LSAT Practice Test 83 - Reading Comprehension - Answers (No Explanations)

Chinese is a language of many distinct dialects that are often mutually unintelligible. Some linguists have argued that a new dialect of Chinese has evolved in the United States, which is commonly used in the (5) Chinatown section of San Francisco. The characterization of this “Chinatown Chinese” as a distinct dialect is based primarily on two claims: first, that it is so different from any other dialect used in China that a person newly arrived from that country might have a (10) difficult time communicating with a Chinese American in San Francisco who speaks nominally the same language as the newcomer, and, second, that no matter which of the traditional Chinese dialects one speaks, one can communicate effectively with other Chinese (15) Americans in San Francisco so long as one is proficient in the uniquely Chinese-American terminologies.

Regarding the first claim, much of the distinctive vocabulary of Chinatown Chinese consists of proper names of geographical places and terms for things (20) that some people, especially those bom and raised in villages, had never encountered in China. Some are transliterated terms, such as dang-tang for “downtown.” Others are direct translations from American English, such as gong-ngihn ngiht bor” plus “day”) for (25) “Labor Day.” However, the core of the language brought to the U.S. by Chinese people has remained intact. Thus, the new vocabulary has supplemented, but not supplanted, the traditional language in the traditional dialects. In fact, normal conversations can (30) be conducted fairly readily between Chinese-speaking Chinese Americans and new arrivals from China, provided that they speak the same traditional Chinese dialect as each other. Terms not familiar to the newcomer, most of which would name objects, places, (35) and events that are part of the local experience, can easily be avoided or explained by the speaker, or their meaning can be inferred from the context. The supposed language barrier is, therefore, mostly imaginary.

The second claim—that the sharing of a uniquely (40) Chinese-American vocabulary makes possible communication among Chinese Americans no matter what their basic dialect of Chinese may be—is a misleading oversimplification. While many Chinese-American speakers of other Chinese dialects (45) have become familiar with Cantonese, now the most common dialect of Chinese spoken in the U.S., through watching Cantonese movies and by hearing that dialect in Hong Kong, Guandong, or the U.S., this is not the same thing as sharing a single unique (50) dialect. Moreover, the dialects of Chinese can differ markedly in their systems of sounds and, to some extent, in grammar and vocabulary, and these differences persist among Chinese-American speakers of these various dialects. Hence, even a common (55) vocabulary for such things as names of U.S. cities, street names, and non-Chinese items does not guarantee mutual intelligibility because these words constitute only a minute percentage of each dialect and are generally peripheral to the core vocabulary.

Chinese is a language of many distinct dialects that are often mutually unintelligible. Some linguists have argued that a new dialect of Chinese has evolved in the United States, which is commonly used in the (5) Chinatown section of San Francisco. The characterization of this “Chinatown Chinese” as a distinct dialect is based primarily on two claims: first, that it is so different from any other dialect used in China that a person newly arrived from that country might have a (10) difficult time communicating with a Chinese American in San Francisco who speaks nominally the same language as the newcomer, and, second, that no matter which of the traditional Chinese dialects one speaks, one can communicate effectively with other Chinese (15) Americans in San Francisco so long as one is proficient in the uniquely Chinese-American terminologies.

Regarding the first claim, much of the distinctive vocabulary of Chinatown Chinese consists of proper names of geographical places and terms for things (20) that some people, especially those bom and raised in villages, had never encountered in China. Some are transliterated terms, such as dang-tang for “downtown.” Others are direct translations from American English, such as gong-ngihn ngiht bor” plus “day”) for (25) “Labor Day.” However, the core of the language brought to the U.S. by Chinese people has remained intact. Thus, the new vocabulary has supplemented, but not supplanted, the traditional language in the traditional dialects. In fact, normal conversations can (30) be conducted fairly readily between Chinese-speaking Chinese Americans and new arrivals from China, provided that they speak the same traditional Chinese dialect as each other. Terms not familiar to the newcomer, most of which would name objects, places, (35) and events that are part of the local experience, can easily be avoided or explained by the speaker, or their meaning can be inferred from the context. The supposed language barrier is, therefore, mostly imaginary.

The second claim—that the sharing of a uniquely (40) Chinese-American vocabulary makes possible communication among Chinese Americans no matter what their basic dialect of Chinese may be—is a misleading oversimplification. While many Chinese-American speakers of other Chinese dialects (45) have become familiar with Cantonese, now the most common dialect of Chinese spoken in the U.S., through watching Cantonese movies and by hearing that dialect in Hong Kong, Guandong, or the U.S., this is not the same thing as sharing a single unique (50) dialect. Moreover, the dialects of Chinese can differ markedly in their systems of sounds and, to some extent, in grammar and vocabulary, and these differences persist among Chinese-American speakers of these various dialects. Hence, even a common (55) vocabulary for such things as names of U.S. cities, street names, and non-Chinese items does not guarantee mutual intelligibility because these words constitute only a minute percentage of each dialect and are generally peripheral to the core vocabulary.

Chinese is a language of many distinct dialects that are often mutually unintelligible. Some linguists have argued that a new dialect of Chinese has evolved in the United States, which is commonly used in the (5) Chinatown section of San Francisco. The characterization of this “Chinatown Chinese” as a distinct dialect is based primarily on two claims: first, that it is so different from any other dialect used in China that a person newly arrived from that country might have a (10) difficult time communicating with a Chinese American in San Francisco who speaks nominally the same language as the newcomer, and, second, that no matter which of the traditional Chinese dialects one speaks, one can communicate effectively with other Chinese (15) Americans in San Francisco so long as one is proficient in the uniquely Chinese-American terminologies.

Regarding the first claim, much of the distinctive vocabulary of Chinatown Chinese consists of proper names of geographical places and terms for things (20) that some people, especially those bom and raised in villages, had never encountered in China. Some are transliterated terms, such as dang-tang for “downtown.” Others are direct translations from American English, such as gong-ngihn ngiht bor” plus “day”) for (25) “Labor Day.” However, the core of the language brought to the U.S. by Chinese people has remained intact. Thus, the new vocabulary has supplemented, but not supplanted, the traditional language in the traditional dialects. In fact, normal conversations can (30) be conducted fairly readily between Chinese-speaking Chinese Americans and new arrivals from China, provided that they speak the same traditional Chinese dialect as each other. Terms not familiar to the newcomer, most of which would name objects, places, (35) and events that are part of the local experience, can easily be avoided or explained by the speaker, or their meaning can be inferred from the context. The supposed language barrier is, therefore, mostly imaginary.

The second claim—that the sharing of a uniquely (40) Chinese-American vocabulary makes possible communication among Chinese Americans no matter what their basic dialect of Chinese may be—is a misleading oversimplification. While many Chinese-American speakers of other Chinese dialects (45) have become familiar with Cantonese, now the most common dialect of Chinese spoken in the U.S., through watching Cantonese movies and by hearing that dialect in Hong Kong, Guandong, or the U.S., this is not the same thing as sharing a single unique (50) dialect. Moreover, the dialects of Chinese can differ markedly in their systems of sounds and, to some extent, in grammar and vocabulary, and these differences persist among Chinese-American speakers of these various dialects. Hence, even a common (55) vocabulary for such things as names of U.S. cities, street names, and non-Chinese items does not guarantee mutual intelligibility because these words constitute only a minute percentage of each dialect and are generally peripheral to the core vocabulary.

Chinese is a language of many distinct dialects that are often mutually unintelligible. Some linguists have argued that a new dialect of Chinese has evolved in the United States, which is commonly used in the (5) Chinatown section of San Francisco. The characterization of this “Chinatown Chinese” as a distinct dialect is based primarily on two claims: first, that it is so different from any other dialect used in China that a person newly arrived from that country might have a (10) difficult time communicating with a Chinese American in San Francisco who speaks nominally the same language as the newcomer, and, second, that no matter which of the traditional Chinese dialects one speaks, one can communicate effectively with other Chinese (15) Americans in San Francisco so long as one is proficient in the uniquely Chinese-American terminologies.

Regarding the first claim, much of the distinctive vocabulary of Chinatown Chinese consists of proper names of geographical places and terms for things (20) that some people, especially those bom and raised in villages, had never encountered in China. Some are transliterated terms, such as dang-tang for “downtown.” Others are direct translations from American English, such as gong-ngihn ngiht bor” plus “day”) for (25) “Labor Day.” However, the core of the language brought to the U.S. by Chinese people has remained intact. Thus, the new vocabulary has supplemented, but not supplanted, the traditional language in the traditional dialects. In fact, normal conversations can (30) be conducted fairly readily between Chinese-speaking Chinese Americans and new arrivals from China, provided that they speak the same traditional Chinese dialect as each other. Terms not familiar to the newcomer, most of which would name objects, places, (35) and events that are part of the local experience, can easily be avoided or explained by the speaker, or their meaning can be inferred from the context. The supposed language barrier is, therefore, mostly imaginary.

The second claim—that the sharing of a uniquely (40) Chinese-American vocabulary makes possible communication among Chinese Americans no matter what their basic dialect of Chinese may be—is a misleading oversimplification. While many Chinese-American speakers of other Chinese dialects (45) have become familiar with Cantonese, now the most common dialect of Chinese spoken in the U.S., through watching Cantonese movies and by hearing that dialect in Hong Kong, Guandong, or the U.S., this is not the same thing as sharing a single unique (50) dialect. Moreover, the dialects of Chinese can differ markedly in their systems of sounds and, to some extent, in grammar and vocabulary, and these differences persist among Chinese-American speakers of these various dialects. Hence, even a common (55) vocabulary for such things as names of U.S. cities, street names, and non-Chinese items does not guarantee mutual intelligibility because these words constitute only a minute percentage of each dialect and are generally peripheral to the core vocabulary.

Chinese is a language of many distinct dialects that are often mutually unintelligible. Some linguists have argued that a new dialect of Chinese has evolved in the United States, which is commonly used in the (5) Chinatown section of San Francisco. The characterization of this “Chinatown Chinese” as a distinct dialect is based primarily on two claims: first, that it is so different from any other dialect used in China that a person newly arrived from that country might have a (10) difficult time communicating with a Chinese American in San Francisco who speaks nominally the same language as the newcomer, and, second, that no matter which of the traditional Chinese dialects one speaks, one can communicate effectively with other Chinese (15) Americans in San Francisco so long as one is proficient in the uniquely Chinese-American terminologies.

Regarding the first claim, much of the distinctive vocabulary of Chinatown Chinese consists of proper names of geographical places and terms for things (20) that some people, especially those bom and raised in villages, had never encountered in China. Some are transliterated terms, such as dang-tang for “downtown.” Others are direct translations from American English, such as gong-ngihn ngiht bor” plus “day”) for (25) “Labor Day.” However, the core of the language brought to the U.S. by Chinese people has remained intact. Thus, the new vocabulary has supplemented, but not supplanted, the traditional language in the traditional dialects. In fact, normal conversations can (30) be conducted fairly readily between Chinese-speaking Chinese Americans and new arrivals from China, provided that they speak the same traditional Chinese dialect as each other. Terms not familiar to the newcomer, most of which would name objects, places, (35) and events that are part of the local experience, can easily be avoided or explained by the speaker, or their meaning can be inferred from the context. The supposed language barrier is, therefore, mostly imaginary.

The second claim—that the sharing of a uniquely (40) Chinese-American vocabulary makes possible communication among Chinese Americans no matter what their basic dialect of Chinese may be—is a misleading oversimplification. While many Chinese-American speakers of other Chinese dialects (45) have become familiar with Cantonese, now the most common dialect of Chinese spoken in the U.S., through watching Cantonese movies and by hearing that dialect in Hong Kong, Guandong, or the U.S., this is not the same thing as sharing a single unique (50) dialect. Moreover, the dialects of Chinese can differ markedly in their systems of sounds and, to some extent, in grammar and vocabulary, and these differences persist among Chinese-American speakers of these various dialects. Hence, even a common (55) vocabulary for such things as names of U.S. cities, street names, and non-Chinese items does not guarantee mutual intelligibility because these words constitute only a minute percentage of each dialect and are generally peripheral to the core vocabulary.

In a typical Hollywood action movie, the hero skirts death to complete a mission. Bad guys shoot, cars explode, objects fall from the sky, but all just miss. If any one of those things happened just a little (5) differently, the hero would be dead. Yet the hero survives. In some respects, the story of our universe resembles an action movie. A slight change to any one of the laws of physics would likely have caused some disaster that would have disrupted the normal (10) evolution of the universe and made life impossible. For example, if the strong nuclear force had been slightly stronger or weaker, stars would have forged very little of the carbon that seems necessary to form planets and living things. Indeed, it seems that in order (15) for a universe to support life, the laws of physics must be so finely tuned that the very existence of such a universe becomes improbable.

Some cosmologists have tried to reconcile the existence of our universe with the seeming (20) improbability of its existence by hypothesizing that our universe is but one of many universes within a wider array called the multiverse. In almost all of those universes, the laws of physics might not allow the formation of matter as we know it and therefore (25) of life. But given the sheer number of possibilities, nature would have had a good chance to get the “right” set of laws at least once.

But just how exceptional is the set of physical laws governing our universe? The view that the laws (30) of physics are finely tuned arises largely from the difficulty scientists have had in identifying alternative sets of laws that would be compatible with life. The conventional way scientists explore whether a particular constant of physics is finely tuned is to (35) tweak it while leaving all other constants unaltered. The scientists then “play the movie” of that universe— they do calculations, what-if scenarios, or computer simulations—to see what disasters occur. But there is no reason to tweak just one parameter at a time. By (40) manipulating multiple constants at once, my colleague and I have identified numerous scenarios—hypothetical universes—where the physical laws would be very different from our own and yet compatible with the formation of complex structures and perhaps even (45) some forms of intelligent life.

Fine tuning has been invoked by some cosmologists as indirect evidence for the multiverse. Do our findings therefore call the concept of the multiverse into question? I do not think this is necessarily the case for (50) two reasons. First, certain models of the birth of the universe would lead us to expect the existence of something like the multiverse. Secondly, the multiverse concept may well prove to be the source of solutions to certain other long-standing puzzles in cosmology.

In a typical Hollywood action movie, the hero skirts death to complete a mission. Bad guys shoot, cars explode, objects fall from the sky, but all just miss. If any one of those things happened just a little (5) differently, the hero would be dead. Yet the hero survives. In some respects, the story of our universe resembles an action movie. A slight change to any one of the laws of physics would likely have caused some disaster that would have disrupted the normal (10) evolution of the universe and made life impossible. For example, if the strong nuclear force had been slightly stronger or weaker, stars would have forged very little of the carbon that seems necessary to form planets and living things. Indeed, it seems that in order (15) for a universe to support life, the laws of physics must be so finely tuned that the very existence of such a universe becomes improbable.

Some cosmologists have tried to reconcile the existence of our universe with the seeming (20) improbability of its existence by hypothesizing that our universe is but one of many universes within a wider array called the multiverse. In almost all of those universes, the laws of physics might not allow the formation of matter as we know it and therefore (25) of life. But given the sheer number of possibilities, nature would have had a good chance to get the “right” set of laws at least once.

But just how exceptional is the set of physical laws governing our universe? The view that the laws (30) of physics are finely tuned arises largely from the difficulty scientists have had in identifying alternative sets of laws that would be compatible with life. The conventional way scientists explore whether a particular constant of physics is finely tuned is to (35) tweak it while leaving all other constants unaltered. The scientists then “play the movie” of that universe— they do calculations, what-if scenarios, or computer simulations—to see what disasters occur. But there is no reason to tweak just one parameter at a time. By (40) manipulating multiple constants at once, my colleague and I have identified numerous scenarios—hypothetical universes—where the physical laws would be very different from our own and yet compatible with the formation of complex structures and perhaps even (45) some forms of intelligent life.

Fine tuning has been invoked by some cosmologists as indirect evidence for the multiverse. Do our findings therefore call the concept of the multiverse into question? I do not think this is necessarily the case for (50) two reasons. First, certain models of the birth of the universe would lead us to expect the existence of something like the multiverse. Secondly, the multiverse concept may well prove to be the source of solutions to certain other long-standing puzzles in cosmology.

In a typical Hollywood action movie, the hero skirts death to complete a mission. Bad guys shoot, cars explode, objects fall from the sky, but all just miss. If any one of those things happened just a little (5) differently, the hero would be dead. Yet the hero survives. In some respects, the story of our universe resembles an action movie. A slight change to any one of the laws of physics would likely have caused some disaster that would have disrupted the normal (10) evolution of the universe and made life impossible. For example, if the strong nuclear force had been slightly stronger or weaker, stars would have forged very little of the carbon that seems necessary to form planets and living things. Indeed, it seems that in order (15) for a universe to support life, the laws of physics must be so finely tuned that the very existence of such a universe becomes improbable.

Some cosmologists have tried to reconcile the existence of our universe with the seeming (20) improbability of its existence by hypothesizing that our universe is but one of many universes within a wider array called the multiverse. In almost all of those universes, the laws of physics might not allow the formation of matter as we know it and therefore (25) of life. But given the sheer number of possibilities, nature would have had a good chance to get the “right” set of laws at least once.

But just how exceptional is the set of physical laws governing our universe? The view that the laws (30) of physics are finely tuned arises largely from the difficulty scientists have had in identifying alternative sets of laws that would be compatible with life. The conventional way scientists explore whether a particular constant of physics is finely tuned is to (35) tweak it while leaving all other constants unaltered. The scientists then “play the movie” of that universe— they do calculations, what-if scenarios, or computer simulations—to see what disasters occur. But there is no reason to tweak just one parameter at a time. By (40) manipulating multiple constants at once, my colleague and I have identified numerous scenarios—hypothetical universes—where the physical laws would be very different from our own and yet compatible with the formation of complex structures and perhaps even (45) some forms of intelligent life.

Fine tuning has been invoked by some cosmologists as indirect evidence for the multiverse. Do our findings therefore call the concept of the multiverse into question? I do not think this is necessarily the case for (50) two reasons. First, certain models of the birth of the universe would lead us to expect the existence of something like the multiverse. Secondly, the multiverse concept may well prove to be the source of solutions to certain other long-standing puzzles in cosmology.

In a typical Hollywood action movie, the hero skirts death to complete a mission. Bad guys shoot, cars explode, objects fall from the sky, but all just miss. If any one of those things happened just a little (5) differently, the hero would be dead. Yet the hero survives. In some respects, the story of our universe resembles an action movie. A slight change to any one of the laws of physics would likely have caused some disaster that would have disrupted the normal (10) evolution of the universe and made life impossible. For example, if the strong nuclear force had been slightly stronger or weaker, stars would have forged very little of the carbon that seems necessary to form planets and living things. Indeed, it seems that in order (15) for a universe to support life, the laws of physics must be so finely tuned that the very existence of such a universe becomes improbable.

Some cosmologists have tried to reconcile the existence of our universe with the seeming (20) improbability of its existence by hypothesizing that our universe is but one of many universes within a wider array called the multiverse. In almost all of those universes, the laws of physics might not allow the formation of matter as we know it and therefore (25) of life. But given the sheer number of possibilities, nature would have had a good chance to get the “right” set of laws at least once.

But just how exceptional is the set of physical laws governing our universe? The view that the laws (30) of physics are finely tuned arises largely from the difficulty scientists have had in identifying alternative sets of laws that would be compatible with life. The conventional way scientists explore whether a particular constant of physics is finely tuned is to (35) tweak it while leaving all other constants unaltered. The scientists then “play the movie” of that universe— they do calculations, what-if scenarios, or computer simulations—to see what disasters occur. But there is no reason to tweak just one parameter at a time. By (40) manipulating multiple constants at once, my colleague and I have identified numerous scenarios—hypothetical universes—where the physical laws would be very different from our own and yet compatible with the formation of complex structures and perhaps even (45) some forms of intelligent life.

Fine tuning has been invoked by some cosmologists as indirect evidence for the multiverse. Do our findings therefore call the concept of the multiverse into question? I do not think this is necessarily the case for (50) two reasons. First, certain models of the birth of the universe would lead us to expect the existence of something like the multiverse. Secondly, the multiverse concept may well prove to be the source of solutions to certain other long-standing puzzles in cosmology.

In a typical Hollywood action movie, the hero skirts death to complete a mission. Bad guys shoot, cars explode, objects fall from the sky, but all just miss. If any one of those things happened just a little (5) differently, the hero would be dead. Yet the hero survives. In some respects, the story of our universe resembles an action movie. A slight change to any one of the laws of physics would likely have caused some disaster that would have disrupted the normal (10) evolution of the universe and made life impossible. For example, if the strong nuclear force had been slightly stronger or weaker, stars would have forged very little of the carbon that seems necessary to form planets and living things. Indeed, it seems that in order (15) for a universe to support life, the laws of physics must be so finely tuned that the very existence of such a universe becomes improbable.

Some cosmologists have tried to reconcile the existence of our universe with the seeming (20) improbability of its existence by hypothesizing that our universe is but one of many universes within a wider array called the multiverse. In almost all of those universes, the laws of physics might not allow the formation of matter as we know it and therefore (25) of life. But given the sheer number of possibilities, nature would have had a good chance to get the “right” set of laws at least once.

But just how exceptional is the set of physical laws governing our universe? The view that the laws (30) of physics are finely tuned arises largely from the difficulty scientists have had in identifying alternative sets of laws that would be compatible with life. The conventional way scientists explore whether a particular constant of physics is finely tuned is to (35) tweak it while leaving all other constants unaltered. The scientists then “play the movie” of that universe— they do calculations, what-if scenarios, or computer simulations—to see what disasters occur. But there is no reason to tweak just one parameter at a time. By (40) manipulating multiple constants at once, my colleague and I have identified numerous scenarios—hypothetical universes—where the physical laws would be very different from our own and yet compatible with the formation of complex structures and perhaps even (45) some forms of intelligent life.

Fine tuning has been invoked by some cosmologists as indirect evidence for the multiverse. Do our findings therefore call the concept of the multiverse into question? I do not think this is necessarily the case for (50) two reasons. First, certain models of the birth of the universe would lead us to expect the existence of something like the multiverse. Secondly, the multiverse concept may well prove to be the source of solutions to certain other long-standing puzzles in cosmology.

In a typical Hollywood action movie, the hero skirts death to complete a mission. Bad guys shoot, cars explode, objects fall from the sky, but all just miss. If any one of those things happened just a little (5) differently, the hero would be dead. Yet the hero survives. In some respects, the story of our universe resembles an action movie. A slight change to any one of the laws of physics would likely have caused some disaster that would have disrupted the normal (10) evolution of the universe and made life impossible. For example, if the strong nuclear force had been slightly stronger or weaker, stars would have forged very little of the carbon that seems necessary to form planets and living things. Indeed, it seems that in order (15) for a universe to support life, the laws of physics must be so finely tuned that the very existence of such a universe becomes improbable.

Some cosmologists have tried to reconcile the existence of our universe with the seeming (20) improbability of its existence by hypothesizing that our universe is but one of many universes within a wider array called the multiverse. In almost all of those universes, the laws of physics might not allow the formation of matter as we know it and therefore (25) of life. But given the sheer number of possibilities, nature would have had a good chance to get the “right” set of laws at least once.

But just how exceptional is the set of physical laws governing our universe? The view that the laws (30) of physics are finely tuned arises largely from the difficulty scientists have had in identifying alternative sets of laws that would be compatible with life. The conventional way scientists explore whether a particular constant of physics is finely tuned is to (35) tweak it while leaving all other constants unaltered. The scientists then “play the movie” of that universe— they do calculations, what-if scenarios, or computer simulations—to see what disasters occur. But there is no reason to tweak just one parameter at a time. By (40) manipulating multiple constants at once, my colleague and I have identified numerous scenarios—hypothetical universes—where the physical laws would be very different from our own and yet compatible with the formation of complex structures and perhaps even (45) some forms of intelligent life.

Fine tuning has been invoked by some cosmologists as indirect evidence for the multiverse. Do our findings therefore call the concept of the multiverse into question? I do not think this is necessarily the case for (50) two reasons. First, certain models of the birth of the universe would lead us to expect the existence of something like the multiverse. Secondly, the multiverse concept may well prove to be the source of solutions to certain other long-standing puzzles in cosmology.

In a typical Hollywood action movie, the hero skirts death to complete a mission. Bad guys shoot, cars explode, objects fall from the sky, but all just miss. If any one of those things happened just a little (5) differently, the hero would be dead. Yet the hero survives. In some respects, the story of our universe resembles an action movie. A slight change to any one of the laws of physics would likely have caused some disaster that would have disrupted the normal (10) evolution of the universe and made life impossible. For example, if the strong nuclear force had been slightly stronger or weaker, stars would have forged very little of the carbon that seems necessary to form planets and living things. Indeed, it seems that in order (15) for a universe to support life, the laws of physics must be so finely tuned that the very existence of such a universe becomes improbable.

Some cosmologists have tried to reconcile the existence of our universe with the seeming (20) improbability of its existence by hypothesizing that our universe is but one of many universes within a wider array called the multiverse. In almost all of those universes, the laws of physics might not allow the formation of matter as we know it and therefore (25) of life. But given the sheer number of possibilities, nature would have had a good chance to get the “right” set of laws at least once.

But just how exceptional is the set of physical laws governing our universe? The view that the laws (30) of physics are finely tuned arises largely from the difficulty scientists have had in identifying alternative sets of laws that would be compatible with life. The conventional way scientists explore whether a particular constant of physics is finely tuned is to (35) tweak it while leaving all other constants unaltered. The scientists then “play the movie” of that universe— they do calculations, what-if scenarios, or computer simulations—to see what disasters occur. But there is no reason to tweak just one parameter at a time. By (40) manipulating multiple constants at once, my colleague and I have identified numerous scenarios—hypothetical universes—where the physical laws would be very different from our own and yet compatible with the formation of complex structures and perhaps even (45) some forms of intelligent life.

Fine tuning has been invoked by some cosmologists as indirect evidence for the multiverse. Do our findings therefore call the concept of the multiverse into question? I do not think this is necessarily the case for (50) two reasons. First, certain models of the birth of the universe would lead us to expect the existence of something like the multiverse. Secondly, the multiverse concept may well prove to be the source of solutions to certain other long-standing puzzles in cosmology.

Passage A

Comedians are not amused when their jokes are stolen, and for that reason we might expect joke-stealing disputes to ripen into lawsuits occasionally. Copyright (5) is the most relevant body of law; formally, it applies to jokes and comedic routines. Yet copyright infringement lawsuits between rival comedians are all but unheard of, despite what appears to be a persistent practice of joke stealing among stand-up comedians. The (10) nonexistence of such lawsuits is a product of both practical considerations that render the cost of enforcing the formal law prohibitively expensive, and legal hurdles that make success difficult and uncertain in lawsuits relating to joke stealing. In the end, copyright (15) law simply does not provide comedians with a cost-effective way of protecting their comedic material. Conventional intellectual property wisdom holds that absent formal legal protection, there would be scant production of creative works, as potential (20) creators would be deterred by the unlikelihood of recouping the cost of their creations. If there is no effective legal protection against joke theft, then why do thousands of comedians keep cranking out new material night after night?

(25) The answer to this question is that, in stand-up comedy, social norms substitute for intellectual property law. Taken as a whole, this norms system governs a wide array of issues that generally parallel those ordered by copyright law. These norms are not (30) merely hortatory. They are enforced with sanctions, including simple badmouthing and refusals to work with an offending comedian. These sanctions, while extralegal, can cause serious reputational harm to an alleged joke thief, and may substantially hamper a (35) comedian’s career. Using this informal system, comedians are able to assert ownership of jokes, regulate their use and transfer, impose sanctions on transgressors, and maintain substantial incentives to invest in new material.

(40) Passage B

Accomplished chefs consider their recipes to be a very valuable form of intellectual property. At the same time, recipes are not a form of innovation that is effectively covered by current intellectual property (45) laws. Recipes are rarely patentable, and combinations of ingredients cannot be copyrighted. Legal protections are potentially available via trade secrecy laws, but chefs very seldom use them. Instead, three implicit social norms are operative among chefs, and together (50) these norms function in a manner quite similar to law-based intellectual property systems.

First, a chef must not copy another chef’s recipe innovation exactly. The function of this norm is analogous to patenting in that the community (55) acknowledges the right of a recipe inventor to exclude others from practicing his or her invention, even if all the information required to do so is publicly available. A second norm mandates that, if a chef reveals recipe-related secret information to a colleague, that (60) colleague must not pass the information on to others without permission. This norm gives a chef a property right similar to that attainable via a contract under trade secrecy law. A third norm is that colleagues must credit developers of significant recipes as the authors (65) of that information. This norm operates in a manner analogous to copyright protection.

Passage A

Comedians are not amused when their jokes are stolen, and for that reason we might expect joke-stealing disputes to ripen into lawsuits occasionally. Copyright (5) is the most relevant body of law; formally, it applies to jokes and comedic routines. Yet copyright infringement lawsuits between rival comedians are all but unheard of, despite what appears to be a persistent practice of joke stealing among stand-up comedians. The (10) nonexistence of such lawsuits is a product of both practical considerations that render the cost of enforcing the formal law prohibitively expensive, and legal hurdles that make success difficult and uncertain in lawsuits relating to joke stealing. In the end, copyright (15) law simply does not provide comedians with a cost-effective way of protecting their comedic material. Conventional intellectual property wisdom holds that absent formal legal protection, there would be scant production of creative works, as potential (20) creators would be deterred by the unlikelihood of recouping the cost of their creations. If there is no effective legal protection against joke theft, then why do thousands of comedians keep cranking out new material night after night?

(25) The answer to this question is that, in stand-up comedy, social norms substitute for intellectual property law. Taken as a whole, this norms system governs a wide array of issues that generally parallel those ordered by copyright law. These norms are not (30) merely hortatory. They are enforced with sanctions, including simple badmouthing and refusals to work with an offending comedian. These sanctions, while extralegal, can cause serious reputational harm to an alleged joke thief, and may substantially hamper a (35) comedian’s career. Using this informal system, comedians are able to assert ownership of jokes, regulate their use and transfer, impose sanctions on transgressors, and maintain substantial incentives to invest in new material.

(40) Passage B

Accomplished chefs consider their recipes to be a very valuable form of intellectual property. At the same time, recipes are not a form of innovation that is effectively covered by current intellectual property (45) laws. Recipes are rarely patentable, and combinations of ingredients cannot be copyrighted. Legal protections are potentially available via trade secrecy laws, but chefs very seldom use them. Instead, three implicit social norms are operative among chefs, and together (50) these norms function in a manner quite similar to law-based intellectual property systems.

First, a chef must not copy another chef’s recipe innovation exactly. The function of this norm is analogous to patenting in that the community (55) acknowledges the right of a recipe inventor to exclude others from practicing his or her invention, even if all the information required to do so is publicly available. A second norm mandates that, if a chef reveals recipe-related secret information to a colleague, that (60) colleague must not pass the information on to others without permission. This norm gives a chef a property right similar to that attainable via a contract under trade secrecy law. A third norm is that colleagues must credit developers of significant recipes as the authors (65) of that information. This norm operates in a manner analogous to copyright protection.

Passage A

Comedians are not amused when their jokes are stolen, and for that reason we might expect joke-stealing disputes to ripen into lawsuits occasionally. Copyright (5) is the most relevant body of law; formally, it applies to jokes and comedic routines. Yet copyright infringement lawsuits between rival comedians are all but unheard of, despite what appears to be a persistent practice of joke stealing among stand-up comedians. The (10) nonexistence of such lawsuits is a product of both practical considerations that render the cost of enforcing the formal law prohibitively expensive, and legal hurdles that make success difficult and uncertain in lawsuits relating to joke stealing. In the end, copyright (15) law simply does not provide comedians with a cost-effective way of protecting their comedic material. Conventional intellectual property wisdom holds that absent formal legal protection, there would be scant production of creative works, as potential (20) creators would be deterred by the unlikelihood of recouping the cost of their creations. If there is no effective legal protection against joke theft, then why do thousands of comedians keep cranking out new material night after night?

(25) The answer to this question is that, in stand-up comedy, social norms substitute for intellectual property law. Taken as a whole, this norms system governs a wide array of issues that generally parallel those ordered by copyright law. These norms are not (30) merely hortatory. They are enforced with sanctions, including simple badmouthing and refusals to work with an offending comedian. These sanctions, while extralegal, can cause serious reputational harm to an alleged joke thief, and may substantially hamper a (35) comedian’s career. Using this informal system, comedians are able to assert ownership of jokes, regulate their use and transfer, impose sanctions on transgressors, and maintain substantial incentives to invest in new material.

(40) Passage B

Accomplished chefs consider their recipes to be a very valuable form of intellectual property. At the same time, recipes are not a form of innovation that is effectively covered by current intellectual property (45) laws. Recipes are rarely patentable, and combinations of ingredients cannot be copyrighted. Legal protections are potentially available via trade secrecy laws, but chefs very seldom use them. Instead, three implicit social norms are operative among chefs, and together (50) these norms function in a manner quite similar to law-based intellectual property systems.

First, a chef must not copy another chef’s recipe innovation exactly. The function of this norm is analogous to patenting in that the community (55) acknowledges the right of a recipe inventor to exclude others from practicing his or her invention, even if all the information required to do so is publicly available. A second norm mandates that, if a chef reveals recipe-related secret information to a colleague, that (60) colleague must not pass the information on to others without permission. This norm gives a chef a property right similar to that attainable via a contract under trade secrecy law. A third norm is that colleagues must credit developers of significant recipes as the authors (65) of that information. This norm operates in a manner analogous to copyright protection.

Passage A

Comedians are not amused when their jokes are stolen, and for that reason we might expect joke-stealing disputes to ripen into lawsuits occasionally. Copyright (5) is the most relevant body of law; formally, it applies to jokes and comedic routines. Yet copyright infringement lawsuits between rival comedians are all but unheard of, despite what appears to be a persistent practice of joke stealing among stand-up comedians. The (10) nonexistence of such lawsuits is a product of both practical considerations that render the cost of enforcing the formal law prohibitively expensive, and legal hurdles that make success difficult and uncertain in lawsuits relating to joke stealing. In the end, copyright (15) law simply does not provide comedians with a cost-effective way of protecting their comedic material. Conventional intellectual property wisdom holds that absent formal legal protection, there would be scant production of creative works, as potential (20) creators would be deterred by the unlikelihood of recouping the cost of their creations. If there is no effective legal protection against joke theft, then why do thousands of comedians keep cranking out new material night after night?

(25) The answer to this question is that, in stand-up comedy, social norms substitute for intellectual property law. Taken as a whole, this norms system governs a wide array of issues that generally parallel those ordered by copyright law. These norms are not (30) merely hortatory. They are enforced with sanctions, including simple badmouthing and refusals to work with an offending comedian. These sanctions, while extralegal, can cause serious reputational harm to an alleged joke thief, and may substantially hamper a (35) comedian’s career. Using this informal system, comedians are able to assert ownership of jokes, regulate their use and transfer, impose sanctions on transgressors, and maintain substantial incentives to invest in new material.

(40) Passage B

Accomplished chefs consider their recipes to be a very valuable form of intellectual property. At the same time, recipes are not a form of innovation that is effectively covered by current intellectual property (45) laws. Recipes are rarely patentable, and combinations of ingredients cannot be copyrighted. Legal protections are potentially available via trade secrecy laws, but chefs very seldom use them. Instead, three implicit social norms are operative among chefs, and together (50) these norms function in a manner quite similar to law-based intellectual property systems.

First, a chef must not copy another chef’s recipe innovation exactly. The function of this norm is analogous to patenting in that the community (55) acknowledges the right of a recipe inventor to exclude others from practicing his or her invention, even if all the information required to do so is publicly available. A second norm mandates that, if a chef reveals recipe-related secret information to a colleague, that (60) colleague must not pass the information on to others without permission. This norm gives a chef a property right similar to that attainable via a contract under trade secrecy law. A third norm is that colleagues must credit developers of significant recipes as the authors (65) of that information. This norm operates in a manner analogous to copyright protection.

Passage A

Comedians are not amused when their jokes are stolen, and for that reason we might expect joke-stealing disputes to ripen into lawsuits occasionally. Copyright (5) is the most relevant body of law; formally, it applies to jokes and comedic routines. Yet copyright infringement lawsuits between rival comedians are all but unheard of, despite what appears to be a persistent practice of joke stealing among stand-up comedians. The (10) nonexistence of such lawsuits is a product of both practical considerations that render the cost of enforcing the formal law prohibitively expensive, and legal hurdles that make success difficult and uncertain in lawsuits relating to joke stealing. In the end, copyright (15) law simply does not provide comedians with a cost-effective way of protecting their comedic material. Conventional intellectual property wisdom holds that absent formal legal protection, there would be scant production of creative works, as potential (20) creators would be deterred by the unlikelihood of recouping the cost of their creations. If there is no effective legal protection against joke theft, then why do thousands of comedians keep cranking out new material night after night?

(25) The answer to this question is that, in stand-up comedy, social norms substitute for intellectual property law. Taken as a whole, this norms system governs a wide array of issues that generally parallel those ordered by copyright law. These norms are not (30) merely hortatory. They are enforced with sanctions, including simple badmouthing and refusals to work with an offending comedian. These sanctions, while extralegal, can cause serious reputational harm to an alleged joke thief, and may substantially hamper a (35) comedian’s career. Using this informal system, comedians are able to assert ownership of jokes, regulate their use and transfer, impose sanctions on transgressors, and maintain substantial incentives to invest in new material.

(40) Passage B

Accomplished chefs consider their recipes to be a very valuable form of intellectual property. At the same time, recipes are not a form of innovation that is effectively covered by current intellectual property (45) laws. Recipes are rarely patentable, and combinations of ingredients cannot be copyrighted. Legal protections are potentially available via trade secrecy laws, but chefs very seldom use them. Instead, three implicit social norms are operative among chefs, and together (50) these norms function in a manner quite similar to law-based intellectual property systems.

First, a chef must not copy another chef’s recipe innovation exactly. The function of this norm is analogous to patenting in that the community (55) acknowledges the right of a recipe inventor to exclude others from practicing his or her invention, even if all the information required to do so is publicly available. A second norm mandates that, if a chef reveals recipe-related secret information to a colleague, that (60) colleague must not pass the information on to others without permission. This norm gives a chef a property right similar to that attainable via a contract under trade secrecy law. A third norm is that colleagues must credit developers of significant recipes as the authors (65) of that information. This norm operates in a manner analogous to copyright protection.

Passage A

Comedians are not amused when their jokes are stolen, and for that reason we might expect joke-stealing disputes to ripen into lawsuits occasionally. Copyright (5) is the most relevant body of law; formally, it applies to jokes and comedic routines. Yet copyright infringement lawsuits between rival comedians are all but unheard of, despite what appears to be a persistent practice of joke stealing among stand-up comedians. The (10) nonexistence of such lawsuits is a product of both practical considerations that render the cost of enforcing the formal law prohibitively expensive, and legal hurdles that make success difficult and uncertain in lawsuits relating to joke stealing. In the end, copyright (15) law simply does not provide comedians with a cost-effective way of protecting their comedic material. Conventional intellectual property wisdom holds that absent formal legal protection, there would be scant production of creative works, as potential (20) creators would be deterred by the unlikelihood of recouping the cost of their creations. If there is no effective legal protection against joke theft, then why do thousands of comedians keep cranking out new material night after night?

(25) The answer to this question is that, in stand-up comedy, social norms substitute for intellectual property law. Taken as a whole, this norms system governs a wide array of issues that generally parallel those ordered by copyright law. These norms are not (30) merely hortatory. They are enforced with sanctions, including simple badmouthing and refusals to work with an offending comedian. These sanctions, while extralegal, can cause serious reputational harm to an alleged joke thief, and may substantially hamper a (35) comedian’s career. Using this informal system, comedians are able to assert ownership of jokes, regulate their use and transfer, impose sanctions on transgressors, and maintain substantial incentives to invest in new material.

(40) Passage B

Accomplished chefs consider their recipes to be a very valuable form of intellectual property. At the same time, recipes are not a form of innovation that is effectively covered by current intellectual property (45) laws. Recipes are rarely patentable, and combinations of ingredients cannot be copyrighted. Legal protections are potentially available via trade secrecy laws, but chefs very seldom use them. Instead, three implicit social norms are operative among chefs, and together (50) these norms function in a manner quite similar to law-based intellectual property systems.

First, a chef must not copy another chef’s recipe innovation exactly. The function of this norm is analogous to patenting in that the community (55) acknowledges the right of a recipe inventor to exclude others from practicing his or her invention, even if all the information required to do so is publicly available. A second norm mandates that, if a chef reveals recipe-related secret information to a colleague, that (60) colleague must not pass the information on to others without permission. This norm gives a chef a property right similar to that attainable via a contract under trade secrecy law. A third norm is that colleagues must credit developers of significant recipes as the authors (65) of that information. This norm operates in a manner analogous to copyright protection.

Passage A

Comedians are not amused when their jokes are stolen, and for that reason we might expect joke-stealing disputes to ripen into lawsuits occasionally. Copyright (5) is the most relevant body of law; formally, it applies to jokes and comedic routines. Yet copyright infringement lawsuits between rival comedians are all but unheard of, despite what appears to be a persistent practice of joke stealing among stand-up comedians. The (10) nonexistence of such lawsuits is a product of both practical considerations that render the cost of enforcing the formal law prohibitively expensive, and legal hurdles that make success difficult and uncertain in lawsuits relating to joke stealing. In the end, copyright (15) law simply does not provide comedians with a cost-effective way of protecting their comedic material. Conventional intellectual property wisdom holds that absent formal legal protection, there would be scant production of creative works, as potential (20) creators would be deterred by the unlikelihood of recouping the cost of their creations. If there is no effective legal protection against joke theft, then why do thousands of comedians keep cranking out new material night after night?

(25) The answer to this question is that, in stand-up comedy, social norms substitute for intellectual property law. Taken as a whole, this norms system governs a wide array of issues that generally parallel those ordered by copyright law. These norms are not (30) merely hortatory. They are enforced with sanctions, including simple badmouthing and refusals to work with an offending comedian. These sanctions, while extralegal, can cause serious reputational harm to an alleged joke thief, and may substantially hamper a (35) comedian’s career. Using this informal system, comedians are able to assert ownership of jokes, regulate their use and transfer, impose sanctions on transgressors, and maintain substantial incentives to invest in new material.

(40) Passage B

Accomplished chefs consider their recipes to be a very valuable form of intellectual property. At the same time, recipes are not a form of innovation that is effectively covered by current intellectual property (45) laws. Recipes are rarely patentable, and combinations of ingredients cannot be copyrighted. Legal protections are potentially available via trade secrecy laws, but chefs very seldom use them. Instead, three implicit social norms are operative among chefs, and together (50) these norms function in a manner quite similar to law-based intellectual property systems.

First, a chef must not copy another chef’s recipe innovation exactly. The function of this norm is analogous to patenting in that the community (55) acknowledges the right of a recipe inventor to exclude others from practicing his or her invention, even if all the information required to do so is publicly available. A second norm mandates that, if a chef reveals recipe-related secret information to a colleague, that (60) colleague must not pass the information on to others without permission. This norm gives a chef a property right similar to that attainable via a contract under trade secrecy law. A third norm is that colleagues must credit developers of significant recipes as the authors (65) of that information. This norm operates in a manner analogous to copyright protection.

Passage A

Comedians are not amused when their jokes are stolen, and for that reason we might expect joke-stealing disputes to ripen into lawsuits occasionally. Copyright (5) is the most relevant body of law; formally, it applies to jokes and comedic routines. Yet copyright infringement lawsuits between rival comedians are all but unheard of, despite what appears to be a persistent practice of joke stealing among stand-up comedians. The (10) nonexistence of such lawsuits is a product of both practical considerations that render the cost of enforcing the formal law prohibitively expensive, and legal hurdles that make success difficult and uncertain in lawsuits relating to joke stealing. In the end, copyright (15) law simply does not provide comedians with a cost-effective way of protecting their comedic material. Conventional intellectual property wisdom holds that absent formal legal protection, there would be scant production of creative works, as potential (20) creators would be deterred by the unlikelihood of recouping the cost of their creations. If there is no effective legal protection against joke theft, then why do thousands of comedians keep cranking out new material night after night?

(25) The answer to this question is that, in stand-up comedy, social norms substitute for intellectual property law. Taken as a whole, this norms system governs a wide array of issues that generally parallel those ordered by copyright law. These norms are not (30) merely hortatory. They are enforced with sanctions, including simple badmouthing and refusals to work with an offending comedian. These sanctions, while extralegal, can cause serious reputational harm to an alleged joke thief, and may substantially hamper a (35) comedian’s career. Using this informal system, comedians are able to assert ownership of jokes, regulate their use and transfer, impose sanctions on transgressors, and maintain substantial incentives to invest in new material.

(40) Passage B

Accomplished chefs consider their recipes to be a very valuable form of intellectual property. At the same time, recipes are not a form of innovation that is effectively covered by current intellectual property (45) laws. Recipes are rarely patentable, and combinations of ingredients cannot be copyrighted. Legal protections are potentially available via trade secrecy laws, but chefs very seldom use them. Instead, three implicit social norms are operative among chefs, and together (50) these norms function in a manner quite similar to law-based intellectual property systems.

First, a chef must not copy another chef’s recipe innovation exactly. The function of this norm is analogous to patenting in that the community (55) acknowledges the right of a recipe inventor to exclude others from practicing his or her invention, even if all the information required to do so is publicly available. A second norm mandates that, if a chef reveals recipe-related secret information to a colleague, that (60) colleague must not pass the information on to others without permission. This norm gives a chef a property right similar to that attainable via a contract under trade secrecy law. A third norm is that colleagues must credit developers of significant recipes as the authors (65) of that information. This norm operates in a manner analogous to copyright protection.

The novelist and social theorist Charlotte Perkins Gilman, whose writings were widely read and discussed in the early twentieth century, played an important role in the debate about the theories'of (5) Charles Darwin and their' application to society. Darwin’s theory of evolution did not directly apply to social ideology, but various intellectuals translated his ideas of natural selection into social language and argued about their interpretation. Some of these (10) Social Darwinist theorists held that the nature of human social interactions is strictly determined by the process of biological evolution, and that it is futile to try to meddle with the competitive struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest. Another, more (15) activist group of Social Darwinists held that although changes in human societies, like those that occur in biological species, do constitute a sort of evolution, this evolution at the level of a human society need not be competitive, but can emerge through collective (20) action within society.

Gilman identified herself with this latter ideological camp and applied evolutionary theory in the movement for social change. The central thesis of this group of Social Darwinists was that although (25) people, like all life, are the products of natural evolutionary forces, the principles of change that determine the development of organisms have brought humans to the point where it is possible for us to contribute consciously to the evolutionary process, to (30) redesign and mold our societies in appropriate ways. This, for Gilman, was not simply a descriptive observation about humanity but was also a source of ethical responsibility. She argued that since a prime source of social evolution is human work, whether in (35) crafts, trades, arts, or sciences, one of the primary ethical responsibilities of a person is to identify and engage in work that is societally relevant and that makes the best use of that person’s talents.

Gilman was not merely engaged in an intellectual (40) debate. Motivated by her ethical vision and convinced of the plasticity of human nature, Gilman vehemently sought to break the molds into which people, especially women, had been thrust. In both her fiction and her social theory she urges women to further social (45) evolution by collectively working toward a reorganization of society. A central goal of the reorganization she envisioned would be the abandonment of gender-specific work roles and hierarchical relationships. Gilman believed that at one time such (50) arrangements had been necessary for evolution because what she felt were male traits of assertiveness, combat, and display were essential for the development of a complex society. Future progress, she believed, now required the restoration of a balance that would (55) include what she saw as female qualities of cooperation and nurturance.

The novelist and social theorist Charlotte Perkins Gilman, whose writings were widely read and discussed in the early twentieth century, played an important role in the debate about the theories'of (5) Charles Darwin and their' application to society. Darwin’s theory of evolution did not directly apply to social ideology, but various intellectuals translated his ideas of natural selection into social language and argued about their interpretation. Some of these (10) Social Darwinist theorists held that the nature of human social interactions is strictly determined by the process of biological evolution, and that it is futile to try to meddle with the competitive struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest. Another, more (15) activist group of Social Darwinists held that although changes in human societies, like those that occur in biological species, do constitute a sort of evolution, this evolution at the level of a human society need not be competitive, but can emerge through collective (20) action within society.

Gilman identified herself with this latter ideological camp and applied evolutionary theory in the movement for social change. The central thesis of this group of Social Darwinists was that although (25) people, like all life, are the products of natural evolutionary forces, the principles of change that determine the development of organisms have brought humans to the point where it is possible for us to contribute consciously to the evolutionary process, to (30) redesign and mold our societies in appropriate ways. This, for Gilman, was not simply a descriptive observation about humanity but was also a source of ethical responsibility. She argued that since a prime source of social evolution is human work, whether in (35) crafts, trades, arts, or sciences, one of the primary ethical responsibilities of a person is to identify and engage in work that is societally relevant and that makes the best use of that person’s talents.

Gilman was not merely engaged in an intellectual (40) debate. Motivated by her ethical vision and convinced of the plasticity of human nature, Gilman vehemently sought to break the molds into which people, especially women, had been thrust. In both her fiction and her social theory she urges women to further social (45) evolution by collectively working toward a reorganization of society. A central goal of the reorganization she envisioned would be the abandonment of gender-specific work roles and hierarchical relationships. Gilman believed that at one time such (50) arrangements had been necessary for evolution because what she felt were male traits of assertiveness, combat, and display were essential for the development of a complex society. Future progress, she believed, now required the restoration of a balance that would (55) include what she saw as female qualities of cooperation and nurturance.

The novelist and social theorist Charlotte Perkins Gilman, whose writings were widely read and discussed in the early twentieth century, played an important role in the debate about the theories'of (5) Charles Darwin and their' application to society. Darwin’s theory of evolution did not directly apply to social ideology, but various intellectuals translated his ideas of natural selection into social language and argued about their interpretation. Some of these (10) Social Darwinist theorists held that the nature of human social interactions is strictly determined by the process of biological evolution, and that it is futile to try to meddle with the competitive struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest. Another, more (15) activist group of Social Darwinists held that although changes in human societies, like those that occur in biological species, do constitute a sort of evolution, this evolution at the level of a human society need not be competitive, but can emerge through collective (20) action within society.

Gilman identified herself with this latter ideological camp and applied evolutionary theory in the movement for social change. The central thesis of this group of Social Darwinists was that although (25) people, like all life, are the products of natural evolutionary forces, the principles of change that determine the development of organisms have brought humans to the point where it is possible for us to contribute consciously to the evolutionary process, to (30) redesign and mold our societies in appropriate ways. This, for Gilman, was not simply a descriptive observation about humanity but was also a source of ethical responsibility. She argued that since a prime source of social evolution is human work, whether in (35) crafts, trades, arts, or sciences, one of the primary ethical responsibilities of a person is to identify and engage in work that is societally relevant and that makes the best use of that person’s talents.

Gilman was not merely engaged in an intellectual (40) debate. Motivated by her ethical vision and convinced of the plasticity of human nature, Gilman vehemently sought to break the molds into which people, especially women, had been thrust. In both her fiction and her social theory she urges women to further social (45) evolution by collectively working toward a reorganization of society. A central goal of the reorganization she envisioned would be the abandonment of gender-specific work roles and hierarchical relationships. Gilman believed that at one time such (50) arrangements had been necessary for evolution because what she felt were male traits of assertiveness, combat, and display were essential for the development of a complex society. Future progress, she believed, now required the restoration of a balance that would (55) include what she saw as female qualities of cooperation and nurturance.

The novelist and social theorist Charlotte Perkins Gilman, whose writings were widely read and discussed in the early twentieth century, played an important role in the debate about the theories'of (5) Charles Darwin and their' application to society. Darwin’s theory of evolution did not directly apply to social ideology, but various intellectuals translated his ideas of natural selection into social language and argued about their interpretation. Some of these (10) Social Darwinist theorists held that the nature of human social interactions is strictly determined by the process of biological evolution, and that it is futile to try to meddle with the competitive struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest. Another, more (15) activist group of Social Darwinists held that although changes in human societies, like those that occur in biological species, do constitute a sort of evolution, this evolution at the level of a human society need not be competitive, but can emerge through collective (20) action within society.

Gilman identified herself with this latter ideological camp and applied evolutionary theory in the movement for social change. The central thesis of this group of Social Darwinists was that although (25) people, like all life, are the products of natural evolutionary forces, the principles of change that determine the development of organisms have brought humans to the point where it is possible for us to contribute consciously to the evolutionary process, to (30) redesign and mold our societies in appropriate ways. This, for Gilman, was not simply a descriptive observation about humanity but was also a source of ethical responsibility. She argued that since a prime source of social evolution is human work, whether in (35) crafts, trades, arts, or sciences, one of the primary ethical responsibilities of a person is to identify and engage in work that is societally relevant and that makes the best use of that person’s talents.

Gilman was not merely engaged in an intellectual (40) debate. Motivated by her ethical vision and convinced of the plasticity of human nature, Gilman vehemently sought to break the molds into which people, especially women, had been thrust. In both her fiction and her social theory she urges women to further social (45) evolution by collectively working toward a reorganization of society. A central goal of the reorganization she envisioned would be the abandonment of gender-specific work roles and hierarchical relationships. Gilman believed that at one time such (50) arrangements had been necessary for evolution because what she felt were male traits of assertiveness, combat, and display were essential for the development of a complex society. Future progress, she believed, now required the restoration of a balance that would (55) include what she saw as female qualities of cooperation and nurturance.

The novelist and social theorist Charlotte Perkins Gilman, whose writings were widely read and discussed in the early twentieth century, played an important role in the debate about the theories'of (5) Charles Darwin and their' application to society. Darwin’s theory of evolution did not directly apply to social ideology, but various intellectuals translated his ideas of natural selection into social language and argued about their interpretation. Some of these (10) Social Darwinist theorists held that the nature of human social interactions is strictly determined by the process of biological evolution, and that it is futile to try to meddle with the competitive struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest. Another, more (15) activist group of Social Darwinists held that although changes in human societies, like those that occur in biological species, do constitute a sort of evolution, this evolution at the level of a human society need not be competitive, but can emerge through collective (20) action within society.

Gilman identified herself with this latter ideological camp and applied evolutionary theory in the movement for social change. The central thesis of this group of Social Darwinists was that although (25) people, like all life, are the products of natural evolutionary forces, the principles of change that determine the development of organisms have brought humans to the point where it is possible for us to contribute consciously to the evolutionary process, to (30) redesign and mold our societies in appropriate ways. This, for Gilman, was not simply a descriptive observation about humanity but was also a source of ethical responsibility. She argued that since a prime source of social evolution is human work, whether in (35) crafts, trades, arts, or sciences, one of the primary ethical responsibilities of a person is to identify and engage in work that is societally relevant and that makes the best use of that person’s talents.

Gilman was not merely engaged in an intellectual (40) debate. Motivated by her ethical vision and convinced of the plasticity of human nature, Gilman vehemently sought to break the molds into which people, especially women, had been thrust. In both her fiction and her social theory she urges women to further social (45) evolution by collectively working toward a reorganization of society. A central goal of the reorganization she envisioned would be the abandonment of gender-specific work roles and hierarchical relationships. Gilman believed that at one time such (50) arrangements had been necessary for evolution because what she felt were male traits of assertiveness, combat, and display were essential for the development of a complex society. Future progress, she believed, now required the restoration of a balance that would (55) include what she saw as female qualities of cooperation and nurturance.

The novelist and social theorist Charlotte Perkins Gilman, whose writings were widely read and discussed in the early twentieth century, played an important role in the debate about the theories'of (5) Charles Darwin and their' application to society. Darwin’s theory of evolution did not directly apply to social ideology, but various intellectuals translated his ideas of natural selection into social language and argued about their interpretation. Some of these (10) Social Darwinist theorists held that the nature of human social interactions is strictly determined by the process of biological evolution, and that it is futile to try to meddle with the competitive struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest. Another, more (15) activist group of Social Darwinists held that although changes in human societies, like those that occur in biological species, do constitute a sort of evolution, this evolution at the level of a human society need not be competitive, but can emerge through collective (20) action within society.

Gilman identified herself with this latter ideological camp and applied evolutionary theory in the movement for social change. The central thesis of this group of Social Darwinists was that although (25) people, like all life, are the products of natural evolutionary forces, the principles of change that determine the development of organisms have brought humans to the point where it is possible for us to contribute consciously to the evolutionary process, to (30) redesign and mold our societies in appropriate ways. This, for Gilman, was not simply a descriptive observation about humanity but was also a source of ethical responsibility. She argued that since a prime source of social evolution is human work, whether in (35) crafts, trades, arts, or sciences, one of the primary ethical responsibilities of a person is to identify and engage in work that is societally relevant and that makes the best use of that person’s talents.

Gilman was not merely engaged in an intellectual (40) debate. Motivated by her ethical vision and convinced of the plasticity of human nature, Gilman vehemently sought to break the molds into which people, especially women, had been thrust. In both her fiction and her social theory she urges women to further social (45) evolution by collectively working toward a reorganization of society. A central goal of the reorganization she envisioned would be the abandonment of gender-specific work roles and hierarchical relationships. Gilman believed that at one time such (50) arrangements had been necessary for evolution because what she felt were male traits of assertiveness, combat, and display were essential for the development of a complex society. Future progress, she believed, now required the restoration of a balance that would (55) include what she saw as female qualities of cooperation and nurturance.

The novelist and social theorist Charlotte Perkins Gilman, whose writings were widely read and discussed in the early twentieth century, played an important role in the debate about the theories'of (5) Charles Darwin and their' application to society. Darwin’s theory of evolution did not directly apply to social ideology, but various intellectuals translated his ideas of natural selection into social language and argued about their interpretation. Some of these (10) Social Darwinist theorists held that the nature of human social interactions is strictly determined by the process of biological evolution, and that it is futile to try to meddle with the competitive struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest. Another, more (15) activist group of Social Darwinists held that although changes in human societies, like those that occur in biological species, do constitute a sort of evolution, this evolution at the level of a human society need not be competitive, but can emerge through collective (20) action within society.

Gilman identified herself with this latter ideological camp and applied evolutionary theory in the movement for social change. The central thesis of this group of Social Darwinists was that although (25) people, like all life, are the products of natural evolutionary forces, the principles of change that determine the development of organisms have brought humans to the point where it is possible for us to contribute consciously to the evolutionary process, to (30) redesign and mold our societies in appropriate ways. This, for Gilman, was not simply a descriptive observation about humanity but was also a source of ethical responsibility. She argued that since a prime source of social evolution is human work, whether in (35) crafts, trades, arts, or sciences, one of the primary ethical responsibilities of a person is to identify and engage in work that is societally relevant and that makes the best use of that person’s talents.

Gilman was not merely engaged in an intellectual (40) debate. Motivated by her ethical vision and convinced of the plasticity of human nature, Gilman vehemently sought to break the molds into which people, especially women, had been thrust. In both her fiction and her social theory she urges women to further social (45) evolution by collectively working toward a reorganization of society. A central goal of the reorganization she envisioned would be the abandonment of gender-specific work roles and hierarchical relationships. Gilman believed that at one time such (50) arrangements had been necessary for evolution because what she felt were male traits of assertiveness, combat, and display were essential for the development of a complex society. Future progress, she believed, now required the restoration of a balance that would (55) include what she saw as female qualities of cooperation and nurturance.