements, rather than replaces, the parties’ presentation of the evidence, so (30) the parties always frame the debate.

Passage B

Regardless of what trial courts may do, appellate courts should resist the temptation to conduct their own independent research of scientific literature.

(35) As a general rule, appellate courts do not hear live testimony. Thus these courts lack some of the critical tools available at the trial level for arriving at a determination of the facts: live testimony and cross-examination. Experts practicing in the field may (40) have knowledge and experience beyond what is reflected in the available scientific literature. And adverse parties can test the credibility and reliability of proffered literature by subjecting the expert witness to the greatest legal engine ever invented for the (45) discovery of truth—cross-examination. The trial judge may even participate in the process by questioning live witnesses. However, these events can only occur at the trial level.

Literature considered for the first time at the (50) appellate level is not subject to live comment by practicing experts and cannot be tested in the crucible of the adversarial system. Thus one of the core criticisms against the use of such sources by appellate courts is that doing so usurps the trial court’s fact- (55) finding function. Internet sources, in particular, have come under criticism for their potential unreliability.

When an appellate court goes outside the record to determine case facts, it ignores its function as a court of review, and it substitutes its own questionable (60) research results for evidence that should have been tested in the trial court. This criticism applies with full force to the use of outside-the-record texts and treatises, regardless of the medium in which they are found.

Passage A

Why do some trial court judges oppose conducting independent research to help them make decisions? One of their objections is that it distorts the adversarial (5) system by requiring an active judicial role and undermining the importance of evidence presented by the opposing parties. Another fear is that judges lack the wherewithal to conduct first-rate research and may wind up using outlier or discredited (10) scientific materials.

While these concerns have some merit, they do not justify an absolute prohibition of the practice. First, there are reasons to sacrifice adversarial values in the scientific evidence context. The adversarial (15) system is particularly ill-suited to handling specialized knowledge. The two parties prescreen and compensate expert witnesses, which virtually ensures conflicting and partisan testimony. At the same time, scientific facts are general truths not confined to the immediate (20) cases. Because scientific admissibility decisions can exert considerable influence over future cases, erroneous decisions detract from the legitimacy of the system. Independent research could help judges avoid such errors.

(25) Second, a trial provides a structure that guides any potential independent research, reducing the possibility of a judge’s reaching outlandish results. Independent research supplements, rather than replaces, the parties’ presentation of the evidence, so (30) the parties always frame the debate.

Passage B

Regardless of what trial courts may do, appellate courts should resist the temptation to conduct their own independent research of scientific literature.

(35) As a general rule, appellate courts do not hear live testimony. Thus these courts lack some of the critical tools available at the trial level for arriving at a determination of the facts: live testimony and cross-examination. Experts practicing in the field may (40) have knowledge and experience beyond what is reflected in the available scientific literature. And adverse parties can test the credibility and reliability of proffered literature by subjecting the expert witness to the greatest legal engine ever invented for the (45) discovery of truth—cross-examination. The trial judge may even participate in the process by questioning live witnesses. However, these events can only occur at the trial level.

Literature considered for the first time at the (50) appellate level is not subject to live comment by practicing experts and cannot be tested in the crucible of the adversarial system. Thus one of the core criticisms against the use of such sources by appellate courts is that doing so usurps the trial court’s fact- (55) finding function. Internet sources, in particular, have come under criticism for their potential unreliability.

When an appellate court goes outside the record to determine case facts, it ignores its function as a court of review, and it substitutes its own questionable (60) research results for evidence that should have been tested in the trial court. This criticism applies with full force to the use of outside-the-record texts and treatises, regardless of the medium in which they are found.