LSAT Practice Test 81 <- LSAT Practice Test 81 - Reading Comprehension - Answers (No Explanations)

LSAT Practice Test 81 - Reading Comprehension - Answers (No Explanations)

LSAT Practice Test 81 - Reading Comprehension - Answers (No Explanations)

1 / 27

1.


Which one of the following most accurately expresses the main point of the passage?


For two decades, Wynton Marsalis complemented
his extraordinary gifts as a jazz trumpeter with
persuasive advocacy of the importance of jazz history
and jazz masters. At his peak, Marsalis ruled the jazz
(5) universe, enjoying virtually unqualified admiration as
a musician and unsurpassed influence as the music’s
leading promoter and defmer. But after drawing
increasing fire from critics and fellow musicians alike
for his neotraditionalism, the biggest name in jazz
(10) faces an uncertain future, as does jazz itself.
In 1999, to mark the end of the century, Marsalis
issued a total of fifteen new CDs. In the following
two years he did not release a single collection of
new music. In fact, after two decades with Columbia
(15) Records—the prestigious label historically associated
with Duke Ellington, Thelonious Monk, and Miles
Davis—Marsalis has no record contract with any
company. Over the past few years Columbia has
drastically reduced its roster of active jazz musicians,
(20) shifting its emphasis to reissues of old recordings.
Atlantic Records folded its jazz catalog into the
operations of its parent company, Warner Music,
and essentially gave up on developing new artists.
For this grim state of affairs in jazz, Marsalis,
(25) the public face of the music and the evident master of
its destiny, has been accused of being at least partly
culpable. Critics charge that, by leading jazz into the
realm of unbending classicism and by sanctifying a
canon of their own choosing, Marsalis and his
(30) adherents have codified the music into a stifling
orthodoxy and inhibited the innovative impulses that
have always advanced jazz. As a former executive
with Columbia noted, “For many people, Marsalis has
come to embody some retro ideology that is not really
(35) of the moment—it’s more museumlike in nature, a
look back.”


Indeed, in seeking to elevate the public perception
of jazz and to encourage young practitioners to pay
attention to the music’s traditions, Marsalis put great
(40) emphasis on its past masters. Still, he never advocated
mere revivalism, and he has demonstrated in his
compositions how traditional elements can be alluded
to, recombined, and reinvented in the name of
individualistic expression, taking the nature of that
(45) tradition and trying to push it forward. However,
record executives came away with a different message:
if the artists of the past are so great and enduring, why
continue investing so much in young talent? So they
shifted their attention to repackaging their catalogs of
(50) vintage recordings.


Where the young talent saw role models and their
critics saw idolatry, the record companies saw brand
names—the ultimate prize of marketing. For long-
established record companies with vast archives of
(55) historic recordings, the economics were irresistible:
it is far more profitable to wrap new covers around
albums paid for generations ago than it is to find,
record, and promote new artists.

2 / 27

2. By stating that many people consider Marsalis to embody a “retro ideology,” the former executive quoted at the end of the third paragraph most likely means that they believe that Marsalis .


- i


For two decades, Wynton Marsalis complemented
his extraordinary gifts as a jazz trumpeter with
persuasive advocacy of the importance of jazz history
and jazz masters. At his peak, Marsalis ruled the jazz
(5) universe, enjoying virtually unqualified admiration as
a musician and unsurpassed influence as the music’s
leading promoter and defmer. But after drawing
increasing fire from critics and fellow musicians alike
for his neotraditionalism, the biggest name in jazz
(10) faces an uncertain future, as does jazz itself.
In 1999, to mark the end of the century, Marsalis
issued a total of fifteen new CDs. In the following
two years he did not release a single collection of
new music. In fact, after two decades with Columbia
(15) Records—the prestigious label historically associated
with Duke Ellington, Thelonious Monk, and Miles
Davis—Marsalis has no record contract with any
company. Over the past few years Columbia has
drastically reduced its roster of active jazz musicians,
(20) shifting its emphasis to reissues of old recordings.
Atlantic Records folded its jazz catalog into the
operations of its parent company, Warner Music,
and essentially gave up on developing new artists.
For this grim state of affairs in jazz, Marsalis,
(25) the public face of the music and the evident master of
its destiny, has been accused of being at least partly
culpable. Critics charge that, by leading jazz into the
realm of unbending classicism and by sanctifying a
canon of their own choosing, Marsalis and his
(30) adherents have codified the music into a stifling
orthodoxy and inhibited the innovative impulses that
have always advanced jazz. As a former executive
with Columbia noted, “For many people, Marsalis has
come to embody some retro ideology that is not really
(35) of the moment—it’s more museumlike in nature, a
look back.”


Indeed, in seeking to elevate the public perception
of jazz and to encourage young practitioners to pay
attention to the music’s traditions, Marsalis put great
(40) emphasis on its past masters. Still, he never advocated
mere revivalism, and he has demonstrated in his
compositions how traditional elements can be alluded
to, recombined, and reinvented in the name of
individualistic expression, taking the nature of that
(45) tradition and trying to push it forward. However,
record executives came away with a different message:
if the artists of the past are so great and enduring, why
continue investing so much in young talent? So they
shifted their attention to repackaging their catalogs of
(50) vintage recordings.


Where the young talent saw role models and their
critics saw idolatry, the record companies saw brand
names—the ultimate prize of marketing. For long-
established record companies with vast archives of
(55) historic recordings, the economics were irresistible:
it is far more profitable to wrap new covers around
albums paid for generations ago than it is to find,
record, and promote new artists.

3 / 27

3.


The author would most likely be less negative about the state of affairs in jazz if


For two decades, Wynton Marsalis complemented
his extraordinary gifts as a jazz trumpeter with
persuasive advocacy of the importance of jazz history
and jazz masters. At his peak, Marsalis ruled the jazz
(5) universe, enjoying virtually unqualified admiration as
a musician and unsurpassed influence as the music’s
leading promoter and defmer. But after drawing
increasing fire from critics and fellow musicians alike
for his neotraditionalism, the biggest name in jazz
(10) faces an uncertain future, as does jazz itself.
In 1999, to mark the end of the century, Marsalis
issued a total of fifteen new CDs. In the following
two years he did not release a single collection of
new music. In fact, after two decades with Columbia
(15) Records—the prestigious label historically associated
with Duke Ellington, Thelonious Monk, and Miles
Davis—Marsalis has no record contract with any
company. Over the past few years Columbia has
drastically reduced its roster of active jazz musicians,
(20) shifting its emphasis to reissues of old recordings.
Atlantic Records folded its jazz catalog into the
operations of its parent company, Warner Music,
and essentially gave up on developing new artists.
For this grim state of affairs in jazz, Marsalis,
(25) the public face of the music and the evident master of
its destiny, has been accused of being at least partly
culpable. Critics charge that, by leading jazz into the
realm of unbending classicism and by sanctifying a
canon of their own choosing, Marsalis and his
(30) adherents have codified the music into a stifling
orthodoxy and inhibited the innovative impulses that
have always advanced jazz. As a former executive
with Columbia noted, “For many people, Marsalis has
come to embody some retro ideology that is not really
(35) of the moment—it’s more museumlike in nature, a
look back.”


Indeed, in seeking to elevate the public perception
of jazz and to encourage young practitioners to pay
attention to the music’s traditions, Marsalis put great
(40) emphasis on its past masters. Still, he never advocated
mere revivalism, and he has demonstrated in his
compositions how traditional elements can be alluded
to, recombined, and reinvented in the name of
individualistic expression, taking the nature of that
(45) tradition and trying to push it forward. However,
record executives came away with a different message:
if the artists of the past are so great and enduring, why
continue investing so much in young talent? So they
shifted their attention to repackaging their catalogs of
(50) vintage recordings.


Where the young talent saw role models and their
critics saw idolatry, the record companies saw brand
names—the ultimate prize of marketing. For long-
established record companies with vast archives of
(55) historic recordings, the economics were irresistible:
it is far more profitable to wrap new covers around
albums paid for generations ago than it is to find,
record, and promote new artists.

4 / 27

4.


Which one of the following describes a situation most analogous to the situation facing Marsalis, as described in the passage?


For two decades, Wynton Marsalis complemented
his extraordinary gifts as a jazz trumpeter with
persuasive advocacy of the importance of jazz history
and jazz masters. At his peak, Marsalis ruled the jazz
(5) universe, enjoying virtually unqualified admiration as
a musician and unsurpassed influence as the music’s
leading promoter and defmer. But after drawing
increasing fire from critics and fellow musicians alike
for his neotraditionalism, the biggest name in jazz
(10) faces an uncertain future, as does jazz itself.
In 1999, to mark the end of the century, Marsalis
issued a total of fifteen new CDs. In the following
two years he did not release a single collection of
new music. In fact, after two decades with Columbia
(15) Records—the prestigious label historically associated
with Duke Ellington, Thelonious Monk, and Miles
Davis—Marsalis has no record contract with any
company. Over the past few years Columbia has
drastically reduced its roster of active jazz musicians,
(20) shifting its emphasis to reissues of old recordings.
Atlantic Records folded its jazz catalog into the
operations of its parent company, Warner Music,
and essentially gave up on developing new artists.
For this grim state of affairs in jazz, Marsalis,
(25) the public face of the music and the evident master of
its destiny, has been accused of being at least partly
culpable. Critics charge that, by leading jazz into the
realm of unbending classicism and by sanctifying a
canon of their own choosing, Marsalis and his
(30) adherents have codified the music into a stifling
orthodoxy and inhibited the innovative impulses that
have always advanced jazz. As a former executive
with Columbia noted, “For many people, Marsalis has
come to embody some retro ideology that is not really
(35) of the moment—it’s more museumlike in nature, a
look back.”


Indeed, in seeking to elevate the public perception
of jazz and to encourage young practitioners to pay
attention to the music’s traditions, Marsalis put great
(40) emphasis on its past masters. Still, he never advocated
mere revivalism, and he has demonstrated in his
compositions how traditional elements can be alluded
to, recombined, and reinvented in the name of
individualistic expression, taking the nature of that
(45) tradition and trying to push it forward. However,
record executives came away with a different message:
if the artists of the past are so great and enduring, why
continue investing so much in young talent? So they
shifted their attention to repackaging their catalogs of
(50) vintage recordings.


Where the young talent saw role models and their
critics saw idolatry, the record companies saw brand
names—the ultimate prize of marketing. For long-
established record companies with vast archives of
(55) historic recordings, the economics were irresistible:
it is far more profitable to wrap new covers around
albums paid for generations ago than it is to find,
record, and promote new artists.

5 / 27

5. According to.


the passage, Marsalis encouraged young jazz musicians to


For two decades, Wynton Marsalis complemented
his extraordinary gifts as a jazz trumpeter with
persuasive advocacy of the importance of jazz history
and jazz masters. At his peak, Marsalis ruled the jazz
(5) universe, enjoying virtually unqualified admiration as
a musician and unsurpassed influence as the music’s
leading promoter and defmer. But after drawing
increasing fire from critics and fellow musicians alike
for his neotraditionalism, the biggest name in jazz
(10) faces an uncertain future, as does jazz itself.
In 1999, to mark the end of the century, Marsalis
issued a total of fifteen new CDs. In the following
two years he did not release a single collection of
new music. In fact, after two decades with Columbia
(15) Records—the prestigious label historically associated
with Duke Ellington, Thelonious Monk, and Miles
Davis—Marsalis has no record contract with any
company. Over the past few years Columbia has
drastically reduced its roster of active jazz musicians,
(20) shifting its emphasis to reissues of old recordings.
Atlantic Records folded its jazz catalog into the
operations of its parent company, Warner Music,
and essentially gave up on developing new artists.
For this grim state of affairs in jazz, Marsalis,
(25) the public face of the music and the evident master of
its destiny, has been accused of being at least partly
culpable. Critics charge that, by leading jazz into the
realm of unbending classicism and by sanctifying a
canon of their own choosing, Marsalis and his
(30) adherents have codified the music into a stifling
orthodoxy and inhibited the innovative impulses that
have always advanced jazz. As a former executive
with Columbia noted, “For many people, Marsalis has
come to embody some retro ideology that is not really
(35) of the moment—it’s more museumlike in nature, a
look back.”


Indeed, in seeking to elevate the public perception
of jazz and to encourage young practitioners to pay
attention to the music’s traditions, Marsalis put great
(40) emphasis on its past masters. Still, he never advocated
mere revivalism, and he has demonstrated in his
compositions how traditional elements can be alluded
to, recombined, and reinvented in the name of
individualistic expression, taking the nature of that
(45) tradition and trying to push it forward. However,
record executives came away with a different message:
if the artists of the past are so great and enduring, why
continue investing so much in young talent? So they
shifted their attention to repackaging their catalogs of
(50) vintage recordings.


Where the young talent saw role models and their
critics saw idolatry, the record companies saw brand
names—the ultimate prize of marketing. For long-
established record companies with vast archives of
(55) historic recordings, the economics were irresistible:
it is far more profitable to wrap new covers around
albums paid for generations ago than it is to find,
record, and promote new artists.

6 / 27

6.


The author would be most likely to agree with which one of the following?


For two decades, Wynton Marsalis complemented
his extraordinary gifts as a jazz trumpeter with
persuasive advocacy of the importance of jazz history
and jazz masters. At his peak, Marsalis ruled the jazz
(5) universe, enjoying virtually unqualified admiration as
a musician and unsurpassed influence as the music’s
leading promoter and defmer. But after drawing
increasing fire from critics and fellow musicians alike
for his neotraditionalism, the biggest name in jazz
(10) faces an uncertain future, as does jazz itself.
In 1999, to mark the end of the century, Marsalis
issued a total of fifteen new CDs. In the following
two years he did not release a single collection of
new music. In fact, after two decades with Columbia
(15) Records—the prestigious label historically associated
with Duke Ellington, Thelonious Monk, and Miles
Davis—Marsalis has no record contract with any
company. Over the past few years Columbia has
drastically reduced its roster of active jazz musicians,
(20) shifting its emphasis to reissues of old recordings.
Atlantic Records folded its jazz catalog into the
operations of its parent company, Warner Music,
and essentially gave up on developing new artists.
For this grim state of affairs in jazz, Marsalis,
(25) the public face of the music and the evident master of
its destiny, has been accused of being at least partly
culpable. Critics charge that, by leading jazz into the
realm of unbending classicism and by sanctifying a
canon of their own choosing, Marsalis and his
(30) adherents have codified the music into a stifling
orthodoxy and inhibited the innovative impulses that
have always advanced jazz. As a former executive
with Columbia noted, “For many people, Marsalis has
come to embody some retro ideology that is not really
(35) of the moment—it’s more museumlike in nature, a
look back.”


Indeed, in seeking to elevate the public perception
of jazz and to encourage young practitioners to pay
attention to the music’s traditions, Marsalis put great
(40) emphasis on its past masters. Still, he never advocated
mere revivalism, and he has demonstrated in his
compositions how traditional elements can be alluded
to, recombined, and reinvented in the name of
individualistic expression, taking the nature of that
(45) tradition and trying to push it forward. However,
record executives came away with a different message:
if the artists of the past are so great and enduring, why
continue investing so much in young talent? So they
shifted their attention to repackaging their catalogs of
(50) vintage recordings.


Where the young talent saw role models and their
critics saw idolatry, the record companies saw brand
names—the ultimate prize of marketing. For long-
established record companies with vast archives of
(55) historic recordings, the economics were irresistible:
it is far more profitable to wrap new covers around
albums paid for generations ago than it is to find,
record, and promote new artists.

7 / 27

7.


The passage provides information sufficient to answer which one of the following questions?


For two decades, Wynton Marsalis complemented
his extraordinary gifts as a jazz trumpeter with
persuasive advocacy of the importance of jazz history
and jazz masters. At his peak, Marsalis ruled the jazz
(5) universe, enjoying virtually unqualified admiration as
a musician and unsurpassed influence as the music’s
leading promoter and defmer. But after drawing
increasing fire from critics and fellow musicians alike
for his neotraditionalism, the biggest name in jazz
(10) faces an uncertain future, as does jazz itself.
In 1999, to mark the end of the century, Marsalis
issued a total of fifteen new CDs. In the following
two years he did not release a single collection of
new music. In fact, after two decades with Columbia
(15) Records—the prestigious label historically associated
with Duke Ellington, Thelonious Monk, and Miles
Davis—Marsalis has no record contract with any
company. Over the past few years Columbia has
drastically reduced its roster of active jazz musicians,
(20) shifting its emphasis to reissues of old recordings.
Atlantic Records folded its jazz catalog into the
operations of its parent company, Warner Music,
and essentially gave up on developing new artists.
For this grim state of affairs in jazz, Marsalis,
(25) the public face of the music and the evident master of
its destiny, has been accused of being at least partly
culpable. Critics charge that, by leading jazz into the
realm of unbending classicism and by sanctifying a
canon of their own choosing, Marsalis and his
(30) adherents have codified the music into a stifling
orthodoxy and inhibited the innovative impulses that
have always advanced jazz. As a former executive
with Columbia noted, “For many people, Marsalis has
come to embody some retro ideology that is not really
(35) of the moment—it’s more museumlike in nature, a
look back.”


Indeed, in seeking to elevate the public perception
of jazz and to encourage young practitioners to pay
attention to the music’s traditions, Marsalis put great
(40) emphasis on its past masters. Still, he never advocated
mere revivalism, and he has demonstrated in his
compositions how traditional elements can be alluded
to, recombined, and reinvented in the name of
individualistic expression, taking the nature of that
(45) tradition and trying to push it forward. However,
record executives came away with a different message:
if the artists of the past are so great and enduring, why
continue investing so much in young talent? So they
shifted their attention to repackaging their catalogs of
(50) vintage recordings.


Where the young talent saw role models and their
critics saw idolatry, the record companies saw brand
names—the ultimate prize of marketing. For long-
established record companies with vast archives of
(55) historic recordings, the economics were irresistible:
it is far more profitable to wrap new covers around
albums paid for generations ago than it is to find,
record, and promote new artists.

8 / 27

8.


Which one of the following most accurately expresses the main point of the passage?


Common sense suggests that we know our own
thoughts directly, but that we infer the thoughts of
other people. The former process is noninferential and
infallible, while the latter is based on others’ behavior
(5) and can always be wrorig. But this assumption is
challenged by experiments in psychology
demonstrating that in certain circumstances young
children tend to misdescribe their own thoughts
regarding simple phenomena while nonetheless
(10) correctly describing those phenomena. It seems that
these children have the same thoughts that adults have
regarding the phenomena but are much less capable of
identifying these thoughts. Some psychologists argue
that this indicates that one’s awareness of one’s own
(15) thoughts is every bit as inferential as one’s awareness
of another person’s thoughts. According to their
interpretation of the experiments, thoughts are
unobservable entities that, among other things, help to
explain why we act as we do. It follows from this that
(20) we are wrong to think of ourselves as having
noninferential and infallible access to our own thoughts.


Recognizing an obligation to explain why we cling
so tenaciously to an illusory belief in noninferential
and infallible knowledge of our own thoughts, these
(25) psychologists suggest that this illusion is analogous to
what happens to us when we become experts in a
particular area. Greater expertise appears to change
not only our knowledge of the area as a whole, but our
very perception of entities in that area. It appears to us
(30) that we become able to see and to grasp these entities
and their relations directly, whereas before we could
only make inferences about them. For instance,
chess experts claim the ability to see without
calculation whether a position is weak or strong.
(35) From a psychological perspective, we become so
expert in making incredibly fast introspective
inferences about our thinking that we fail to notice that
we are making them. This failure leads naturally to the
supposition that there is no way for us to be wrong in
(40) our identification of what we ourselves think because
we believe we are perceiving it directly.


In claiming that we have only inferential access to
our thoughts, the psychologists come perilously close
to claiming that we base our inferences about what we
(45) ourselves are thinking solely on observations of our
own external behavior. But, in fact, their arguments
do not commit them to this claim; the psychologists
suggest that we are somehow able to base our
inferences about what we are thinking on internal
(50) cognitive activity that is not itself thought—
e.g., fleeting and instantaneous sensations and
emotions. The frequent occurrence of such internal
activities explains why we develop the capacity to
make quick and reliable inferences. Their intemality
(55) makes it impossible for anyone else to make an
inference based on them that contradicts our own.
Thus, they are crucial in creating the illusion of
noninferentiality and infallibility.

9 / 27

9.


Which one of the following, if true, would most call into question the psychologists’ interpretation of the experiments with children (lines 10-16)?


Common sense suggests that we know our own
thoughts directly, but that we infer the thoughts of
other people. The former process is noninferential and
infallible, while the latter is based on others’ behavior
(5) and can always be wrorig. But this assumption is
challenged by experiments in psychology
demonstrating that in certain circumstances young
children tend to misdescribe their own thoughts
regarding simple phenomena while nonetheless
(10) correctly describing those phenomena. It seems that
these children have the same thoughts that adults have
regarding the phenomena but are much less capable of
identifying these thoughts. Some psychologists argue
that this indicates that one’s awareness of one’s own
(15) thoughts is every bit as inferential as one’s awareness
of another person’s thoughts. According to their
interpretation of the experiments, thoughts are
unobservable entities that, among other things, help to
explain why we act as we do. It follows from this that
(20) we are wrong to think of ourselves as having
noninferential and infallible access to our own thoughts.


Recognizing an obligation to explain why we cling
so tenaciously to an illusory belief in noninferential
and infallible knowledge of our own thoughts, these
(25) psychologists suggest that this illusion is analogous to
what happens to us when we become experts in a
particular area. Greater expertise appears to change
not only our knowledge of the area as a whole, but our
very perception of entities in that area. It appears to us
(30) that we become able to see and to grasp these entities
and their relations directly, whereas before we could
only make inferences about them. For instance,
chess experts claim the ability to see without
calculation whether a position is weak or strong.
(35) From a psychological perspective, we become so
expert in making incredibly fast introspective
inferences about our thinking that we fail to notice that
we are making them. This failure leads naturally to the
supposition that there is no way for us to be wrong in
(40) our identification of what we ourselves think because
we believe we are perceiving it directly.


In claiming that we have only inferential access to
our thoughts, the psychologists come perilously close
to claiming that we base our inferences about what we
(45) ourselves are thinking solely on observations of our
own external behavior. But, in fact, their arguments
do not commit them to this claim; the psychologists
suggest that we are somehow able to base our
inferences about what we are thinking on internal
(50) cognitive activity that is not itself thought—
e.g., fleeting and instantaneous sensations and
emotions. The frequent occurrence of such internal
activities explains why we develop the capacity to
make quick and reliable inferences. Their intemality
(55) makes it impossible for anyone else to make an
inference based on them that contradicts our own.
Thus, they are crucial in creating the illusion of
noninferentiality and infallibility.

10 / 27

10.


Based on the passage, the author is most likely to believe which one of the following about the view that “we base our inferences about what we ourselves are thinking solely on observations of our own external ' behavior” (lines 44—46)?


Common sense suggests that we know our own
thoughts directly, but that we infer the thoughts of
other people. The former process is noninferential and
infallible, while the latter is based on others’ behavior
(5) and can always be wrorig. But this assumption is
challenged by experiments in psychology
demonstrating that in certain circumstances young
children tend to misdescribe their own thoughts
regarding simple phenomena while nonetheless
(10) correctly describing those phenomena. It seems that
these children have the same thoughts that adults have
regarding the phenomena but are much less capable of
identifying these thoughts. Some psychologists argue
that this indicates that one’s awareness of one’s own
(15) thoughts is every bit as inferential as one’s awareness
of another person’s thoughts. According to their
interpretation of the experiments, thoughts are
unobservable entities that, among other things, help to
explain why we act as we do. It follows from this that
(20) we are wrong to think of ourselves as having
noninferential and infallible access to our own thoughts.


Recognizing an obligation to explain why we cling
so tenaciously to an illusory belief in noninferential
and infallible knowledge of our own thoughts, these
(25) psychologists suggest that this illusion is analogous to
what happens to us when we become experts in a
particular area. Greater expertise appears to change
not only our knowledge of the area as a whole, but our
very perception of entities in that area. It appears to us
(30) that we become able to see and to grasp these entities
and their relations directly, whereas before we could
only make inferences about them. For instance,
chess experts claim the ability to see without
calculation whether a position is weak or strong.
(35) From a psychological perspective, we become so
expert in making incredibly fast introspective
inferences about our thinking that we fail to notice that
we are making them. This failure leads naturally to the
supposition that there is no way for us to be wrong in
(40) our identification of what we ourselves think because
we believe we are perceiving it directly.


In claiming that we have only inferential access to
our thoughts, the psychologists come perilously close
to claiming that we base our inferences about what we
(45) ourselves are thinking solely on observations of our
own external behavior. But, in fact, their arguments
do not commit them to this claim; the psychologists
suggest that we are somehow able to base our
inferences about what we are thinking on internal
(50) cognitive activity that is not itself thought—
e.g., fleeting and instantaneous sensations and
emotions. The frequent occurrence of such internal
activities explains why we develop the capacity to
make quick and reliable inferences. Their intemality
(55) makes it impossible for anyone else to make an
inference based on them that contradicts our own.
Thus, they are crucial in creating the illusion of
noninferentiality and infallibility.

11 / 27

11.


Which one of the following is most closely analogous to the explanation in the passage of how persons fail to notice that they are making inferences about their thoughts?


Common sense suggests that we know our own
thoughts directly, but that we infer the thoughts of
other people. The former process is noninferential and
infallible, while the latter is based on others’ behavior
(5) and can always be wrorig. But this assumption is
challenged by experiments in psychology
demonstrating that in certain circumstances young
children tend to misdescribe their own thoughts
regarding simple phenomena while nonetheless
(10) correctly describing those phenomena. It seems that
these children have the same thoughts that adults have
regarding the phenomena but are much less capable of
identifying these thoughts. Some psychologists argue
that this indicates that one’s awareness of one’s own
(15) thoughts is every bit as inferential as one’s awareness
of another person’s thoughts. According to their
interpretation of the experiments, thoughts are
unobservable entities that, among other things, help to
explain why we act as we do. It follows from this that
(20) we are wrong to think of ourselves as having
noninferential and infallible access to our own thoughts.


Recognizing an obligation to explain why we cling
so tenaciously to an illusory belief in noninferential
and infallible knowledge of our own thoughts, these
(25) psychologists suggest that this illusion is analogous to
what happens to us when we become experts in a
particular area. Greater expertise appears to change
not only our knowledge of the area as a whole, but our
very perception of entities in that area. It appears to us
(30) that we become able to see and to grasp these entities
and their relations directly, whereas before we could
only make inferences about them. For instance,
chess experts claim the ability to see without
calculation whether a position is weak or strong.
(35) From a psychological perspective, we become so
expert in making incredibly fast introspective
inferences about our thinking that we fail to notice that
we are making them. This failure leads naturally to the
supposition that there is no way for us to be wrong in
(40) our identification of what we ourselves think because
we believe we are perceiving it directly.


In claiming that we have only inferential access to
our thoughts, the psychologists come perilously close
to claiming that we base our inferences about what we
(45) ourselves are thinking solely on observations of our
own external behavior. But, in fact, their arguments
do not commit them to this claim; the psychologists
suggest that we are somehow able to base our
inferences about what we are thinking on internal
(50) cognitive activity that is not itself thought—
e.g., fleeting and instantaneous sensations and
emotions. The frequent occurrence of such internal
activities explains why we develop the capacity to
make quick and reliable inferences. Their intemality
(55) makes it impossible for anyone else to make an
inference based on them that contradicts our own.
Thus, they are crucial in creating the illusion of
noninferentiality and infallibility.

12 / 27

12.


According to the passage, one’s gaining greater expertise in a field appears to result in


Common sense suggests that we know our own
thoughts directly, but that we infer the thoughts of
other people. The former process is noninferential and
infallible, while the latter is based on others’ behavior
(5) and can always be wrorig. But this assumption is
challenged by experiments in psychology
demonstrating that in certain circumstances young
children tend to misdescribe their own thoughts
regarding simple phenomena while nonetheless
(10) correctly describing those phenomena. It seems that
these children have the same thoughts that adults have
regarding the phenomena but are much less capable of
identifying these thoughts. Some psychologists argue
that this indicates that one’s awareness of one’s own
(15) thoughts is every bit as inferential as one’s awareness
of another person’s thoughts. According to their
interpretation of the experiments, thoughts are
unobservable entities that, among other things, help to
explain why we act as we do. It follows from this that
(20) we are wrong to think of ourselves as having
noninferential and infallible access to our own thoughts.


Recognizing an obligation to explain why we cling
so tenaciously to an illusory belief in noninferential
and infallible knowledge of our own thoughts, these
(25) psychologists suggest that this illusion is analogous to
what happens to us when we become experts in a
particular area. Greater expertise appears to change
not only our knowledge of the area as a whole, but our
very perception of entities in that area. It appears to us
(30) that we become able to see and to grasp these entities
and their relations directly, whereas before we could
only make inferences about them. For instance,
chess experts claim the ability to see without
calculation whether a position is weak or strong.
(35) From a psychological perspective, we become so
expert in making incredibly fast introspective
inferences about our thinking that we fail to notice that
we are making them. This failure leads naturally to the
supposition that there is no way for us to be wrong in
(40) our identification of what we ourselves think because
we believe we are perceiving it directly.


In claiming that we have only inferential access to
our thoughts, the psychologists come perilously close
to claiming that we base our inferences about what we
(45) ourselves are thinking solely on observations of our
own external behavior. But, in fact, their arguments
do not commit them to this claim; the psychologists
suggest that we are somehow able to base our
inferences about what we are thinking on internal
(50) cognitive activity that is not itself thought—
e.g., fleeting and instantaneous sensations and
emotions. The frequent occurrence of such internal
activities explains why we develop the capacity to
make quick and reliable inferences. Their intemality
(55) makes it impossible for anyone else to make an
inference based on them that contradicts our own.
Thus, they are crucial in creating the illusion of
noninferentiality and infallibility.

13 / 27

13.


According to the psychologists cited in the passage, the illusion of direct knowledge of our own thoughts arises from the fact that


Common sense suggests that we know our own
thoughts directly, but that we infer the thoughts of
other people. The former process is noninferential and
infallible, while the latter is based on others’ behavior
(5) and can always be wrorig. But this assumption is
challenged by experiments in psychology
demonstrating that in certain circumstances young
children tend to misdescribe their own thoughts
regarding simple phenomena while nonetheless
(10) correctly describing those phenomena. It seems that
these children have the same thoughts that adults have
regarding the phenomena but are much less capable of
identifying these thoughts. Some psychologists argue
that this indicates that one’s awareness of one’s own
(15) thoughts is every bit as inferential as one’s awareness
of another person’s thoughts. According to their
interpretation of the experiments, thoughts are
unobservable entities that, among other things, help to
explain why we act as we do. It follows from this that
(20) we are wrong to think of ourselves as having
noninferential and infallible access to our own thoughts.


Recognizing an obligation to explain why we cling
so tenaciously to an illusory belief in noninferential
and infallible knowledge of our own thoughts, these
(25) psychologists suggest that this illusion is analogous to
what happens to us when we become experts in a
particular area. Greater expertise appears to change
not only our knowledge of the area as a whole, but our
very perception of entities in that area. It appears to us
(30) that we become able to see and to grasp these entities
and their relations directly, whereas before we could
only make inferences about them. For instance,
chess experts claim the ability to see without
calculation whether a position is weak or strong.
(35) From a psychological perspective, we become so
expert in making incredibly fast introspective
inferences about our thinking that we fail to notice that
we are making them. This failure leads naturally to the
supposition that there is no way for us to be wrong in
(40) our identification of what we ourselves think because
we believe we are perceiving it directly.


In claiming that we have only inferential access to
our thoughts, the psychologists come perilously close
to claiming that we base our inferences about what we
(45) ourselves are thinking solely on observations of our
own external behavior. But, in fact, their arguments
do not commit them to this claim; the psychologists
suggest that we are somehow able to base our
inferences about what we are thinking on internal
(50) cognitive activity that is not itself thought—
e.g., fleeting and instantaneous sensations and
emotions. The frequent occurrence of such internal
activities explains why we develop the capacity to
make quick and reliable inferences. Their intemality
(55) makes it impossible for anyone else to make an
inference based on them that contradicts our own.
Thus, they are crucial in creating the illusion of
noninferentiality and infallibility.

14 / 27

14.


It can most reasonably be inferred that the choice of children as the subjects of the psychology experiments discussed in the passage was advantageous to the experimenters for which one of the following reasons?


Common sense suggests that we know our own
thoughts directly, but that we infer the thoughts of
other people. The former process is noninferential and
infallible, while the latter is based on others’ behavior
(5) and can always be wrorig. But this assumption is
challenged by experiments in psychology
demonstrating that in certain circumstances young
children tend to misdescribe their own thoughts
regarding simple phenomena while nonetheless
(10) correctly describing those phenomena. It seems that
these children have the same thoughts that adults have
regarding the phenomena but are much less capable of
identifying these thoughts. Some psychologists argue
that this indicates that one’s awareness of one’s own
(15) thoughts is every bit as inferential as one’s awareness
of another person’s thoughts. According to their
interpretation of the experiments, thoughts are
unobservable entities that, among other things, help to
explain why we act as we do. It follows from this that
(20) we are wrong to think of ourselves as having
noninferential and infallible access to our own thoughts.


Recognizing an obligation to explain why we cling
so tenaciously to an illusory belief in noninferential
and infallible knowledge of our own thoughts, these
(25) psychologists suggest that this illusion is analogous to
what happens to us when we become experts in a
particular area. Greater expertise appears to change
not only our knowledge of the area as a whole, but our
very perception of entities in that area. It appears to us
(30) that we become able to see and to grasp these entities
and their relations directly, whereas before we could
only make inferences about them. For instance,
chess experts claim the ability to see without
calculation whether a position is weak or strong.
(35) From a psychological perspective, we become so
expert in making incredibly fast introspective
inferences about our thinking that we fail to notice that
we are making them. This failure leads naturally to the
supposition that there is no way for us to be wrong in
(40) our identification of what we ourselves think because
we believe we are perceiving it directly.


In claiming that we have only inferential access to
our thoughts, the psychologists come perilously close
to claiming that we base our inferences about what we
(45) ourselves are thinking solely on observations of our
own external behavior. But, in fact, their arguments
do not commit them to this claim; the psychologists
suggest that we are somehow able to base our
inferences about what we are thinking on internal
(50) cognitive activity that is not itself thought—
e.g., fleeting and instantaneous sensations and
emotions. The frequent occurrence of such internal
activities explains why we develop the capacity to
make quick and reliable inferences. Their intemality
(55) makes it impossible for anyone else to make an
inference based on them that contradicts our own.
Thus, they are crucial in creating the illusion of
noninferentiality and infallibility.

15 / 27

15.


Which one of the following most accurately describes the primary purpose of the second paragraph?


Dowsing is the practice of detecting resources or
objects beneath the ground by passing handheld, inert
tools such as forked sticks, pendulums, or metal rods
over a terrain. For example, dowsers typically
(5) determine prospective water-well drilling locations by
walking with a horizontally held forked tree branch
until it becomes vertical, claiming the branch is pulled
to this position. The distance to the water from the
surface and the potential well’s flow rate are then
(10) determined by holding the branch horizontally again
and either walking in place or backwards while the
branch is pulled vertical again. The number of paces
indicates the distance to the water, and the strength of
the pull felt by the dowser correlates with the potential
(15) well’s flow rate.


Those skeptical of dowsing’s efficacy point to the
crudeness of its methods as a self-evident reason to
question it. They assert that dowsers’ use of inert tools
indicates that the dowsers themselves actually make
(20) subconscious determinations concerning the likely
location of groundwater using clues derived from
surface conditions; the tools’ movements merely
reflect the dowsers’ subconscious thoughts. Further,
skeptics say, numerous studies show that while a few
(25) dowsers have demonstrated considerable and
consistent success, the success rate for dowsers
generally is notably inconsistent. Finally, skeptics
note, dowsing to locate groundwater is largely
confined to areas where groundwater is expected to
(30) be ubiquitous, making it statistically unlikely that a
dowsed well will be completely dry.


Proponents of dowsing point out that it involves a
number of distinct techniques and contend that each of
these techniques should be evaluated separately. They
(35) also note that numerous dowsing studies have been
influenced by a lack of care in selecting the study
population; dowsers are largely self-proclaimed and
self-certified, and verifiably successful dowsers are
not well represented in the typical study. Proponents
(40) claim that successful dowsers may be sensitive to
minute changes in Earth’s electromagnetic field
associated with variations in subsurface conditions.
They also claim that these dowsers have higher
success rates than geologists and hydrologists who
(45) use scientific tools such as electromagnetic sensors or
seismic readings to locate groundwater.


The last two claims were corroborated during a
recent and extensive study that utilized teams of the
most successful dowsers, geologists, and hydrologists
(50) to locate reliable water supplies in various arid
countries. Efforts were concentrated on finding
groundwater in narrow, tilted fracture zones in bedrock
underlying surface sediments. The teams were
unfamiliar with the areas targeted, and they agreed
(55) that no surface clues existed that could assist in
pinpointing the locations of fracture zones. The
dowsers consistently made significantly more accurate
predictions regarding drill sites, and on request even
located a dry fracture zone, suggesting that dowsers
(60) can detect variations in subsurface conditions.

16 / 27

16.


According to the passage, dowsing’s skeptics acknowledge which one of the following?


Dowsing is the practice of detecting resources or
objects beneath the ground by passing handheld, inert
tools such as forked sticks, pendulums, or metal rods
over a terrain. For example, dowsers typically
(5) determine prospective water-well drilling locations by
walking with a horizontally held forked tree branch
until it becomes vertical, claiming the branch is pulled
to this position. The distance to the water from the
surface and the potential well’s flow rate are then
(10) determined by holding the branch horizontally again
and either walking in place or backwards while the
branch is pulled vertical again. The number of paces
indicates the distance to the water, and the strength of
the pull felt by the dowser correlates with the potential
(15) well’s flow rate.


Those skeptical of dowsing’s efficacy point to the
crudeness of its methods as a self-evident reason to
question it. They assert that dowsers’ use of inert tools
indicates that the dowsers themselves actually make
(20) subconscious determinations concerning the likely
location of groundwater using clues derived from
surface conditions; the tools’ movements merely
reflect the dowsers’ subconscious thoughts. Further,
skeptics say, numerous studies show that while a few
(25) dowsers have demonstrated considerable and
consistent success, the success rate for dowsers
generally is notably inconsistent. Finally, skeptics
note, dowsing to locate groundwater is largely
confined to areas where groundwater is expected to
(30) be ubiquitous, making it statistically unlikely that a
dowsed well will be completely dry.


Proponents of dowsing point out that it involves a
number of distinct techniques and contend that each of
these techniques should be evaluated separately. They
(35) also note that numerous dowsing studies have been
influenced by a lack of care in selecting the study
population; dowsers are largely self-proclaimed and
self-certified, and verifiably successful dowsers are
not well represented in the typical study. Proponents
(40) claim that successful dowsers may be sensitive to
minute changes in Earth’s electromagnetic field
associated with variations in subsurface conditions.
They also claim that these dowsers have higher
success rates than geologists and hydrologists who
(45) use scientific tools such as electromagnetic sensors or
seismic readings to locate groundwater.


The last two claims were corroborated during a
recent and extensive study that utilized teams of the
most successful dowsers, geologists, and hydrologists
(50) to locate reliable water supplies in various arid
countries. Efforts were concentrated on finding
groundwater in narrow, tilted fracture zones in bedrock
underlying surface sediments. The teams were
unfamiliar with the areas targeted, and they agreed
(55) that no surface clues existed that could assist in
pinpointing the locations of fracture zones. The
dowsers consistently made significantly more accurate
predictions regarding drill sites, and on request even
located a dry fracture zone, suggesting that dowsers
(60) can detect variations in subsurface conditions.

17 / 27

17.


The reasoning in which one of the following is most analogous to an argument explicitly attributed to dowsing’s skeptics in the passage?


Dowsing is the practice of detecting resources or
objects beneath the ground by passing handheld, inert
tools such as forked sticks, pendulums, or metal rods
over a terrain. For example, dowsers typically
(5) determine prospective water-well drilling locations by
walking with a horizontally held forked tree branch
until it becomes vertical, claiming the branch is pulled
to this position. The distance to the water from the
surface and the potential well’s flow rate are then
(10) determined by holding the branch horizontally again
and either walking in place or backwards while the
branch is pulled vertical again. The number of paces
indicates the distance to the water, and the strength of
the pull felt by the dowser correlates with the potential
(15) well’s flow rate.


Those skeptical of dowsing’s efficacy point to the
crudeness of its methods as a self-evident reason to
question it. They assert that dowsers’ use of inert tools
indicates that the dowsers themselves actually make
(20) subconscious determinations concerning the likely
location of groundwater using clues derived from
surface conditions; the tools’ movements merely
reflect the dowsers’ subconscious thoughts. Further,
skeptics say, numerous studies show that while a few
(25) dowsers have demonstrated considerable and
consistent success, the success rate for dowsers
generally is notably inconsistent. Finally, skeptics
note, dowsing to locate groundwater is largely
confined to areas where groundwater is expected to
(30) be ubiquitous, making it statistically unlikely that a
dowsed well will be completely dry.


Proponents of dowsing point out that it involves a
number of distinct techniques and contend that each of
these techniques should be evaluated separately. They
(35) also note that numerous dowsing studies have been
influenced by a lack of care in selecting the study
population; dowsers are largely self-proclaimed and
self-certified, and verifiably successful dowsers are
not well represented in the typical study. Proponents
(40) claim that successful dowsers may be sensitive to
minute changes in Earth’s electromagnetic field
associated with variations in subsurface conditions.
They also claim that these dowsers have higher
success rates than geologists and hydrologists who
(45) use scientific tools such as electromagnetic sensors or
seismic readings to locate groundwater.


The last two claims were corroborated during a
recent and extensive study that utilized teams of the
most successful dowsers, geologists, and hydrologists
(50) to locate reliable water supplies in various arid
countries. Efforts were concentrated on finding
groundwater in narrow, tilted fracture zones in bedrock
underlying surface sediments. The teams were
unfamiliar with the areas targeted, and they agreed
(55) that no surface clues existed that could assist in
pinpointing the locations of fracture zones. The
dowsers consistently made significantly more accurate
predictions regarding drill sites, and on request even
located a dry fracture zone, suggesting that dowsers
(60) can detect variations in subsurface conditions.

18 / 27

18.


The author of the passage would be most likely to agree with which one of the following statements about the results of the groundwater-locating study discussed in the final paragraph?


Dowsing is the practice of detecting resources or
objects beneath the ground by passing handheld, inert
tools such as forked sticks, pendulums, or metal rods
over a terrain. For example, dowsers typically
(5) determine prospective water-well drilling locations by
walking with a horizontally held forked tree branch
until it becomes vertical, claiming the branch is pulled
to this position. The distance to the water from the
surface and the potential well’s flow rate are then
(10) determined by holding the branch horizontally again
and either walking in place or backwards while the
branch is pulled vertical again. The number of paces
indicates the distance to the water, and the strength of
the pull felt by the dowser correlates with the potential
(15) well’s flow rate.


Those skeptical of dowsing’s efficacy point to the
crudeness of its methods as a self-evident reason to
question it. They assert that dowsers’ use of inert tools
indicates that the dowsers themselves actually make
(20) subconscious determinations concerning the likely
location of groundwater using clues derived from
surface conditions; the tools’ movements merely
reflect the dowsers’ subconscious thoughts. Further,
skeptics say, numerous studies show that while a few
(25) dowsers have demonstrated considerable and
consistent success, the success rate for dowsers
generally is notably inconsistent. Finally, skeptics
note, dowsing to locate groundwater is largely
confined to areas where groundwater is expected to
(30) be ubiquitous, making it statistically unlikely that a
dowsed well will be completely dry.


Proponents of dowsing point out that it involves a
number of distinct techniques and contend that each of
these techniques should be evaluated separately. They
(35) also note that numerous dowsing studies have been
influenced by a lack of care in selecting the study
population; dowsers are largely self-proclaimed and
self-certified, and verifiably successful dowsers are
not well represented in the typical study. Proponents
(40) claim that successful dowsers may be sensitive to
minute changes in Earth’s electromagnetic field
associated with variations in subsurface conditions.
They also claim that these dowsers have higher
success rates than geologists and hydrologists who
(45) use scientific tools such as electromagnetic sensors or
seismic readings to locate groundwater.


The last two claims were corroborated during a
recent and extensive study that utilized teams of the
most successful dowsers, geologists, and hydrologists
(50) to locate reliable water supplies in various arid
countries. Efforts were concentrated on finding
groundwater in narrow, tilted fracture zones in bedrock
underlying surface sediments. The teams were
unfamiliar with the areas targeted, and they agreed
(55) that no surface clues existed that could assist in
pinpointing the locations of fracture zones. The
dowsers consistently made significantly more accurate
predictions regarding drill sites, and on request even
located a dry fracture zone, suggesting that dowsers
(60) can detect variations in subsurface conditions.

19 / 27

19.


The passage, provides information most helpful in answering which one of the following questions?


Dowsing is the practice of detecting resources or
objects beneath the ground by passing handheld, inert
tools such as forked sticks, pendulums, or metal rods
over a terrain. For example, dowsers typically
(5) determine prospective water-well drilling locations by
walking with a horizontally held forked tree branch
until it becomes vertical, claiming the branch is pulled
to this position. The distance to the water from the
surface and the potential well’s flow rate are then
(10) determined by holding the branch horizontally again
and either walking in place or backwards while the
branch is pulled vertical again. The number of paces
indicates the distance to the water, and the strength of
the pull felt by the dowser correlates with the potential
(15) well’s flow rate.


Those skeptical of dowsing’s efficacy point to the
crudeness of its methods as a self-evident reason to
question it. They assert that dowsers’ use of inert tools
indicates that the dowsers themselves actually make
(20) subconscious determinations concerning the likely
location of groundwater using clues derived from
surface conditions; the tools’ movements merely
reflect the dowsers’ subconscious thoughts. Further,
skeptics say, numerous studies show that while a few
(25) dowsers have demonstrated considerable and
consistent success, the success rate for dowsers
generally is notably inconsistent. Finally, skeptics
note, dowsing to locate groundwater is largely
confined to areas where groundwater is expected to
(30) be ubiquitous, making it statistically unlikely that a
dowsed well will be completely dry.


Proponents of dowsing point out that it involves a
number of distinct techniques and contend that each of
these techniques should be evaluated separately. They
(35) also note that numerous dowsing studies have been
influenced by a lack of care in selecting the study
population; dowsers are largely self-proclaimed and
self-certified, and verifiably successful dowsers are
not well represented in the typical study. Proponents
(40) claim that successful dowsers may be sensitive to
minute changes in Earth’s electromagnetic field
associated with variations in subsurface conditions.
They also claim that these dowsers have higher
success rates than geologists and hydrologists who
(45) use scientific tools such as electromagnetic sensors or
seismic readings to locate groundwater.


The last two claims were corroborated during a
recent and extensive study that utilized teams of the
most successful dowsers, geologists, and hydrologists
(50) to locate reliable water supplies in various arid
countries. Efforts were concentrated on finding
groundwater in narrow, tilted fracture zones in bedrock
underlying surface sediments. The teams were
unfamiliar with the areas targeted, and they agreed
(55) that no surface clues existed that could assist in
pinpointing the locations of fracture zones. The
dowsers consistently made significantly more accurate
predictions regarding drill sites, and on request even
located a dry fracture zone, suggesting that dowsers
(60) can detect variations in subsurface conditions.

20 / 27

20.


The passage provides the most support for inferring which one of the following statements?


Dowsing is the practice of detecting resources or
objects beneath the ground by passing handheld, inert
tools such as forked sticks, pendulums, or metal rods
over a terrain. For example, dowsers typically
(5) determine prospective water-well drilling locations by
walking with a horizontally held forked tree branch
until it becomes vertical, claiming the branch is pulled
to this position. The distance to the water from the
surface and the potential well’s flow rate are then
(10) determined by holding the branch horizontally again
and either walking in place or backwards while the
branch is pulled vertical again. The number of paces
indicates the distance to the water, and the strength of
the pull felt by the dowser correlates with the potential
(15) well’s flow rate.


Those skeptical of dowsing’s efficacy point to the
crudeness of its methods as a self-evident reason to
question it. They assert that dowsers’ use of inert tools
indicates that the dowsers themselves actually make
(20) subconscious determinations concerning the likely
location of groundwater using clues derived from
surface conditions; the tools’ movements merely
reflect the dowsers’ subconscious thoughts. Further,
skeptics say, numerous studies show that while a few
(25) dowsers have demonstrated considerable and
consistent success, the success rate for dowsers
generally is notably inconsistent. Finally, skeptics
note, dowsing to locate groundwater is largely
confined to areas where groundwater is expected to
(30) be ubiquitous, making it statistically unlikely that a
dowsed well will be completely dry.


Proponents of dowsing point out that it involves a
number of distinct techniques and contend that each of
these techniques should be evaluated separately. They
(35) also note that numerous dowsing studies have been
influenced by a lack of care in selecting the study
population; dowsers are largely self-proclaimed and
self-certified, and verifiably successful dowsers are
not well represented in the typical study. Proponents
(40) claim that successful dowsers may be sensitive to
minute changes in Earth’s electromagnetic field
associated with variations in subsurface conditions.
They also claim that these dowsers have higher
success rates than geologists and hydrologists who
(45) use scientific tools such as electromagnetic sensors or
seismic readings to locate groundwater.


The last two claims were corroborated during a
recent and extensive study that utilized teams of the
most successful dowsers, geologists, and hydrologists
(50) to locate reliable water supplies in various arid
countries. Efforts were concentrated on finding
groundwater in narrow, tilted fracture zones in bedrock
underlying surface sediments. The teams were
unfamiliar with the areas targeted, and they agreed
(55) that no surface clues existed that could assist in
pinpointing the locations of fracture zones. The
dowsers consistently made significantly more accurate
predictions regarding drill sites, and on request even
located a dry fracture zone, suggesting that dowsers
(60) can detect variations in subsurface conditions.

21 / 27

21.


Which one of the following principles underlies the arguments in both passages?


Passage A


Why do some trial court judges oppose conducting
independent research to help them make decisions?
One of their objections is that it distorts the adversarial
(5) system by requiring an active judicial role and
undermining the importance of evidence presented
by the opposing parties. Another fear is that judges
lack the wherewithal to conduct first-rate research
and may wind up using outlier or discredited
(10) scientific materials.


While these concerns have some merit, they do
not justify an absolute prohibition of the practice.
First, there are reasons to sacrifice adversarial values
in the scientific evidence context. The adversarial
(15) system is particularly ill-suited to handling specialized
knowledge. The two parties prescreen and compensate
expert witnesses, which virtually ensures conflicting
and partisan testimony. At the same time, scientific
facts are general truths not confined to the immediate
(20) cases. Because scientific admissibility decisions can
exert considerable influence over future cases,
erroneous decisions detract from the legitimacy of the
system. Independent research could help judges avoid
such errors.


(25) Second, a trial provides a structure that guides
any potential independent research, reducing the
possibility of a judge’s reaching outlandish results.
Independent research supplements, rather than
replaces, the parties’ presentation of the evidence, so
(30) the parties always frame the debate.


Passage B


Regardless of what trial courts may do, appellate
courts should resist the temptation to conduct their
own independent research of scientific literature.


(35) As a general rule, appellate courts do not hear
live testimony. Thus these courts lack some of the
critical tools available at the trial level for arriving
at a determination of the facts: live testimony and
cross-examination. Experts practicing in the field may
(40) have knowledge and experience beyond what is
reflected in the available scientific literature. And
adverse parties can test the credibility and reliability
of proffered literature by subjecting the expert witness
to the greatest legal engine ever invented for the
(45) discovery of truth—cross-examination. The trial judge
may even participate in the process by questioning
live witnesses. However, these events can only occur
at the trial level.


Literature considered for the first time at the
(50) appellate level is not subject to live comment by
practicing experts and cannot be tested in the crucible
of the adversarial system. Thus one of the core
criticisms against the use of such sources by appellate
courts is that doing so usurps the trial court’s fact-
(55) finding function. Internet sources, in particular, have
come under criticism for their potential unreliability.


When an appellate court goes outside the record
to determine case facts, it ignores its function as a
court of review, and it substitutes its own questionable
(60) research results for evidence that should have been
tested in the trial court. This criticism applies with
full force to the use of outside-the-record texts and
treatises, regardless of the medium in which they
are found.

22 / 27

22.


It can be inferred that each author would agree that if judges conduct independent research, that research


Passage A


Why do some trial court judges oppose conducting
independent research to help them make decisions?
One of their objections is that it distorts the adversarial
(5) system by requiring an active judicial role and
undermining the importance of evidence presented
by the opposing parties. Another fear is that judges
lack the wherewithal to conduct first-rate research
and may wind up using outlier or discredited
(10) scientific materials.


While these concerns have some merit, they do
not justify an absolute prohibition of the practice.
First, there are reasons to sacrifice adversarial values
in the scientific evidence context. The adversarial
(15) system is particularly ill-suited to handling specialized
knowledge. The two parties prescreen and compensate
expert witnesses, which virtually ensures conflicting
and partisan testimony. At the same time, scientific
facts are general truths not confined to the immediate
(20) cases. Because scientific admissibility decisions can
exert considerable influence over future cases,
erroneous decisions detract from the legitimacy of the
system. Independent research could help judges avoid
such errors.


(25) Second, a trial provides a structure that guides
any potential independent research, reducing the
possibility of a judge’s reaching outlandish results.
Independent research supplements, rather than
replaces, the parties’ presentation of the evidence, so
(30) the parties always frame the debate.


Passage B


Regardless of what trial courts may do, appellate
courts should resist the temptation to conduct their
own independent research of scientific literature.


(35) As a general rule, appellate courts do not hear
live testimony. Thus these courts lack some of the
critical tools available at the trial level for arriving
at a determination of the facts: live testimony and
cross-examination. Experts practicing in the field may
(40) have knowledge and experience beyond what is
reflected in the available scientific literature. And
adverse parties can test the credibility and reliability
of proffered literature by subjecting the expert witness
to the greatest legal engine ever invented for the
(45) discovery of truth—cross-examination. The trial judge
may even participate in the process by questioning
live witnesses. However, these events can only occur
at the trial level.


Literature considered for the first time at the
(50) appellate level is not subject to live comment by
practicing experts and cannot be tested in the crucible
of the adversarial system. Thus one of the core
criticisms against the use of such sources by appellate
courts is that doing so usurps the trial court’s fact-
(55) finding function. Internet sources, in particular, have
come under criticism for their potential unreliability.


When an appellate court goes outside the record
to determine case facts, it ignores its function as a
court of review, and it substitutes its own questionable
(60) research results for evidence that should have been
tested in the trial court. This criticism applies with
full force to the use of outside-the-record texts and
treatises, regardless of the medium in which they
are found.

23 / 27

23.


Which one of the following phrases is used by the author of passage B to express a concern that is most closely related to the concern expressed by the author of passage A using the phrase “lack the wherewithal” (line 7)?


Passage A


Why do some trial court judges oppose conducting
independent research to help them make decisions?
One of their objections is that it distorts the adversarial
(5) system by requiring an active judicial role and
undermining the importance of evidence presented
by the opposing parties. Another fear is that judges
lack the wherewithal to conduct first-rate research
and may wind up using outlier or discredited
(10) scientific materials.


While these concerns have some merit, they do
not justify an absolute prohibition of the practice.
First, there are reasons to sacrifice adversarial values
in the scientific evidence context. The adversarial
(15) system is particularly ill-suited to handling specialized
knowledge. The two parties prescreen and compensate
expert witnesses, which virtually ensures conflicting
and partisan testimony. At the same time, scientific
facts are general truths not confined to the immediate
(20) cases. Because scientific admissibility decisions can
exert considerable influence over future cases,
erroneous decisions detract from the legitimacy of the
system. Independent research could help judges avoid
such errors.


(25) Second, a trial provides a structure that guides
any potential independent research, reducing the
possibility of a judge’s reaching outlandish results.
Independent research supplements, rather than
replaces, the parties’ presentation of the evidence, so
(30) the parties always frame the debate.


Passage B


Regardless of what trial courts may do, appellate
courts should resist the temptation to conduct their
own independent research of scientific literature.


(35) As a general rule, appellate courts do not hear
live testimony. Thus these courts lack some of the
critical tools available at the trial level for arriving
at a determination of the facts: live testimony and
cross-examination. Experts practicing in the field may
(40) have knowledge and experience beyond what is
reflected in the available scientific literature. And
adverse parties can test the credibility and reliability
of proffered literature by subjecting the expert witness
to the greatest legal engine ever invented for the
(45) discovery of truth—cross-examination. The trial judge
may even participate in the process by questioning
live witnesses. However, these events can only occur
at the trial level.


Literature considered for the first time at the
(50) appellate level is not subject to live comment by
practicing experts and cannot be tested in the crucible
of the adversarial system. Thus one of the core
criticisms against the use of such sources by appellate
courts is that doing so usurps the trial court’s fact-
(55) finding function. Internet sources, in particular, have
come under criticism for their potential unreliability.


When an appellate court goes outside the record
to determine case facts, it ignores its function as a
court of review, and it substitutes its own questionable
(60) research results for evidence that should have been
tested in the trial court. This criticism applies with
full force to the use of outside-the-record texts and
treatises, regardless of the medium in which they
are found.

24 / 27

24.


Given the statements about cross-examination in lines 39-^3, the author of passage B would be most likely to take issue with which one of the following claims by the author of passage A?


Passage A


Why do some trial court judges oppose conducting
independent research to help them make decisions?
One of their objections is that it distorts the adversarial
(5) system by requiring an active judicial role and
undermining the importance of evidence presented
by the opposing parties. Another fear is that judges
lack the wherewithal to conduct first-rate research
and may wind up using outlier or discredited
(10) scientific materials.


While these concerns have some merit, they do
not justify an absolute prohibition of the practice.
First, there are reasons to sacrifice adversarial values
in the scientific evidence context. The adversarial
(15) system is particularly ill-suited to handling specialized
knowledge. The two parties prescreen and compensate
expert witnesses, which virtually ensures conflicting
and partisan testimony. At the same time, scientific
facts are general truths not confined to the immediate
(20) cases. Because scientific admissibility decisions can
exert considerable influence over future cases,
erroneous decisions detract from the legitimacy of the
system. Independent research could help judges avoid
such errors.


(25) Second, a trial provides a structure that guides
any potential independent research, reducing the
possibility of a judge’s reaching outlandish results.
Independent research supplements, rather than
replaces, the parties’ presentation of the evidence, so
(30) the parties always frame the debate.


Passage B


Regardless of what trial courts may do, appellate
courts should resist the temptation to conduct their
own independent research of scientific literature.


(35) As a general rule, appellate courts do not hear
live testimony. Thus these courts lack some of the
critical tools available at the trial level for arriving
at a determination of the facts: live testimony and
cross-examination. Experts practicing in the field may
(40) have knowledge and experience beyond what is
reflected in the available scientific literature. And
adverse parties can test the credibility and reliability
of proffered literature by subjecting the expert witness
to the greatest legal engine ever invented for the
(45) discovery of truth—cross-examination. The trial judge
may even participate in the process by questioning
live witnesses. However, these events can only occur
at the trial level.


Literature considered for the first time at the
(50) appellate level is not subject to live comment by
practicing experts and cannot be tested in the crucible
of the adversarial system. Thus one of the core
criticisms against the use of such sources by appellate
courts is that doing so usurps the trial court’s fact-
(55) finding function. Internet sources, in particular, have
come under criticism for their potential unreliability.


When an appellate court goes outside the record
to determine case facts, it ignores its function as a
court of review, and it substitutes its own questionable
(60) research results for evidence that should have been
tested in the trial court. This criticism applies with
full force to the use of outside-the-record texts and
treatises, regardless of the medium in which they
are found.

25 / 27

25.


Which one of the following words as used in passage B comes closest to having the same reference as the word “crucible” in line 49?


Passage A


Why do some trial court judges oppose conducting
independent research to help them make decisions?
One of their objections is that it distorts the adversarial
(5) system by requiring an active judicial role and
undermining the importance of evidence presented
by the opposing parties. Another fear is that judges
lack the wherewithal to conduct first-rate research
and may wind up using outlier or discredited
(10) scientific materials.


While these concerns have some merit, they do
not justify an absolute prohibition of the practice.
First, there are reasons to sacrifice adversarial values
in the scientific evidence context. The adversarial
(15) system is particularly ill-suited to handling specialized
knowledge. The two parties prescreen and compensate
expert witnesses, which virtually ensures conflicting
and partisan testimony. At the same time, scientific
facts are general truths not confined to the immediate
(20) cases. Because scientific admissibility decisions can
exert considerable influence over future cases,
erroneous decisions detract from the legitimacy of the
system. Independent research could help judges avoid
such errors.


(25) Second, a trial provides a structure that guides
any potential independent research, reducing the
possibility of a judge’s reaching outlandish results.
Independent research supplements, rather than
replaces, the parties’ presentation of the evidence, so
(30) the parties always frame the debate.


Passage B


Regardless of what trial courts may do, appellate
courts should resist the temptation to conduct their
own independent research of scientific literature.


(35) As a general rule, appellate courts do not hear
live testimony. Thus these courts lack some of the
critical tools available at the trial level for arriving
at a determination of the facts: live testimony and
cross-examination. Experts practicing in the field may
(40) have knowledge and experience beyond what is
reflected in the available scientific literature. And
adverse parties can test the credibility and reliability
of proffered literature by subjecting the expert witness
to the greatest legal engine ever invented for the
(45) discovery of truth—cross-examination. The trial judge
may even participate in the process by questioning
live witnesses. However, these events can only occur
at the trial level.


Literature considered for the first time at the
(50) appellate level is not subject to live comment by
practicing experts and cannot be tested in the crucible
of the adversarial system. Thus one of the core
criticisms against the use of such sources by appellate
courts is that doing so usurps the trial court’s fact-
(55) finding function. Internet sources, in particular, have
come under criticism for their potential unreliability.


When an appellate court goes outside the record
to determine case facts, it ignores its function as a
court of review, and it substitutes its own questionable
(60) research results for evidence that should have been
tested in the trial court. This criticism applies with
full force to the use of outside-the-record texts and
treatises, regardless of the medium in which they
are found.

26 / 27

26.


It can be inferred, based on their titles, that the relationship between which one of the following pairs of documents is most analogous to the relationship between passage A and passage B, respectively?


Passage A


Why do some trial court judges oppose conducting
independent research to help them make decisions?
One of their objections is that it distorts the adversarial
(5) system by requiring an active judicial role and
undermining the importance of evidence presented
by the opposing parties. Another fear is that judges
lack the wherewithal to conduct first-rate research
and may wind up using outlier or discredited
(10) scientific materials.


While these concerns have some merit, they do
not justify an absolute prohibition of the practice.
First, there are reasons to sacrifice adversarial values
in the scientific evidence context. The adversarial
(15) system is particularly ill-suited to handling specialized
knowledge. The two parties prescreen and compensate
expert witnesses, which virtually ensures conflicting
and partisan testimony. At the same time, scientific
facts are general truths not confined to the immediate
(20) cases. Because scientific admissibility decisions can
exert considerable influence over future cases,
erroneous decisions detract from the legitimacy of the
system. Independent research could help judges avoid
such errors.


(25) Second, a trial provides a structure that guides
any potential independent research, reducing the
possibility of a judge’s reaching outlandish results.
Independent research supplements, rather than
replaces, the parties’ presentation of the evidence, so
(30) the parties always frame the debate.


Passage B


Regardless of what trial courts may do, appellate
courts should resist the temptation to conduct their
own independent research of scientific literature.


(35) As a general rule, appellate courts do not hear
live testimony. Thus these courts lack some of the
critical tools available at the trial level for arriving
at a determination of the facts: live testimony and
cross-examination. Experts practicing in the field may
(40) have knowledge and experience beyond what is
reflected in the available scientific literature. And
adverse parties can test the credibility and reliability
of proffered literature by subjecting the expert witness
to the greatest legal engine ever invented for the
(45) discovery of truth—cross-examination. The trial judge
may even participate in the process by questioning
live witnesses. However, these events can only occur
at the trial level.


Literature considered for the first time at the
(50) appellate level is not subject to live comment by
practicing experts and cannot be tested in the crucible
of the adversarial system. Thus one of the core
criticisms against the use of such sources by appellate
courts is that doing so usurps the trial court’s fact-
(55) finding function. Internet sources, in particular, have
come under criticism for their potential unreliability.


When an appellate court goes outside the record
to determine case facts, it ignores its function as a
court of review, and it substitutes its own questionable
(60) research results for evidence that should have been
tested in the trial court. This criticism applies with
full force to the use of outside-the-record texts and
treatises, regardless of the medium in which they
are found.

27 / 27

27.


The stances of the authors of passage A and passage B, respectively, toward independent research on the part of trial judges are most accurately described as


Passage A


Why do some trial court judges oppose conducting
independent research to help them make decisions?
One of their objections is that it distorts the adversarial
(5) system by requiring an active judicial role and
undermining the importance of evidence presented
by the opposing parties. Another fear is that judges
lack the wherewithal to conduct first-rate research
and may wind up using outlier or discredited
(10) scientific materials.


While these concerns have some merit, they do
not justify an absolute prohibition of the practice.
First, there are reasons to sacrifice adversarial values
in the scientific evidence context. The adversarial
(15) system is particularly ill-suited to handling specialized
knowledge. The two parties prescreen and compensate
expert witnesses, which virtually ensures conflicting
and partisan testimony. At the same time, scientific
facts are general truths not confined to the immediate
(20) cases. Because scientific admissibility decisions can
exert considerable influence over future cases,
erroneous decisions detract from the legitimacy of the
system. Independent research could help judges avoid
such errors.


(25) Second, a trial provides a structure that guides
any potential independent research, reducing the
possibility of a judge’s reaching outlandish results.
Independent research supplements, rather than
replaces, the parties’ presentation of the evidence, so
(30) the parties always frame the debate.


Passage B


Regardless of what trial courts may do, appellate
courts should resist the temptation to conduct their
own independent research of scientific literature.


(35) As a general rule, appellate courts do not hear
live testimony. Thus these courts lack some of the
critical tools available at the trial level for arriving
at a determination of the facts: live testimony and
cross-examination. Experts practicing in the field may
(40) have knowledge and experience beyond what is
reflected in the available scientific literature. And
adverse parties can test the credibility and reliability
of proffered literature by subjecting the expert witness
to the greatest legal engine ever invented for the
(45) discovery of truth—cross-examination. The trial judge
may even participate in the process by questioning
live witnesses. However, these events can only occur
at the trial level.


Literature considered for the first time at the
(50) appellate level is not subject to live comment by
practicing experts and cannot be tested in the crucible
of the adversarial system. Thus one of the core
criticisms against the use of such sources by appellate
courts is that doing so usurps the trial court’s fact-
(55) finding function. Internet sources, in particular, have
come under criticism for their potential unreliability.


When an appellate court goes outside the record
to determine case facts, it ignores its function as a
court of review, and it substitutes its own questionable
(60) research results for evidence that should have been
tested in the trial court. This criticism applies with
full force to the use of outside-the-record texts and
treatises, regardless of the medium in which they
are found.

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About This Quiz

This is Reading Comprehension from LSAT Practice Test 81. The test was created in June, 2017.